[1] Quine, W.V. & Ullian, J.S. (1978) The Web Of Belief. (2nd ed) New York. Random House. p 11.

[2] Even if that argument is not sound, and there are other ways to correctly justify a moral theory, this book can be viewed as an investigation of the epistemic justifiability of action-guiding theories.

[3] Works by such writers are mentioned in the References/Bibliography at the end of this book.

[4] In philosophy, ‘prescription’ means a statement telling you what you (allegedly) should do. Many philosophers use ‘normative’ instead of ‘prescriptive’. I prefer ‘prescriptive’ because ‘normative theories’ suggests that the values the theories advocate are ‘norms’, i.e., normal — and this is often not the case.

[5] A moral skeptic doubts whether any moral theory is true or close to truth. A moral nihilist is more than just doubtful. A nihilist is sure all moral theories are false.

[6] Various problems with the notions ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ are discussed below. It can be far from clear how much evidence is sufficient.

[7] This is because the book’s primary aim is to develop an epistemically justifiable theory applicable to all intended practices. So the theory must be sufficiently practicable for this. It must give us and be based on practicable knowledge.

[8] We can use Newton’s physics to land on the moon. From the viewpoint of the truer or more generally true Einsteinian physics, Newton’s physics are epistemically questionable. If the scale is the whole universe, or galaxies, Einstein’s physics is much more accurate. But on the comparatively small scale of the Earth-to-moon distance, Newton is about as accurate as Einstein. So, for purposes such as moon-landings, Newton’s physics is epistemically sufficiently practicable. And it’s easier.

                There are controversies concerning such issues. E.g., see Standford, Kyle B. “Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism”, J. Philosophy, vol C. 11. Nov 2003. pp 553-572, and that article’s references. However, various arguments below seem to plausibly resolve the controversies, at least regarding the book’s focus on practicable knowledge.

[9] This distinction relates to the ‘is-ought’ issue, discussed soon.

[10] Moral theories claiming this are criticised soon. One criticism here:- It is plausible that longest-term happiness could be maximised by having, for all future generations, e.g., only one racial type, the presently most numerous, say Chinese. This would avoid the great unhappiness involved in racial conflict. If true, is this evidence that all not of that race ought to be killed (painlessly) or not reproduce? Similarly regarding having only one religion etc.

[11] E.g., one theory claims that pleasure or happiness is what we ought to always only aim to achieve; other theories deny this, claiming instead, e.g., that being responsible, e.g., regarding child-raising and contributing to society, which often involve unpleasurable sacrifices, is most important.

[12] The discussion here is perhaps an over-simplification regarding knowledge in general, though not regarding morality compared with science. Analytic statements include ‘A black cat is black’ and ‘1+2=3’. They are reducible to ‘X is X’, which is circular. E.g., ‘A black cat is black’ is expressible as ‘A black thing is a black thing’, i.e., X is X; and ‘1+2=3’ is ‘1+1+1 is 1+1+1’, i.e., X is X. Some say we can have analytic knowledge, but there are some controversial issues here. The present point is merely and plausibly that we do not need to look outside of an analytic statement for evidence that it is true, i.e., ‘X is X’ just is true, formally — but this is no help in justifying any one morality among the many. ‘X is X’ is abstract, and formal. Morality concerns non-abstract content in that it refers to concrete things such as observable actions, one’s self-observable conscious intentions, and so on. Abstract, analytic statements are no help in investigating whether a moral theory’s content is (close to) the truth. This is because (1) ‘A green cat is green’ is in an analytic sense true, but this is separate from whether it is true there are green cats, in observable reality; and an equivalent separation applies to moral arguments; and (2) if an analytic statement, as in ‘X is X’, could justify non-abstract content, it could justify contradictory things. (This would be like the circular ‘X is right because X is right’, where X could be ‘murder’ or ‘not-murdering’, and so on.) The issue of using an abstract, formal statement in morality is discussed further later, when Kant is discussed.

[13] Dark reddish-purple is the next most useful colour, as in some Prunus trees.

[14] Part II argues that a type of fairness (and much else) can be indirectly epistemically justified. As a moral concept though, fairness is unjustifiable.

[15] The standard involves much more than simple observation. This is discussed further later.

[16] Some philosophers define ‘good’ and ‘right’ as meaning the same thing. Others define them as meaning different things. For the purposes of the present discussion, any of such definitions can apply.

[17] This raises the problem of induction, which is discussed later.

[18] We simply must make choices regarding such things as whether to kill ourselves or others, to act helpfully or unhelpfully, be selfish or unselfish, to care for children or not, or for this child more than that child, to lie or not, to eat meat or not, to smoke or not — and so on. Each such choice is a issue in the how-should-one-live sphere. Each such choice means implementing an associated theory, e.g., a theory advocating that we do not kill ourselves, or that we be helpful in certain situations. If, e.g., we at least implicitly prefer (choose) to be alive rather than not alive, we have an at least implicit theory here — the thought that life is more justifiable than death.

[19] Here I might seem to be holding a moral belief, namely that conflict, war, suffering and so on ought to be avoided. This possibly apparent inconsistency with the book’s anti-moral position is only apparent. Part II argues that there are other, non-moral, epistemically justifiable reasons for avoiding war and so on.

[20] There are complex problems here. A simplified answer is:- Young children are exempt from criticism here. If adults are aware or informed that and why their moral beliefs are questionable, and that they individually have an epistemically justifiable responsibility to investigate the epistemic justifiability of those beliefs and thereon-based acts, then they are fully responsible here. Education is crucial here. (Even young children can begin to understand such issues.)

[21] As Part II will make clear, here I am not beginning an argument allegedly justifying a rigid, authoritarian society. Quite the contrary. E.g., I’m seeking authority for total individual epistemic autonomy (freedom).

[22] I’m using ‘god’ as a non-sexist term, to mean a supernatural being which could have any or both or no gender(s).

[23] By ‘X is plausible’ I mean there is a significant possibility that X is correct. Here there seems to be insufficient evidence to epistemically justify X, but there is more apparently supporting evidence for X than against X, or about the same possibly-significant degree of apparently supporting evidence for X and for some alternative(s). E.g:- Imagine a new disease, the cause of which we have no idea. Going on all the evidence concerning all other known causes of diseases,  initially equally plausible hypotheses could include: bacteria, a virus and pollution. Implausible alleged causes include: witchcraft, demons and immorality.

[24] E.g., consider different views concerning the historical fact that Europeans were victorious over the indigenous populations of America. Agreeing on exactly the same fact or true ‘is’ here, some persons believe that the invasion and conquest ought to have occurred, but other persons believe the opposite. A person who has the moral belief that the European conquest of America ought to have occurred, does so ultimately because the person has a moral belief stating or implying that the European conquest of America ought to have occurred. (E.g., the foundation-belief that Europeans tended to be Christian and that Christians ought to rule non-Christians, or that the (allegedly) white (actually pinkish) races are superior and ought to rule the world, implies  that the  European conquest of America ought to have occurred.) A person who has the moral belief that the European conquest of America ought not to have occurred, does so ultimately because the person has a moral belief stating or implying that the European conquest of America ought not to have occurred.  Here there is obviously problematic circularity. This involves the same fact being interpreted via a moral belief. The fact does not imply any moral belief: there is no logical or epistemic connection between them. It is the person’s moral belief which causes the person’s moral interpretation of the fact. The fact does not cause a moral belief, or mean that the moral belief is also a fact, or true.

[25] Hume stressed that this gap exists, and then seems to argue that his theory fills it as far as possible.

[26] Some creatures, e.g., some fish and snakes, do normally kill and eat as many of their young as they can catch. Presumably there is a gene motivating this, or no gene motivating care of their young. Such young do tend to pass on their parents’ genes — simply because the genes give parents the ability to produce newborn which are so numerous, fast-moving and independent that most escape their parent’s jaws. The normal human desire to care for children was presumably naturally selected because newborn humans are very unlike those newborn.

[27] Part II suggests that something like this common core can be indirectly epistemically justifiable. It cannot and need not be justified by a moral theory.

[28] Divergible prescriptions are those a society can have which are very different from another society’s in the same area, and, all else  equal, that divergence will not affect the survivability of the society. E.g., in the area ‘dress codes’, suppose one society teaches that bare shoulders are immoral but bare knees are permissible, and another society teaches the opposite; and this divergence has no affect on the survivability of either society. The difference then, would not concern these societies’ common, survival-necessary morality. The distinction between a common core and divergible morals is only rough: it may be very difficult to correctly categorise some moral rules. But that does not matter for present purposes.

[29] The  event ‘moral beliefs exist’ is a fact, an ‘is’. A true explanation of that event is an ‘is’. The belief that we ought to have and act on moral beliefs is an ‘ought’. I’m arguing that there is an epistemic gap between that explanatory ‘is’ and that allegedly justified ‘ought’.

[30] An alternative explanation is that there is (are) some god(s) who egotistically put a god-worshipping part in our brain — so that we can worship the god(s). However, this and similar explanations lack objectivity: there is no evidence to epistemically justify any such explanation for us. And, if a specific god created that brain part, why create it so as to allow humans to worship innumerable other very different gods, and human charismatic leaders? There is ample evidence that natural selection occurs, and it seems highly plausible that evolutionary theory can explain brain events which bind a gene-protecting group together via beliefs they gullibly feel confidently comforted by.

[31] Instead of ‘Society of Ends’, many translators of Kant use ‘Kingdom of Ends’. I’ll use the former. Kant used the word ‘Reich’, which can mean many types of State or society. If he meant ‘Kingdom’, I think he would have always used ‘Koenigreich’, which specifically means ‘kingdom’. He did not. With this, Kant argued for a democratic society, with every individual having the maximum freedom consistent with every other individual having that freedom — not a king ruling over less free subjects.

[32] Hobbes, T. Leviathan. Ch XIII

[33] Kant’s theory often directly concerns ‘maxims’ rather than ends, but, as will be explained further below, each maxim implies an end. E.g., the maxims ‘Never lie’ and ‘Help others’ imply, respectively, achieving the ends ‘Lies are never told’ and ‘Others are helped’ or, at least, ‘I intended to help others’.

[34]  Regarding the problem of induction which arises here,  John Worrall makes amusing insightful comments. See Worrall, J (1989) “Why Popper and Watkins Fail to solve the problem of induction.”, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 117: 257-96. The problem is discussed further below, later.

[35] Calling this ‘war’ instead of ‘murder’ is a verbal delusion used to help make this moral belief acceptable.

[36] This change could occur via evolution, perhaps related to the fact that people now normally have an urban,  technological, mass-society environment, not the non-urban, technologically-primitive, small-tribe environment we evolved in. Or, Earth could be irradiated by something changing most people’s emotional neurophysiology or the common-morality gene(s) passed on to the next generation. So any universally accepted and universally applicable intersubjective theory, say Hume’s, could be replaced by a different intersubjectivity. This replaceability and contradictability would not apply with an objective or epistemically justifiable theory, as in science. (This is expanded on in Part II.)

[37] George Couvalis, Flinders University, South Australia, mentioned this point to me. Again, most ideas in Part I are not mine.

[38] Arguments such as this have been round since the ancient Greeks. Aristotle argued similarly, and I’ve used his ideas here as interpreted by John Hospers. (Hospers, J (1973) An Introduction To Philosophical Analysis. Routledge & Kegan Paul.)  Again, most points in Part I were made by other writers.

[39] Two positive (or negative) poles of a magnet do not attract each other. But here gravity still applies, though a magnet’s force can merely be stronger. Such issues are discussed further later.

[40] This example, and the just-mentioned one concerning murder, are mine (though Kant may use them in a minor text I’ve not read) . However, his theory implies them. The next examples, concerning selfishness generally and lying, are Kant’s.

[41] By ‘will’ here, Kant means something like ‘coherently or correctly imagine you’ve commanded’: you are the legislator of X in that you would cause X to be universally done if you could. This relates to the above point that, for Kant, a justifiable act is one which we can know (correctly imagine) is universally applicable, though it might not ever be universally applied (done). As suggested above, and will be explained further shortly, ‘will’ has nothing to do with being ‘willing’, i.e., being happy to do something. ‘Will’, in Kant’s most general categorical imperative, involves being able, without contradiction, to imagine something as universally applying, i.e., as a law. Kant rules out emotion, i.e., willingness and unwillingness, from laws.

[42] Problems regarding this definition are discussed soon.

[43] E.g., in Metaphysics of Morals AK (RPA) 6:224. (Gregor (1996) transl pp 16-17) (Gregor uses ‘AK’ to mean the Academy’s editions of Kant’s work, i.e.,  the Royal Prussian Academy’s editions, whereas I use ‘RPA’ for the same.)

[44] Because universal applicability and non-contradiction are inextricable regarding epistemically justifiable principles, as in scientific laws, the situation regarding morality or separate maxims shows that what  Kant calls ‘moral laws’ are not epistemically justifiable, and not laws.

[45] A farmer told me he saw this happen to one of his flocks of sheep.

[46] Groundwork RPApp 421-424 (‘RPAp’ means ‘Royal Prussian Academy page’)

[47] Rachels, James. (1999) The Elements Of Moral Philosophy. 3rd edition. McGraw-Hill. pp128-9.

[48] Some try to save Kant here by arguing that Kant’s basic principles are correct, but that he applies them to examples he should have avoided —  because examples such as that involving a would-be murderer are too problematic, and are argued to not fit with his correct, basic principles. (George Couvalis, Flinders University, South Australia, informally outlined to me this attempt to save Kant.) However, this attempt does not work. E.g:- A basic principle here, Kant says, is that there are only two types of law: negative (prohibitions, i.e., ‘Don’t do X’) and positive (commands, i.e., ‘Do Y’). An associated principle, Kant claims, is that a negative law applies regarding lying because a negative law is defined by its opposite being inconceivable. As argued in the previous chapter, ‘Always lie’ is inconceivable. So, according to Kant, the opposite of ‘Always lie’ is ‘Never lie’, and this is hence a negative law. Yet that associated principle is simply asserted. It seems ad hoc, lacking evidence. We cannot know it is correct or a fundamental truth. Why, e.g., are there not only positive laws, as in ‘Always be truthful’? Negatives can be stated as positives, and ‘Never be truthful’ is inconceivable. Even if that was not an epistemic problem, it is still the case that ‘Always lie’ is inconceivable, so Kant has applied his principle here correctly. But, plausibly, an opposite of ‘Always lie’ is ‘Don’t always lie’ — and ‘Don’t always lie’ can mean the partly negative, partly positive, ‘Don’t always lie, but do lie to achieve X’ or ‘Always be truthful, except to achieve X’. And  X can be many different, conflicting universalisable things, including ‘save innocents from murderers’ and ‘help murderers’. Kant’s UCI gives us no way to know what to do here. Other issues here are discussed later.

[49] E.g., in Mill, J.S. (1843) A System of Logic

[50] Kant tries to argue that ‘Don’t help others’ could not be a specific categorical imperative because no rational being would wish to not be helped when the being needed help (Groundwork, RPAp 423.); therefore a rational being would help others, which is universalisable. Kant says that ‘Don’t help others’ is universalisable, but that to obey this would contradict the (alleged) help-needing nature of a rational being. Hence, says Kant, this qualifies ‘Help others’ as a positive law, and, hence, an imperfect duty.  However, here Kant sneaks in  moral concepts he often insists must be ruled out. He sneaks in the notion that a human would wish to be helped when needed, and the notion that this (alleged) ‘is’ implies that the (alleged) wish ‘ought’ to be acted on. So here he has an is-ought problem. And elsewhere he rules out any specifics of human nature as a basis for morality. This includes human dependence on others, e.g., for food. A ‘rational being’ is not necessarily human, he points out. A rational being is simply something capable of reason, as in a computer, or a conceivable rational god or alien — each of which does or could lack human needs, dependence and wishes. E.g., an alien, once born, could conceivably be independent of others by photosynthesising its own food, and so on. Kant elsewhere also rules out what persons wish,  or would be willing to do, as a basis for morality. As argued above, Kant points out that if something is objectively right, it is irrelevant if we wish for or like it or not. The UCI only implies what is objectively right, insists Kant. Wishing to be helped sometimes is irrelevant here. Besides, even if a rational being as such, namely as in a computer, could wish, why would it wish to exist or survive? These issues are discussed further, later.

[51] Shortly, in another footnote, a problem regarding this prioritising is discussed.

[52] A specific definition of ‘innocent’ would be needed. I’ll ignore the problems here.

[53] This prioritising, this reversal of what Kant advocated, would also occur if one interpretation of  the criterion for what Kant calls ‘positive laws’ was given priority over the  criterion for what Kant calls ‘negative laws’. Here, consider a rational being which also has a (human?) nature which unavoidably wishes to help protect innocents, along with and via self-consistently wishing itself to be so protected. This being could not will the universalisation of a maxim such as ‘Never lie’ here, because doing so would contradict its nature (that wish). So, here, ‘Never lie’ would be overruled. As argued above (and below), there seems no epistemic justification for Kant giving one criterion or alleged type of law priority over another. Yet, if so, there would still be conflict in practice, over which to give priority, and whether the priority is absolute, or relative to different situations. Kant could still give no epistemic justification for one choice here rather than the other.

[54]  E.g., Kant says “[With a wide, i.e., imperfect, duty] the law ... leaves a playroom for free choice ..., the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do .... But a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions ... but only as permission to limit one ... duty by another (e.g., love of one’s neighbour in general by love of one’s parents).” Metaphysics of Morals AK (RPA) 6:390. Gregor (ed & transl) p 152 . Also:  “[One] ought to sacrifice a part of [one’s] welfare to others ... [but how] far [this sacrifice] should extend depends, in large part, on what each person’s true needs are in view of his sensibilities, and it must be left to each to decide this for himself ... [regarding] this duty[,which] ... is only a wide one.” (Here Kant recognises the area/maxim problem, but gives no clear solution.) In sum, Kant says we are not to perform an imperfect duty in every relevant situation, i.e., universally. E.g., even though it is universally the case that one could help someone else, Kant says one need not help others in every situation where they need help, because one is sometimes also obliged to fulfil one’s imperfect duty to do things just for oneself. And vice versa. We often cannot perform two such duties universally: they would conflict. Further here, it is highly problematic to know what “each person’s true needs are”. This is only resolvable via having a single, epistemically justifiable end, because  there are certain things which are true needs in relation to achieving such an end: everything which is justifiable except that end would be a means to that end. Otherwise, persons can conflict regarding what they believe are true (justifiable) needs. E.g., each of many conflicting religions tends to see belief in and support for itself, and disbelief in and opposition to other religions, as true needs. A ‘need’ is a need  for something, X, and a need for X is relative to the end, X, or to some further end because X helps achieve that end.  X is only a need from a perspective involving an end. Kant gives no epistemically justifiable end here (or anywhere). E.g., humans need food in order to survive, but Kant gives no coherent, epistemic justification for the survival of all, or any, humans.

[55] This point assumes that Kant says laws imply duties, i.e., that imperfect duties are not in an area separate from lawful acts. (Such separation would involve the just-mentioned area-problems.) However, the UCI says ‘Act only on a maxim you can will to be a universal law’, and Kant restates this as “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”. (My emphases.) (Groundwork, RPAp 402). So, there is no intended act not covered by a law. And Kant says we ought to do dutiful acts.  All justified acts then, are lawful, says Kant. Duties, which, as Kant says, are inherently justifiable acts, must be implied by a law, for Kant. Otherwise, Kant would not see duties as justifiable: they’d not be duties. Kant says duties are implied by laws. E.g., ‘Never lie’ implies a duty to never lie.

[56] Kant says the basis for distinguishing perfect from imperfect duties derives from the (alleged) fact  that negative laws imply perfect duties, and positive laws imply imperfect duties. Allegedly:- Perfect duties are those where we cannot conceive of a universalisable maxim which contradicts the duty. E.g., we cannot conceive of or correctly imagine universal lying. Imperfect duties, he says, are those where a maxim contradicting the duty can be conceived of as being universally done — but the nature of rational beings would be contradicted if the duty was not fulfilled. E.g., humans could universally obey ‘Be unhelpful to others’, but, Kant says, it is the nature of a rational being to sometimes need help — and any rational being would obey ‘Help others’ because the being would wish to be helped when the being needed it; and so on.
             I’ve discussed the problems here above, arguing that Kant’s basis for distinguishing between perfect and imperfect duties is too problematic. Besides, the present discussion relates them to universal applicability, which Kant stresses is the defining nature of all laws. Hence all duties, which Kant says are directly implied by laws, (as in the (alleged) law, ‘Never lie’, implying the duty, ‘Never lie’,) should be universally applied (obeyed). The discussion also fits with the UCI, which he says is the most general categorical imperative. This means the UCI’s criterion of universal applicability would apply to both perfect and imperfect duties. So both should be universally applicable, period.

                Further, Kant’s distinction between perfect duties and imperfect duties involves him giving priority to perfect duties. So, allegedly, in a potential conflict between a perfect and an imperfect duty, the perfect should be done. But this prioritising seems ad hoc, a mere assertion, without evidence. With this, any alleged negative law can be expressed positively, as in ‘Never lie’ being expressed as ‘Always be truthful’. This makes it a positive law, like ‘Be helpful’ or ‘Protect innocent lives’. So any priority given to a negative law and implied duty over a positive law and implied duty, i.e., the perfect over the imperfect, due to the alleged negativity, disappears.
             Also, if perfect and imperfect duties are implied by laws, namely morality’s equivalent to laws of nature, then to claim that one type of law and hence duty, e.g., an alleged negative type, has priority over another, is to contradict how laws of nature work. In nature, one law, say the law of friction, does not step aside and allow some other law(s) to have priority and be the only one(s) applicable. If nature’s laws worked thus, then, e.g., the law of friction,  which describes how brakes stop a car, would sometimes not apply. Then, via the laws of motion, cars would propel us unstoppably forward. In sum, according to a fundamental notion in Kant’s theory, a claim that one type of law has priority over and should/can replace another is merely a claim — without evidence. All the evidence there is suggests otherwise.

[57] Kant says we have a duty to perfect “any capacities whatever”. Gregor (transl & ed)  Metaphysics of Morals. p 154-5. AK 6:391-3. To get them all perfect seems a full-time (universally applicable) task.

[58] I’ll argue that, to the degree that human knowledge is incomplete, to that degree we’ll have unavoidable problems deciding a justified balance among actions in any (sub-)area. E.g., suppose ‘Eat only a balanced, healthy diet’ is justified. Present dietary knowledge and related health knowledge cannot tell each person the precise balance among proteins, carbohydrates, water, vitamins, fibre etc which they should eat at each meal. However, here we can have approximate knowledge, or get close enough to the truth, so that we have sufficiently practicable knowledge to normally keep people reasonably healthy. In many areas we can have such sufficiently practicable knowledge — and learn more.

[59] Groundwork RPAp 436. (‘RPAp’ means ‘Royal Prussian Academy page’)

[60] Kant’s rational beings as such could inherently only be motivated to achieve an end which is or is equivalent to a rational principle. Kant’s rational principle here is the UCI. This is insufficiently motivating for humans, so something equivalent but more motivating is needed, he suggests.

[61] Groundwork RPAp 427-430. Note that this law is expressed in a way which is both positive and negative. It can also be expressed as ‘Never treat persons merely as a means; always treat them (also) as an end.’. This positive-negative mix and reversibility is another example of  certain  problems discussed above (and in the Appendix), e.g., regarding Kant insisting there are only two types of laws, one positive, one negative.

[62] ‘Always treat persons as ends, never merely as a means’ would be just part of what the UCI implies, namely an imperfect duty, according to one interpretation of Kant’s criterion for a positive law and hence imperfect duty. If a rational being also has a nature which involves it not wishing to be treated merely as a means, this being could not will the opposite of that maxim because doing so would contradict its nature. Yet, if it is an imperfect duty, the ‘always’ and ‘never’ have to go, says Kant, because imperfect duties are flexible, not applying universally. So this would  be further problematic. And, if that imperfect duty is equivalent to the UCI, this would mean that either the UCI would have to stop applying universally, or this imperfect duty would have to apply universally and hence become a perfect duty.

[63] Groundwork RPAp 436.

[64] Groundwork RPAp 460-61

[65] Kant claims that humans have a unique emotion, a respect for rationality. See, e.g., Groundwork RPAp 400. Later, when dealing with a different issue, I’ll imply that this claim is correct, with qualifications.

[66] Groundwork, RPAp 428-9

[67] E.g., to always act on ‘Never lie’ is to achieve perfect truthfulness.

[68] Such characteristics tend to be aspects of common morality. So the present point can be seen as using a moral argument against Kant’s moral argument here. This implies that Kant’s argument is epistemically questionable in that an opposing argument, which is also from a moral standpoint, is more or less as plausible or appealing as Kant’s. This would be problematic. However, later I’ll argue that such characteristics can be advocated by an epistemically justifiable practical theory.

[69] E.g., Groundwork, RPAp 393-4 and 397-401.

[70] If ‘person’ is defined as a rational being as such, or only the rational aspect of a human, recent points show this would also be too problematic.

[71] In that we can know anything, including that oneself exists, we are rational and hence at least implicitly necessarily conceive of ourselves as rational. Yet this does not mean we also necessarily conceive of ourselves as ends-in-ourselves.

[72] Kant sees such statements as ‘merely empirical’, i.e., based on the observable. He contrasts the empirically objective with what he sees as the objective according to pure practical reason, which ignores the empirical. (‘1+2=3’ and the formal principle of non-contradiction, ‘Not both X and not-X’, are types of pure reasoning. So is the UCI.) Kant says that pure reason is what’s needed to discover the true or objective morality. He says empirical objectivity merely shows us what we do, but pure reason shows us what we should do (i.e., via the UCI). However, Kant’s claim that all rational beings necessarily conceive of themselves as ends-in-themselves is the claim that they do necessarily conceive of themselves as ends-in-themselves. So it is equivalent to an empirical claim. Besides, Kant suggests that self-observation is needed to show us what we do as purely rational beings; and self-observation is plausibly a type of empirical objectivity, because observation is the basis of empirical objectivity. Further, much of the above concerning Kant seems to show that pure practical reason, involving only the formal, as in the UCI, cannot unambiguously or epistemically justifiably show us what we should do. In sum, Kant’s concepts here seem confused.

[73] ‘Merely’ tends to have a negative connotation. ‘Only’ can avoid this.

[74] Groundwork, RPAp 423

[75] Kant defines an imperfect duty as the type of duty implied by a positive law, and he defines a law as a rule valid for all rational beings, not just for human beings. This means that notions such as ‘A human would wish to be helped, when needed’ are not part of Kant’s definition of an imperfect duty. Hence those concepts are sneaked in. Similarly:- He says that a positive law and hence imperfect duty are defined by the maxim opposite to the law being conceivable and universalisable, but that universalising the opposite maxim would contradict the nature of a rational being. Humans, with their dependence on help, do not fit the definition of rational beings as such. Besides, again, Kant’s definition of a positive law, with its implied alleged imperfect duty, as opposed to negative laws and implied perfect duties, seems ad hoc. Why shouldn’t all laws be of the same type? Kant stresses that moral laws are morality’s equivalent to nature’s laws, but there do not seem to be both positive and negative laws of nature, defined in a way equivalent to how Kant defines (alleged) positive and negative moral laws and associated duties.

[76] E.g., Groundwork, RPAp 425

[77] This was discussed in a previous footnote in this chapter. Humans who are unconscious do not have a rational aspect while unconscious.

[78] The only type of moral theory escaping this problem is one which states all persons ought to die, e.g., leaving non-human life-forms to run the planet better.

[79] Positively, freedom means freedom to do something. Negatively, freedom means freedom from something. In practice, the negative and positive go together, like two sides of a coin. E.g., suppose, when Fred turns 18, he becomes free from the legal restrictions on drinking alcohol when under 18. This means Fred is now free to legally drink alcohol.

[80] Groundwork RPAp 446-7

[81] Such points are made by Thomas Nagel, Cohen and others. See, e.g., Cohen, G.A. (1996) “Reason, Humanity And The Moral Law” in Korsgaard, C (1996) The Sources Of Normativity. Cambridge University Press  (Paperback edition.) 167-188 and Nagel, T (1996) “Universality And The Reflective Self” in the same book, pp 200-209

[82] Groundwork RPAp 447

[83] In a discussion in the Kant Reading Group, Adelaide University,  2003.

[84] See, e.g., work by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. Works by them and other modern Kantians or neo-Kantians are in the References.

[85] A specific scientific practice aims at discovering truths about something, e.g., about fruit-growing or bomb-making. The specific end of a commercial or political director of the research here is, say, truths regarding how to grow more fruit or kill more people. Yet in that the science as such here is inherently aiming to be epistemically justifiable as such, science’s end or aim is knowledge, as opposed to the ends of different commercial, political etc directors of scientific research. Truth or knowledge as such is the universal, general end at which all scientific enterprises inherently aim. If we abstract from all the specific contents of each confirmed scientific theory, namely truths regarding fruits, bombs, planets, diseases and so on, we are left with the notion, ‘truth as such’. (Note that this is rather different from Kant’s claim, discussed in Part I, that if we abstract from the contents of all scientific laws, we are only left with the form ‘universal applicability, and, with this, non-contradiction’. I’ll argue that the former abstracting includes but goes significantly beyond Kant’s, taking us to an epistemically justifiable practical theory.)     

[86] Here lies one of the recently-mentioned problems regarding the specifics of this very abstract discussion: specifically which truths should one aim at or practise? Again, this problem is dealt with soon, when the context for doing so has been better developed.

[87] This is obvious to us, but not to all through history. Bertrand Russell tells a story something like the following:- A priest, centuries ago, was asked to observe the number of planets visible through a recent invention, a telescope. He refused, stating there is no need to observe in order to discover the truth, because the Bible says there are seven (a holy or special number, according to the Bible). The telescope could show there were at least eight.

[88] A reminder: ‘UCI’ is short for the ‘universalisability version of Kant’s alleged categorical imperative’, namely ‘Act only on a maxim you can at the same time will to be a universal law’.

[89] Namely the UCI’s interrelated notions of non-contradiction and universal applicability of laws as in science. Part I shows that Kant’s allegedly equivalent more specific versions of the UCI are not a significant increase in helpfulness here.

[90] A reminder of an example or analogy from Part I, from within science:- Centuries ago, the view that Earth orbited the sun was somewhat epistemically justifiable in that observation was used as apparent evidence: observation, as opposed to not observing, has at least the potential to provide the sufficient evidence needed for epistemic justification here. Yet that view was too narrow. It was not fully epistemically justifiable in that the needed overall view was missing. With this, the observation that the sun appears to orbit Earth contradicted the truth, the epistemically justifiable, because the observation was made from a viewpoint on what was falsely believed (not observed) to be a stationary Earth. The overall view involves observing that Earth is not stationary, and hence that the narrow view is not as epistemically justifiable as possible and contradicts the overall, sufficient evidence. Only the overall view can know that the narrow view needs to be ruled out; not vice versa.

[91] E.g., in a court case, one witness can contradict another; but if they agree, their testimonies are in harmony.

[92] In a contradictory relationship between two things, one negates or has a negative relationship with the other. Regarding statements, one says the other is not the case. Regarding events, one causes the other to stop or not happen.
             It is not anti-truth truths (statements) as such which contradict pro-truth truths (statements). (As argued further below, no practicable truths or true statements contradict each other.) It is the learning or practising of one type of knowledge which can causally contradict someone’s ability, motivation or opportunity to learn or practise another type. E.g., if Vince practices his knowledge of how to kill on Harriet, who is his pro-truth teacher, this murder contradicts (negates) Harriet’s ability to practise her pro-truth educating. He has caused her to stop being pro-truth. It is Vince’s practising of ‘truths about how to kill’ which made the truths or knowledge anti-truth here. We can use the same truths to know how to not kill pro-truth persons. Here those truths would be pro-truth. A crucial pro-truth truth is that, to be optimally pro-truth, we need to learn and practise only pro-truth truths. The general issues here are discussed further soon.

[93] The previous footnote shows that, instead of the term ‘pro-truth truth’, it would be more accurate to use ‘potentially pro-truth truth’. The next paragraph in the main body makes this explicit. However, the notion, ‘potentially’, will normally remain implicit below, as it is obvious and terms such as ‘potentially pro-(or anti- or a-)truth truth’ are long and clumsy. If a person learns something which is for them a pro-truth truth, this means it is not just a potential pro-truth truth for them. It means they actually put it into practice to achieve something pro-truth.

[94] Decades ago, in a book the name and author of which I’ve forgotten, it was explained that the notions ‘motivation, ability and opportunity’ cover everything needed for a human to achieve something. The explanation was something like this:- Bill is at a pool, and is motivated to swim, but cannot now do so because he has no ability to swim. Meredith, a good swimmer, is at the pool but is not motivated to swim now, so she doesn’t. Fiona, a good swimmer, would love a swim now, but cannot because she has no opportunity — due to being kilometres from any water. So, the event, ‘swimming now’, is not achieved by any of the three.

[95] This refers to beings on Earth. There may be aliens who are better.

[96] Intentionally curing diseases in pro-truth persons is obviously pro-truth. The medical knowledge here is pro-truth because it is directly intended to be used in a pro-truth way. Bottle-top knowledge is not. However, we could imagine highly unlikely situations where bottle-top knowledge is, by chance only, directed in a pro-truth way. Suppose Erica can win a million dollars if she has expert knowledge in a trivia quiz, and the topic just happens to be bottle-top decorations. Suppose Erica happens to be a bottle-top expert, and will give any winnings to research into a disease she has and wants cured. The resulting medical knowledge will, unknown to Erica, also cure diseases in pro-truth persons. Her bottle-top knowledge would here be unintentionally pro-truth, but not for her. It would only be pro-truth knowledge for thereby-cured pro-truth persons and their curers. In the rest of the discussion I’ll ignore such possible coincidences.

[97] An abstract notion can cover contradictory specifics, as explained recently regarding ‘freedom’. Here, ‘general’ means a notion covering non-conflicting specifics. This will become clearer below.

[98] Any such certain quantity and/or quality might be a certain range, rather than a single, precise amount. E.g., it would be anti-truth to say that the optimal pro-truth age of persons is precisely, say, 32 years old. It is pro-truth to realise that humans need a population with a range of ages, to be optimally pro-truth. E.g., in order for anyone to get to be 32, they need to have been younger, and been cared for by older persons. Regarding intellectual achievement, in maths the optimal age seems young, perhaps around 20-25, but in much broader or multi-disciplinary areas, e.g., philosophy, the average age of greatest achievement is quite old. To acquire wisdom takes a long time, a large range of years. And so on, e.g., regarding diet, any amount of X between, say, 30 and 50 units, could be as pro-truth as any other amount in that range, in some situations.

[99] A word such as ‘can’ is used in such sentences because sometimes there is situational relativity. This is discussed often later. For now, a brief example:- Age can be a-truth, but suppose that Sally is 20 years old and Jim is 60, and both have a fatal but curable disease which will kill within a month, unless treated. Due to limited medical resources, only one can be cured. Suppose, as far as we can tell, that both have equal ability to discover and practise the same quantity and quality of pro-truth truth, each future year. Yet Sally probably has about 60 future years, and Jim only 15. Here, if ‘one’s age’ means ‘probably Y years before one’s death’, then age is not a-truth. It would be pro-truth to discriminate in favour of Sally, and give her the only cure. If Jim was truly pro-truth, he would impartially accept this.

                It is important to note that pro-truth situational relativity only means that, in different situations, different means may be optimal regarding achieving the single ultimate, primary end. That is, the end does not change. There is no relativity regarding the end. Only the means to that end change. As an analogy, suppose we always aim at the single end, ‘Feeling comfortably warm’. In freezing weather the best means to that end might be wearing three layers of clothing; in a moderately cold situation two layers may be best; on a very warm day nakedness may be the best means to achieve that end.

[100] Such points are expanded on later. This discussion is only preliminary.

[101] Even one of Kant’s purely rational beings must have some aspects other than rationality. As a perfectly rational being could not have any anti-rational aspects, those aspects must be a-rational. A computer has to have some colour, shape and so on, and if such aspects don’t affect the computer’s ability to be rational, they are a-rational. This argument can be applied to any perfectly pro-truth, non-human being.

[102] A duty is something one ought to do, regardless of whether one feels like doing it. A permitted act is merely an act one may do if, e.g., one feels like it. It is not something one ought to do.

[103] Again, this is a simplified example. Qualifications may be needed. E.g., suppose that, somehow, all of one sex turned homosexual and would not help with reproduction. As humanity would die out, the potentially most pro-truth species on Earth would no longer be able to do any pro-truth things. Here, sexuality would be anti-truth, not a-truth. Or, suppose all of one sex died, and so could not help reproduce. It would be anti-truth to have just one gender. In that sense, gender would not be a-truth. This case of  situational relativity is discussed further, e.g., in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 5.

[104] Here, again, there is situational relativity. E.g., suppose there is one nation, N1, far more pro-truth than another, N2, and able to influence N2 to become more pro-truth, though N1 needs more resources than N2 if that change is to occur. Temporarily, here it is justified for N1 to have more resources than N2. When N2 changes, a pro-truth equitable sharing is just(ified). What is epistemically justifiably fair or just changes relative to whether this or that situation is the more pro-truth.

[105] This book concerns epistemically justifiable practices, i.e., the practicable. With this, as mentioned in Part I, practicable knowledge or practicable truth is the focus. There are areas where what is said by some experts to be knowledge concerns the apparently impracticable. E.g., quantum mechanics and black holes seem at least somewhat problematic here. And, as process physics suggests, an underlying randomness may have been involved in producing that which is practicable for us. But, because this book concerns practicable knowledge, any such for-us-impracticable randomness does not matter. And, practicable knowledge needs to be distinguished from purely theoretical issues underlying events of which we have practicable knowledge.  Hilary Putnam discusses how there can be apparently equally meaningful but conflicting views concerning the fundamental or metaphysical nature of matter. (E.g., see Putnam, H (1993) “Objectivity And The Science-Ethics Distinction” in The Quality Of Life, edited by Nussbaum, M and Sen, A. Oxford. Clarendon Press.) E.g., is a rock fundamentally solid, or non-solid (space with occasional sub-atomic particles, or events), i.e., molecules? It is impracticable for us to understand enough to know that, of such views, view V1 is the fundamental truth and V2 is not, or that both are (the?) fundamental truth(s). However, regardless of whether something, e.g., a rock, has this or that ultimate or metaphysical nature, we can still reliably make walls with certain rocks, via in-practice viewing rocks as solid, big (enough), enduring objects; and we can still reliably make medically-useful things with the same rocks, via in-practice viewing them as non-solid, i.e., consisting mostly of empty space interspersed with tiny objects, i.e., sub-atomic particles, some of which involve medically-useful, non-enduring radio-active isotopes. And so on. In sum, regarding practicable knowledge, we can forget about any such metaphysical or fundamental purely-theoretical issues. And so on, regarding everything in our practicable universe. (For us, as argued below, there is only one practicable universe — though there might be impracticable multiverses.) Due to the focus of this book, and its intended main audience, the issues mentioned in this footnote are only discussed occasionally.

[106] Knowledge is of course inherently epistemically justified. Part I’s discussion of this, and the present discussions, show that there cannot be directly epistemically un-justifiable knowledge.

[107] There may be a better candidate. If so, it will be an even better solution regarding a justifiable guide to how one should live. Hence I would welcome it.

[108] A reminder: ‘UCI’ is short for the ‘universalisability version of Kant’s alleged categorical imperative’, namely ‘Act only on a maxim you can at the same time will to be a universal law’.

[109] Quine, W.V. & Ullian, J.S. (1978) The Web Of Belief. (2nd ed) New York. Random House

[110] See Whewell, W (1968) William Whewell’s Theory of Scientific Method, Butts, R (ed). Pittsburgh. University of Pittsburgh Press. Suzi Roux’s (Flinders University, South Australia) work on Whewell helped me realise how well some of Whewell’s ideas fit with pro-truth theory.  (‘Consilience’ may seem misspelt. Whewell made up new words.)

[111] The term ‘universally’ makes the term ‘as-a-whole’ redundant in some contexts. I only include it here to emphasise that the discussion takes an overall view of practicable truth. This holistic view is required by epistemic rationality for various reasons. One is that anything less than an overall view of an issue can miss something relevant to our arriving at the truth. E.g., if we only look at the sun apparently moving round us on an apparently still Earth, we can easily falsely believe the sun orbits Earth.

[112] See, e.g., Feyerabend, P (1988) "Against Method" 2nd ed. London. Verso.

[113] Such authors’ works are mentioned in the References.

[114] It is impracticable here to do anything more epistemically justifiable than this, namely via us knowing ultimate truths concerning nature independently of our present knowledge of nature as acquired via the present state of science. Similarly, it is impracticable for us to now have the hindsight concerning present science which might show us that present science has unknown-of errors. We cannot simultaneously be both in the present and the future, to know now what we do not know now. So, in that the impracticable is epistemically unjustifiable, it is unjustifiable to make certain criticisms of science which could be suggested by, e.g., B. Kyle Standford’s “Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism”, J. Philosophy, vol C. 11. Nov 2003. pp 553-572. The ‘pessimistic induction’ discussed there could suggest the criticism that, because various past theories were faulty, modern theories are (or are likely to be) faulty. (Many very old theories, e.g., concerning levers, were not faulty in that they are still precisely practicable. Does induction from such successes suggest that other, modern theories are not (likely to be) faulty? And, to consistently practise completely pessimistic induction, one would not rely on food for sustenance, on air for breathing, on computers or pens for writing about pessimistic induction, and so on. One would do nothing practicable, i.e., nothing. One would be dead or unconscious.) That main point concerning pessimistic induction can be adapted to apply to a criticism stating that present theories claiming to be realist are or could be like various past theories which did not fully understand or properly refer to the real specific fundamental or ontological nature of the basics of nature. If a theory is sufficiently practicable, such criticisms miss their mark regarding a book concerned with the practicable. E.g., Lavoisier’s theory that heat is caused by a subtle caloric fluid has been replaced by a highly practicable theory stating that increasing the degree of molecular motion causes correspondingly increased degrees of heat. There may be something more real or fundamental, underlying such practicable notions as ‘increasing molecular motion’. But this is a purely theoretical or metaphysical issue compared to the issue of practicability. We need not concern ourselves with such issues for the practical purpose of increasing heat. As far as practicable knowledge is concerned, the increasing molecular motion theory refers to a sufficiently real cause of increasing heat. We can cause a fire by rubbing certain sticks together.

[115] All who successfully implement their intentions use at least simple science. E.g., to talk, or read this book, we use laws of physiology, psychology and physics; to open a book or a hinged door or chew food we use the simple scientific principle of leverage; to walk we use scientific principles of physics, e.g., concerning balance and centre of gravity. We can do nothing intentionally without using scientific principles. (Skeptics of science do such things and are hence self-contradictory.)

[116] As will become clear, such standards are specific standards coming under the one, fundamental, general standard.

[117] Chalmers, Alan F (1982) What Is This Thing Called Science? University of Queensland Press. p127

[118] Similarly, ideas or observational standards in anthropology can be applied to genetics, and vice versa, giving us new knowledge. E.g:- Geneticists were investigating why a particular nerve disease spread much faster in one native tribe than anywhere else. Normally, only women got the disease. So some geneticists thought a sex-linked geographically-isolated gene played an important role. By only applying the ideas of genetics as it was at that stage, this theory seemed plausible. It was wrong, because this was an insufficiently overall theory. Later, anthropology applied its ideas to the issue, giving the right answer, giving us a wider and more accurate science. Anthropologists observed that the custom in this tribe was to eat dead relatives. It was observed that women normally ate the brains, the best way to get the nerve disease.

[119] As will become clear, I’m not saying that supporting scientists is the only justifiable, ultimate, pro-truth aim for all persons. Far from it.

[120] He can be interpreted as showing that harmony is the case here. His notion of ‘consilience’ is very similar. I use his work because he seems to deserve more recognition. See Whewell, W (1968) William Whewell’s Theory of Scientific Method, Butts, R (ed). Pittsburgh. University of Pittsburgh Press; and Whewell’s Inductive Table of Astronomy in William Whewell (1840), Philosophy Of The Inductive Sciences

[121] E.g., with gravity, the fundamental effect (according to Newton) is attraction proportional to the masses of the bodies concerned and, inversely, to the square of the distance between them. This explains the above stones dropping, tides rising, and so on, along with other explanatory notions, e.g., for orbiting planets, the laws of motion and inertia.

[122] See, e.g., Fodor, J (1983) The Modularity of Mind Cambridge Massachusetts. MIT Press.

[123] A reminder: U H/I E/T is short for ‘universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’.

[124] That is, such harmony exists as far as it is practicable for us to know. And this book focuses on the practicable. Problems such as the first cause and  induction involve issues it is not practicable to solve or understand. It is not practicable to understand the first cause of the universe, or whether there was a first cause. Some aspect of any first cause might not harmonise with the thereby-caused practicable harmony over time we observe. And the laws of physics may have been quite different long before it became practicable for us to exist and  begin to grasp them and observe harmony over time; or there may have been no or fewer laws. (The next paragraph in this footnote can be applied to those possibilities.) Regarding induction since such distant possibilities/times, the only evidence we have that the future will be like the past is evidence concerning the past, not the future. It is impracticable to precisely know the future, for all time (or whether time will continue, or what the thing we experience as ‘time’ fundamentally is, apart from that experience).

                Yet, as far as it is practicable for us to know, i.e., judging on what is for us practicable past evidence, universal harmonious operation of the laws of nature across time will continue to be the case. Regarding any law universally ceasing to apply, the U H in U H/I E/T will be the case for us until that happens, namely as long as we exist:- Here, we humans could only ever find evidence for that continuing harmony because, if just one of the fundamental laws universally ceased to operate as it has done during human existence, we would quickly cease to exist. That is, each force described by a fundamental law is crucial in maintaining our existence. E.g., if the laws describing the forces holding molecules together ceased to be laws, our bodies would cease to exist. Similarly, our planet would cease to exist if any of the other fundamental forces of nature, e.g., gravity, ceased to lawfully operate. So we could never (be alive to) find evidence against the harmonious nature of the laws involved in it being practicable for us to reliably do things, including staying alive. In that sense, for us, there is no problem of induction. It is a purely theoretical problem, not an issue concerning what is for us practicable truth. (Another possible end to U H here would be via laws erratically changing, e.g., applying only in some places at some times, unpredictably. Here some of us could keep living, until in the wrong place at the wrong time. Till then there would be a problem of induction regarding what is practicable  for us.)

[125] Unlike with Kant’s insoluble area/maxim borderline problem, there are clear borders here. E.g., colour’s irrelevance regarding gravity shows that the colour area is quite separate from the gravity area. This chapter increasingly shows that the epistemic standard, U H/I E/T, lacks the major problems Kant’s standard has, and which moral standards or concepts have.

[126] The probable or approximate nature of some events, allegedly involving probabilistic or approximate laws, is explainable via recent points concerning opposition and co-operation. E.g., suppose a bacterial disease affects about sixty percent of persons in each situation of a certain type. This is not because a single medical law only applies approximately sixty percent rather than universally, namely one hundred percent. It is because, say, about forty percent of people are immune to the bacteria. Their immune systems successfully oppose the bacteria, just like one’s leg muscles can successfully oppose the force (not the law) of gravity which in the absence of leg-muscles would cause us to collapse downwards. Similarly for probabilities in coin-tossing and so on. (The general explanatory notion here may also help explain at least some of any apparently impracticable issues.)

[127] E.g., the chemical and physical forces involved in the event, ‘Our experiencing colour on a basketball’, are irrelevant here regarding the force of gravity operating on the ball.

[128] Thinking is a human activity, something we do. In that sense it too is a practice. Still, there are obviously important differences between thinking and a publicly observable practice.

[129] Socrates said an unexamined life is not worth living. This applies here, and can be re-interpreted as: ‘An unexamined or too-narrow view of epistemic justifiability means a life which is not epistemically justifiable.’

[130] It is also the (narrowly-applicable)  standard regarding anti-truth and a-truth truths as such, but that is beside the point here. Regarding learning and practising anti-truth truths:- There is no truth stating anything like ‘Learning and/or practising anti-truth truths is epistemically justifiable because doing so increases or maintains (the existence of) knowledge’, because any such statement is untrue. As explained before, the truth here is that learning and/or practising anti-truth truths is epistemically unjustifiable in that it negates (the existence of) knowledge. So U H/I E/T is not the standard involved in any such statement, or in such learning and practising.

[131] It can be a-truth to learn and practise certain truths. This is justifiably permitted, as opposed to being epistemically justifiable or a duty. The general issue here is discussed later.

[132] I’ve been to such a hill, in the state of Victoria (I think), Australia.

[133] As with the elephant parable, and seeing a stick apparently bent by water being known, via an overall view, to be an observation of refraction.

[134] That is, as far as it is practicable to know, i.e., judging on past evidence. And, again, this book’s theory concerns the practicable, not the impracticable. Besides, as suggested by a footnote above, it would probably be the case that we could only ever find evidence supporting the law of gravity because, if gravity stopped operating, perhaps along with other laws of nature, this would stop the force that now holds us on Earth, and is crucial regarding holding Earth together, and in orbit round the sun — and stop a force crucial in holding our bodies together. If the laws cease to operate, we would quickly cease to exist. So, we could only ever find evidence supporting the laws of nature, because without those laws there’d be no ‘we’.

[135] E.g., as suggested by the footnote in Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3, discussing possible multiverses.

[136] See the References.

[137] Recent footnotes concerning induction suggest this.

[138] E.g., in Critique Of Practical Reason Great, Books Of The Western World, p 329, he says we need to “be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty of reason (theoretical as well as practical) and ... derive all from one principle, which ... reason inevitably demands, ... [achieving] a perfectly systematic unity.”

[139] He suggests our perception might pre-consciously filter out anything which would mean there is not a systematic practicable unity (as in U H/I E/T). If so, the filtered-out things, which would contradict U H/I E/T, are inaccessible to us, and hence meaningless. It would be impossible for us to know of them. And so it would be impossible or impracticable for us to know of contradictions within practicable knowledge as a whole.

[140] As mentioned in Part I, later I’ll argue that we can epistemically justify many of the prescriptions advocated by moral theories. ‘Never murder persons’ is one.

[141] In a sense, that preface relates to something trivial, namely the fact that ‘It is true that X’ can involve an X which is either true or false or untestable. So here the ‘It is true’ tells us nothing important, namely about what actually is true. E.g., Tamara might mistakenly believe it is Sunday. Pro-truth theory recognises this issue, because it inherently recognises it is important to actually have the (pro-truth) truth, not false or untestable beliefs. However, in another sense, that prefacing is important regarding a point supplementing the above justification.  This point shows that we are all unavoidably, necessarily, at least implicitly presuppositionally (or prefacingly) pro-truth, and that, hence, in a sense being pro-truth is an absolute for us, as discussed further soon. It is important that in all our serious statements we intend to state the truth, and are hence pro-truth. Still, that point is not crucial regarding justifying an epistemically justifiable theory. An epistemically justifiable standard, and theory based thereon, is inherently epistemically justified. Previous sections’ justificatory arguments here are sufficient.

[142] Here, ‘truth’ of course means ‘that which I believe (with no epistemic justification) to be the truth’

[143] If there is no truth, nothing can be pro- the truth.

[144] ‘Possible’ here refers to knowledge and any methods we might not yet possess, but which we could eventually acquire. People once lacked modern statistical epistemic methods, but had the capacity to learn them.

[145] More precisely:- Within our mental universe we can externally epistemically justifiably assess things, via a high level of thought using an epistemic standard to reflect on and assess a thought at a lower level. E.g., Jack can use the arithmetic standard ‘1=1’ or ‘X is X’ to assess whether his sum, ‘30+60=90’, is correct, as explained in Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3. Via being at a different, higher, assessing level within Jack’s mind, his reflective level is external to the lower, assessed level. Via a similar process:- Within our possible mental universe we can use our methods of assessing epistemic justifiability, e.g., to discover that Newton’s physics is only reliable in certain areas  Within our possible mental universe we can also improve those methods, e.g., due to reflecting on Newton’s physics and finding that Newton is unreliable in some areas, we can be prompted to develop more refined observations and maths, to give us a more reliable or more overall accurate physics theory than Newton’s. We have done this. So our epistemic mental universe can grow, up to whatever is the possible (achievable) limit. Yet we cannot get outside of that possible maximum or any present epistemic mental universe to assess it from outside (or do this via being at a higher level of thought than our highest level). To do this would mean we have one brain or mind outside our entire brain or mind. This is equivalent to being outside of a room you are simultaneously entirely within.

[146] This relates to George Berkeley’s insight that the only evidence we have for the world outside our senses is what we experience inside our mind via our senses. All is internal to one’s mind. Ultimately one can never have external evidence that one’s senses or mental experiences are not illusions, and that there is a world outside what we think is sensory experience of an outside world. But, as indicated by arguments in this book, we can know there is no epistemic point in us  worrying about such possibilities. As far as we can know, we can have what is for us practicable knowledge. It is impracticable to know whether everything is a delusion or illusion.
             A version of something like Goedel’s theorem(s) might also apply here. The fundamental notions underlying what is for us practicable epistemic justifiability are just there, unable to be externally or independently proven, or prove themselves. This is like gravity seeming to be just there, fundamentally, a beginning point which can explain why many other things exist or happen, e.g., tides, but its own existence cannot be explained. Still, for us, as far as we can know, gravity is practicable — we use it, e.g., to stay on Earth.

[147] Quine, W.V. & Ullian, J.S. (1978) The Web Of Belief. (2nd ed) New York. Random House. P 11.

[148] If each plausible ‘is’ does imply an ‘ought’, this allows contradictory ‘oughts’ to be justified because there are conflicting plausible views concerning what ‘is’. E.g., it is the case that human nature, via evolution, tends to involve both competitiveness and co-operation. To live via the many conflicting alleged implications here would be too epistemically problematic, as argued above. This also applies to the other possibility regarding the is-ought issue, namely that people can correctly agree about what ‘is’, but conflict over which ‘ought’ this ‘is’ implies.

[149] More precisely, it is an absolute for any conscious human. It is not an absolute for us to be conscious. We can choose to be unconscious or dead.

[150] And this is a possible problem. E.g., in future, someone may discover true moral law(s) or something which disproves the main ideas of this book.

[151] E.g., Groundwork RPAp 451 and 452

[152] Theorists such as David Hume often see reason or rationality as, e.g., “the slave of the passions”. Here reason is said to exist only to achieve emotionally-valued ends, e.g., wealth or sex. Yet, in seeking the standard  underlying knowledge or truth in general, I am discussing the epistemically justifiable as such, and hence (epistemic) rationality as such. Rationality as such has no purpose other than to be rational, i.e., seek truth. What a passion or person does with a truth discovered by reason is not an issue here. Any such truth is still a truth, a part of truth-as-a-whole, involving that standard. And that is the issue here.

[153] The issue here depends on how ‘rationality’ is defined. In Part I it was defined as involving an overall view which considers all the available evidence. There are problems here. E.g., we might not know when we have a sufficiently overall view, or what evidence there might be apart from that we know of. A simplified example:- If it is true that the only available evidence to most Medieval persons regarding the Earth’s shape was the apparent perception that they were on more or less flat ground, then, by one definition of ‘rational’, they were rational or epistemically justified if they believed the planet is flat. (But, as points above suggest, there was more available evidence — if they took a more careful, more overall view. E.g., Earth’s shadow on the moon during an eclipse showed that Earth was round.) (It can be rational or epistemically justifiable to suspend judgement until further evidence is available or noticed.)

[154] Such comments could seem to suggest that I developed pro-truth theory out of Kant’s theory. The theory could be developed from Kant’s. However, the basics were developed via studying history, long before I studied philosophy or knew of Kant. Similarly, much of this book involves science, but the theory originally primarily involved history, not science. Science is focused on here because, e.g., it is more obviously an exemplary epistemic enterprise, and is more widely seen as such.

[155] Here I’m referring to a type of democracy suited to making pro-truth decisions. There is another type, discussed later, appropriate for when there is a need to decide among persons’ different a-truth preferences.

[156] Points above imply a distinction between notions such as ‘optimal’ and ‘maximum’, and between ‘effort’ and ‘dedication’. E.g:- A person who starts off putting maximum effort every day into studying, digging or singing, is likely to soon exhaust or damage their concentration, muscles or vocal chords. This means they are likely to achieve less in the long-term than if they put in less effort and, instead , dedicated themselves moreso to rest and other activities, to optimally re-create their personal resources. The epistemically justifiable view is an overall view, namely one which takes the longest-term view. This overall view (knowledge) also sees that this footnote so far concerns a balance among practices, in relation to only a fraction (e.g., just digging) of what a person justifiably needs to do overall. Regarding such fractions or parts, the term ‘optimal (dedication)’ is appropriate. But regarding the practices or resources overall, or in one’s life as a whole, the term ‘maximum’ is appropriate in that, e.g., one has a justifiable duty to make the most of the available resources (in a balanced way), doing nothing else than being optimally pro-truth. (Those resources include needed rest, recreation and so on, which can involve a-truth preferences.) Nothing else is justifiable. It is only justifiable to put the maximum possible dedication into being optimally justifiable in the maximum possible areas. The U H in U H/I E/T implies this.

[157] A simple example:- Suppose Zoe knows Bill has always been kind to dogs, but she sees him apparently forcing a metal object down a dog’s throat, with the dog apparently thereby choking to death. Zoe could state, “Bill, you cruel swine, stop killing that dog. I’m going to kill you”, and then kill Bill. It would be more rational, more epistemically justifiable, to wait a few seconds and ask ,“Bill, what are you doing?”. Bill would then state the truth: “The poor dog is choking on a bone stuck in its throat. I’m breaking and removing the bone with these pliers.”

[158] However, I think that all such beliefs’ contents should be kept alive (though not believed), in that it seems overall pro-truth to show each generation that such beliefs are unjustifiable. My reasons for this are similar to those J.S. Mill suggests in On Liberty. E.g., it can be important (i) to “know thine (potential) enemy”, so as to be informed regarding how to defeat the possible future anti-truth enemy, and (ii) to not allow pro-truth knowledge to become merely unexamined, undefended beliefs, i.e., dogma or faith.

[159] E.g., the frontal cerebral (cognitive) cortex is linked with the limbic (emotional) system.

[160] A thing, e.g., an emotion, felt to be of intrinsic value is valued purely for its own sake. The intrinsically valuable is an end, or ultimate aim, not something valued merely as a means to some other end. Something which is a means to an end has only extrinsic value. E.g., Jenny, a boxer, may purposely get herself moderately angry before each fight, as a means to fight more determinedly and be more likely to win. After a win, she naturally feels elated and powerful, and finds these two emotions intrinsically valuable. For her, the anger is merely of extrinsic value in achieving that end. Similarly, Barbara believes that a certain type of art has intrinsic value. She keeps her collection of this art only to look at and enjoy, and would never sell it. By contrast, her husband believes her art should be sold, as its price has increased greatly, they are not rich, and he wants the money to renovate their house. For him, the art, or rich people’s desire to enjoy it, is a means to the end ‘money’, which is a means to his end, ‘renovation’. For him, renovation is of intrinsic value, but the art and money are only of extrinsic value.

[161] As Kant pointed out, to be of absolute or ultimate justifiability or value is to be of intrinsic value. Further:- The standard is of intrinsic epistemic justifiability or value because it is the only standard with overall epistemic justifiability. There is no justifiable substitute.  The standard and end are essential or inherent or intrinsic to or within epistemic justifiability as a whole. And, because from an epistemically justifiable viewpoint that end is the only justifiable end, it  cannot be of extrinsic value regarding any other justifiable end. So the pro-truth end and associated standard are alone of intrinsic justifiability or value. (Again, the only coherent meaning of ‘justifiable’ is ‘epistemically justifiable’.) Emotions can be felt or believed to be intrinsically valuable (justifiable); but only that primarily epistemic end is intrinsically valuable. However, I’ll argue that achieving this end involves some emotions felt to be intrinsically valuable, though the end’s epistemic aspect is primary.

[162] E.g., someone might feel annoyance at a loud noise made by a passing car, when trying to sleep. Such emotions tend not to be intrinsically valued. But they could be pro-truth. E.g., such annoyance may prompt the person, a student, to soundproof the room, resulting in a sleep improved enough to help the student learn pro-truth knowledge better.

[163] This was discussed in David Suzuki’s TV series, The Nature Of Things. In some orphanages, e.g., in late 20th century Romania, there was plenty of evidence for this. See also Shaw in the Psychology and Aging journal, March 2004.  Similarly, consider the famous experiment where caged infant monkeys only had two types of substitute-mother as company:- Both types looked somewhat like a real mother. They were mostly wire mesh. One gave milk. The other gave no food but had a furry patch on its chest. The infants spent much more time cuddling the fur than with the food-provider. The human primate infant also has a deep need for hugging a (preferably real) carer. So, hugging and similar, along with real care and associated emotions, are crucial pro-truth needs for us, especially (but not only) when young. With this, pet dogs and similar can provide pro-truth therapy and company. They can be intrinsically valued things of pro-truth value.

[164] This type applies universally only to at least potentially pro-truth beings. E.g., it does not apply to bacteria which threaten the lives of at least potentially pro-truth beings. Similarly, unjustifiable benevolence includes benevolence to persons such as incurably psychopathic mass-murders, whose most-liked activity is murder, by benevolently never imprisoning them or similar,  kindly letting them do what they like most.

[165] Here one’s frontal cortex controls those unjustifiable emotions, via the brain’s interconnections and the cognitive decision to do so. This decision can include effectively deciding to feel more benevolent. Such meditation was discussed on the Australian ABC TV show, The Big Picture: Primal Instincts, 8:30 pm, March 3, 2004.

[166] Some feminist and some masculinist commentators describe a cognitive-based theory as a ‘male thing’, and a caring-based theory as a ‘female thing’. Pro-truth theory suggests that such descriptions are not fully epistemically justifiable. Pro-truth theory interrelates the cognitive and emotional, and sees them as combinable in the same person, whether male or female.

[167] An overall view considers what is optimal on-average, long-term. Temporary deviations from that average could help the quantities or measurable qualities constituting that average be optimal. E.g., there would be a justifiable temporary need to work longer and sleep less during an emergency.

[168] As Hume pointed out, as discussed in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, our natural tendency here is to only feel fond of at least some persons in our ingroup, and feel indifferent, wary or hostile about others who we naturally see as outgroups. (Socialised views concerning who is an outgroup tend to be built on a natural basis.) Evolutionarily, one’s tribe was crucial regarding passing on one’s genes, and this was made more likely if other tribes were eliminated or dominated so they could not use scarce resources. (Hate is naturally helpful here.)

                An ‘obligation’ is a duty which one does not enjoy. The most general term here, ‘duties’, can be divided into three types, negative, neutral and positive — respectively: 1) obligations, 2) duties we don’t mind performing, and 3) duties which are a pleasure. E.g., naturally, normal mothers on-average tend to find it a pleasurable duty to care for their babies. It is important to note that, as Kant, Hume and some psychologists point out, normally we can to a large degree (re)train at least many emotions. By conditioning or habituation, and/or via meditation, we can often come to enjoy a duty that we were originally emotionally neutral or negative about. Universal pro-truth benevolence can be(come) a pleasure.

[169] ‘Direct love’ is personal. It involves such things as hugging, sharing meals and talking with the loved ones. Indirect love is such things as sending aid to starving strangers on the other side of the world, people you will probably never meet in person.

[170] It is clearly impracticable to directly love all the six billion or so persons in the world.

[171] As suggested later, this does not mean, e.g., that a parent is justified in ensuring that the parent’s children get a bigger share of ‘non-emotional’ resources, e.g., toys and education, than is fair in relation to persons universally sharing resources in the most overall pro-truth way, i.e., world-wide. It only means that a parent’s own children, which includes any adopted children, have a pro-truth need to get most of the pro-truth emotional resources they need from those who most directly care for them, i.e., normally, parents. (If the parents die or similar, this would be other persons.)

                This also does not mean that, if distant children lack direct carers,  then adults distant from them who could provide that care need not bother. As all children have the right to such care, all able potential carers have a duty here. Circles need to be flexible, or open. E.g., unloved children in Joanne’s distant-circle can be adopted by her, becoming part of Joanne’s close-circle, becoming directly loved. This fits best with U H/I E/T.

[172] Helpful here would be a universal scheme of world-wide travel exchanges and similar — an expanded version of the ‘sister-city’ scheme practised by Australia, Japan and others.

[173] The optimal balance here, and elsewhere, would be achieved when each person (and hence the world) is as optimally pro-truth as possible, which involves each having access to the resources making this possible. The resources include a loving close-circle. The universal benevolence involves ensuring each has those resources. This is pro-truth fairness.

[174] The social aim is not universal harmony as such among persons. Universal harmony among persons could be achieved via all believing in some religion or fascist doctrine, which are inherently anti-truth.

[175] Having emotional experiences, and choosing to have them, are things we can do. In that sense, they are practices, and can be intended practices.

[176] Hume, D. (1968) Hume’s Moral And Political Philosophy. Edited by Aiken, H.D. New York. Hafner.

[177] This example is similar to my experience.

[178] As suggested by the Australian ABC TV show, Catalyst,  June 24th, 2004, there might in some cases be amazingly simple ways to do this, e.g., by intentionally smiling on the right side of one’s face (e.g., as opposed to sneering on the other side), the more emotionally-positive thereto-connected left side of the brain can become more active. Laughter clubs could help too.

[179] See, e.g., Gaudry, E and Spielberger, C.D (1971) Anxiety And Educational Achievement. Sydney. John Wiley & Sons, and Holt, John (1969) How Children Fail and (1970) How Children Learn Penguin. Parts of such books can be re-interpreted in a pro-truth way.

[180] Research into the brain suggests a physical basis enabling this, in that the frontal cortex has neural connections with the limbic (emotional) system, and can overrule at least many emotions. This is partly similar to Jerry Fodor’s point regarding how our higher-level, flexible cognition can overrule our brain’s primitive, encapsulated (i.e., inflexible or unchangeable) perceptual experiences. E.g., again, we perceive a stick partly in water as thereby bent, but our brain’s higher-level cognitive parts overrule that misleading perception — so we (justifiably) believe the stick did not bend. (See, e.g., Fodor, J (1983) The Modularity of Mind Cambridge Massachusetts. MIT Press.) Similarly, our higher-level cognitive parts can overrule an emotion when we believe the emotion ought not to be expressed. So, e.g., Anne, who feels like physically attacking Tina because Anne is angry with and dislikes Tina, can stop the attack. Further, if Anne has sufficient higher-level control, she can stop feeling the dislike and anger. Again, a type of meditation is useful here, for developing that control.

[181] Popper, K (1966) "The Open Society and its Enemies". Vol 2. London. Routledge. p 225 and 238

[182] Popper, K (1966) "The Open Society and its Enemies". Vol 2. London. Routledge. p 225

[183] A direct democracy is more democratic (inclusive or universal) than an indirect democracy. In indirect democracies citizens vote only every few years, for a mostly unknown member of parliament who promises (often fraudulently and self-servingly) to  (indirectly) represent all voters, regarding all governmental decisions, many not anticipated by voters. A referendum is a type of direct democracy: all voters directly make the decision. Referendums tend to be merely occasional. A fully direct pro-knowledge democracy would be full-time, encouraging all concerned with any decision  to be involved in  making the decision, for all high-level decisions. U H/I E/T implies this universality among pro-truth persons. Modern internet and similar communications technology could make direct democracy practicable. A pro-truth peaceful world would remove the motivation to have the less democratic, more efficient military-style governments perhaps best able to wage war.

[184] I accept Foucault’s notion that positive freedom is empowerment, and vice versa (and much else he says). If you are free to do something, you have the power to do it, and vice versa.  See, e.g., Patton, P. “Taylor And Foucault On Power And Freedom” in Political Studies, XXXVII, 1989, pp 260-276. and Foucault, M. “The Subject And Power” in Dreyfus, H, and Rabinow, P, (eds) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Harvester Press. 1982.

[185] There is also an action-implementing, neural-motor level. But this is not a level of thought (and it is levels of thought which are being discussed). It consists of the unthinking motor neurones, muscles and so on which implement the action-prompting level’s command to act.

[186] Again, as argued in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, the term ‘justifiable’ can coherently only mean ‘epistemically justifiable’.

[187] It is epistemically unjustifiable to ask for more than one is able to do. This is discussed further, later.

[188] The notion of an intrinsically justifiable pro-truth self is also different from an interpretation of Kant which focuses on the notion that rational nature or a rational being as such is an end in itself, given that by ‘rational nature’ Kant seems to mean something like ‘thinking via non-contradiction and universalisability, as in the UCI’. In Part II, Chapter 1, Section 6 it was argued that this purely formal notion, because it lacks epistemically justifiable content, i.e., (pro-truth) truth, it lacks overall epistemic justifiability. Hence a rational being as such cannot properly be of epistemically justifiable intrinsic value. A calculator or computer as such is a rational being as such, and we justifiably tend not to regard them as being of justifiable intrinsic value. Rationality as such is merely of epistemically justifiable extrinsic value. It is a mere means, a method, a method  intended to achieve something epistemically justifiable, a method which inherently aims to have truth as its content. It is only part of the means to the end, ‘epistemically justifiable knowledge-content’.

[189] Again, this book is primarily intended for undergraduate students. So, especially regarding beginning undergraduates, I don’t think such comments are patronising. I hope not. They are certainly not intended to be. Being patronising can have anti-truth effects.

[190] Such points concern that structure’s orthogonality. As explained elsewhere, diversity can also be pro-truth and hence belong on the vertical dimension too. E.g., if we lack pro-truth knowledge concerning a disease, we are most likely to think of the correct hypothesis if we think of diverse plausible hypotheses rather than stick with just one problematic hypothesis. Here pro-knowledge persons converge by agreeing that diverging is pro-knowledge.

[191] Here then is a practical theory which epistemically justifiably orthogonally reconciles the notions of ‘the right’ and ‘the (feels) good’. (This comment relates to a distinction, made by some philosophers, between ‘(cognitively known to be) right’, i.e., a claim concerning objectivity, and ‘(feels) good (or is desirable)’, a subjective or emotional notion. (There are other definitions.))  The pro-truth structure shows we can do what’s right and still have a qualitatively very good life. With this, pro-truth theory alone can epistemically justifiably orthogonally reconcile the objective and subjective.

[192] J.S. Mill’s ideas concerning eccentricity and free-thinking, as in his On Liberty, can be re-interpreted in a pro-truth way here (and applied to a-truth freedom too).

[193] So-called ‘white power’ supporters can probably more easily believe their race is justifiably intrinsically valuable and that their racism is justified because of the moral (delusory) self-centred notions often associated with the term ‘white’, and its opposite, ‘black’. E.g., ‘white’ is often associated with purity, with moral goodness, with being the opposite of moral evil. Such notions appeal to  self-centred, self-called ‘whites’. ‘Black’ is often associated with evil, and so on. E.g., expressions such as ‘You black-hearted fellow’ are often used as insults. However, as I long ago read somewhere (source forgotten), the truth is that the colour of so-called ‘white’ persons is from pale pink to pinky-brown or, when tanned, they are brown. So-called ‘black’ persons tend to really be different shades of brown. So the true name for so-called ‘white power’ is something like ‘pink power’. Or, instead of ‘white-power’ seeing itself as intrinsically opposed to ‘black power’, it is more accurate to see them as, respectively, ‘pinky-brown power’ and ‘often browner power’. Sticking to the truth here, and elsewhere, e.g., regarding ageism, would make it much harder to associate moral notions such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ with unjustifiable discrimination. So such truths are pro-truth truths.

[194] This implies a need for a radical revision of Rawls’s social contract theory, its ‘original position’, views concerning freedom, aims for society, and so on.

[195] Here is another implication for Rawls’s theory. His notion of (justice as) fairness is epistemically unjustifiable because it does not relate to that aim.

[196] E.g., if food is short on an isolated island, it could be the case that either one person sacrifices themselves, or all die.

[197] The arguments in this book imply that it is not epistemically justifiable to call this ‘ageism’. It is pro-truth, epistemically justifiable discrimination. If an ‘ism’ label is used, the most appropriate is something like ‘pro-truthism’ or ‘justifiabilism’.

[198] Again, ‘fairness’ is an abstract term; in practice it must be relative to some specific practicable notion. Some believe that fairness should be relative to randomness or arbitrariness, e.g., by choosing via coin-tossing among persons needing some life-saving medical procedure, to see who gets the procedure. Such fairness-as-arbitrariness could allow an anti-truth mass murderer to be saved, and a pro-truth medical researcher to die. A Hitler could be saved, and a Florey dies. The notion, ‘Be arbitrary’, is epistemically unjustifiable. The only notion to which fairness can epistemically justifiably be relative is the epistemically justifiable standard/end. Medical procedures, and any resources, would epistemically justifiably be given to whoever both needs and epistemically justifiably most deserves them. It is justifiably fair  for persons to get what they justifiably deserve, and need.

[199] E.g., if a certain part, P, of a live person’s brain, ceases electro-chemical activity, e.g., due to injury, then the person’s conscious experience of the bodily function which P was involved with ceases, as does the function, as in blindness. All such evidence suggests that, when the whole brain’s electro-chemical activity ceases, due to death, the person’s whole consciousness ceases. (This is evidence against religious beliefs in an after-life. There is no evidence for such beliefs.)

[200] However, it is pro-truth to avoid death if one’s continued life would probably mean a more pro-truth world than if one dies. Here Sally has a responsibility to get cured.

[201] Again, pro-truth situational relativity only means that, in different situations, different means may be optimal in relation to achieving the single ultimate, primary end. That is, the end does not change; there is no relativity (changeability) of the single, justifiable end. Only the means to that end change.
             Incidentally, this notion of situational relativity,  and the related notion of a situationally-variable balance among the means needed to optimally achieve that single end, solves the controversies concerning issues such as moral particularism versus atomism.

[202] I’m distinguishing such grief from ‘depression in general’, a much wider term.

[203] Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2 discusses this further.

[204] Here they might unjustifiably arbitrarily toss a coin, imagining this is fair, as discussed in a recent footnote.

[205] Until at least a majority is optimally pro-truth and hence entirely unselfish, something like Rawls’s difference principle might be most pro-truth here. That is, to increase the pro-truth nature of society for all, some may need to be motivated by differential rewards or benefits, e.g., via higher pay. Yet it may be most pro-truth here to pay the difference in a different type of currency. All could get the same income in what could be called ‘basic dollars’. Beyond that, people could earn different amounts of something like ‘leisure dollars’. These could only be spent on leisure. So, e.g., if Christine earns more than Kevin, she could have holidays in more distant locations than he could normally afford. The non-basic (and basic) currency could not be spent on things giving Christine unjustifiable power or influence over others, e.g., via achieving control over a newspaper which influences others’ thinking. And so on. The richer could not use their greater wealth to have greater power over others.

[206] Of course, apart from personal wealth-equality (at least regarding ‘basic dollars’), person P1’s work might require more wealth-input than P2’s. E.g., medical equipment can cost more than the equipment a kindergarten teacher needs. But all non-personal wealth would, in a just(ifiable) society, be socially-universalised wealth — unselfishly used to justifiably benefit humanity.

[207] The abstract concept ‘fairness’ is only practicable if it relates to something sufficiently specific to be unambiguously practicable. The only epistemically justifiable practicable notion of ‘fairness’ is, e.g., to share resources so as to achieve the pro-truth end as optimally as possible overall, i.e., over all persons and time.

[208] E.g., past experience shows it is likely we’ll discover more cures for human diseases in as-yet uninvestigated species. If we make them extinct before we investigate them, e.g., via destroying an environment they need, they cannot provide that knowledge. Importantly, for the human animal, the aesthetic appeal of natural environments can also be of intrinsic emotional value, and this and the freedom to enjoy them and exercise in them, and so on, can indirectly have pro-truth effects. (Something similar can apply to art.)

[209] It is not practicable, e.g., for an infant to have the same balance or reciprocity between rights and responsibilities as an able adult. Adults have the justifiable responsibility to provide children with food, education and so on. Children have a pro-truth right to those resources, but no responsibility to fully reciprocate —  till much later. They need to learn that, when older, they will have a duty to use their abilities, developed via those resources, in a pro-truth way, for all.

[210] It’s a-truth to be an exception (individualistic) in a-truth areas. It’s pro-truth to make an exceptional advance in pro-truth knowledge; and so on.

[211] The ‘overall’ here relates to a point made two footnotes ago. E.g., over the overlapping lifespans of all able persons, there can be the harmony (balance) among benefits and burdens implied by that footnote.

[212] They are worthwhile (justifiable) for other reasons too, as implied above. Similarly, various other things this book says are justifiable can be so for reasons other than the explicitly given reason(s).

[213] An overall (widest-possible) view of ‘able’ is needed. E.g., I had an aunt, almost totally physically and somewhat intellectually disabled for years, who was able to give me helpful emotional support during various family disasters. (So did my dog, which greatly lacked intellectual ability.) Without such support this book might not have been written, or would have taken years longer.

[214] E.g., a pro-knowledge direct democracy would encourage all concerned with a decision to be  involved in making the decision, though, at least sometimes, some persons would be have the opportunity to only have their views considered by the decision-makers. A pro-knowledge democracy needs knowledge-based decisions wherever possible. E.g., school children who lack knowledge concerning the healthiest diets school canteens could offer could request certain foods, but the final decision would crucially involve those with most dietary knowledge here. However, nutrition as such would not be the only thing considered. Dietary knowledge alone is insufficient. Decision-makers with a justifiable overall view (judgement) would also consider social-psychological and other factors here. E.g., if children desperately want hamburgers within various taste/appearance ranges, it should be possible to have healthy hamburgers within those ranges, rather than force a nutritionally-equivalent unwanted sandwich on the children. Importantly, before a final decision, the children would have the reasons (evidence) for  what is probably the decision explained to them, and have an opportunity to state their views on this  — in case the decision-makers missed some factor. The children would need to understand that the decision is justified and involved considering their reasonable views and any a-truth preferences.

[215] In ‘cultures’ I include religious groups. E.g., the Australian government insists on non-sexism in employment, but permits the Roman Catholic culture to refuse to employ women as priests, cardinals etc. Of course, even if a religious culture is or becomes non-sexist, it remains unjustifiable for other reasons.

[216] Some comments in this section suggest there is what philosophers call an ‘internal’ motivation to be  pro-truth.

[217]  Because there is often that lack, or only a theoretical prefacing, the universality here is an aspect of being only minimally pro-truth.

[218] This point is adapted from a type of naturalistic epistemology. See, e.g., Hilary Kornblith’s “Introduction”, in Kornblith’s (1994) (ed) Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edition. Massachusetts: Bradford Book, MIT Press, p 5. Kornblith discusses Quine here.

[219] The survival-necessary areas concerning food, cliffs and so on, namely observable survival-related issues, are different from the moral and religious areas, where observation is impossible and evidence unavailable. As argued in Part I, regarding morality and religion, it can be survival-helpful to have false beliefs. However, it is not survival-necessary: we can also survive via a practical theory as close to truth as possible. This book  suggests that this would be more survival-helpful too, overall.

[220] This is because it is impossible to achieve an overall harmony which includes false beliefs. The reasons for this involve the above explanation that there is, for us, only one reality, one practicable truth-as-a-whole. Part II, Chapter 4 discusses the reasons further.                    

[221] As explained in Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4.1, certain  rights, a type of flourishing and so on are not the foundation of pro-truth theory. They are means to or an aspect of achieving its end for humans. The foundation, the pro-truth standard, is epistemically based. The justifiability of those rights etc  is derived from that foundation or basis: they are derivative, not fundamental. That section also explained that the situation is different regarding duties. E.g., the most general duty, ‘Be pro-truth’, is the same as that prescriptive standard, so in that sense this duty is fundamental. Because it is a pro-truth virtue to be pro-truth, the previous sentence applies to this virtue.

[222] These problems were at least implicitly discussed in Part I. E.g., a moral interpretation of virtues means they are reducible to the types of moral concepts explicitly discussed in Part I. E.g., if modesty is a moral virtue, this must be because being modest is a morally correct thing to do — so the fundamental notion here is that modesty is (allegedly) good in itself. That’s the alleged reason why it is (allegedly) morally virtuous to be modest. Similarly for bravery, honesty and so on. So the discussion in Part I can be adapted to apply to the moral notion, ‘virtue’. One such issue here is that moral virtue theories involve epistemically insoluble problems involving conflicts among virtues. E.g., if it is morally virtuous to be both honest and kind, then, as many skeptics point out, how can we know when it is unkind to be honest? (Only a single epistemically justifiable standard/end can solve such conflicts.)

[223] Being cruel for the sake of cruelty is definitely anti-truth, as it conflicts with the peacefulness and  positive interpersonal relationships implied by the notion ‘Universal harmony regarding achieving the pro-truth’. However, there can be very hard choices here, as in some cases where it could be pro-truth to hurt someone’s feelings, e.g., by making honest criticisms of them which seem likely, on limited evidence, to help them become more pro-truth in the long run. (A version of the saying, ‘Sometimes you need to be cruel to be kind’, can apply.) The overall intention or end-aim here is not to be cruel, but to be helpfully pro-truth. A distinction needs to be made between temporary means and long-term end.

[224] This point, plus points above concerning Kant’s formal, epistemic standard, via which something can be allegedly judged to be a duty, suggest further that Kant’s epistemic standard is too limited. E.g., it is true that ‘Always lie’ cannot conceivably be universalised; yet just because there is this inconceivability, this does not mean that ‘Never lie’ or ‘Always be truthful’ is an epistemically justifiable perfect duty.

[225] Rawls (1999) Theory Of Justice. OUP, Revised Edition (the last, as he’s dead).  p3

[226] The next section qualifies Rawls’s use of selfish persons. The present discussion relies on the fact that the specific ends aimed at are not the epistemically justifiable end, not the (alterable) fact that they are also selfish ends.

[227] The epistemically justifiable re-interpretation of Aristotle’s notion, ‘nous’, mentioned in the previous section, applies here. That is, a highest-level integrating level of thought is needed to oversee and achieve the epistemically justifiable flourishing outlined in the present chapter and elsewhere in this book.

[228] The Australian ABC Radio National program, “Life Matters”, 9th Dec 2003, reported on this.

[229] However, Rawls seems to use egoists as a ‘worst-possible’ type, implying that a fair society is achievable even with the worst-possible type of persons — and that as real persons are mostly not that bad (selfish), a real, fair society would be even more easily achievable (and happier (more flourishing) due to a natural, somewhat unselfish sense of community).

[230] And the fact that anger is often associated with swearing is a different issue. The justifiability of the degree of any anger here, and whether the anger is directed towards something unjustified, are important issues. Various points above apply to them.

[231] These comments describe part of the situation regarding swearing in the so-called Western nations, especially those with a mainly British background. I have no idea what the situation is in some other cultures.

[232] They could make decisions here for adults lacking epistemic autonomy. E.g., benevolent carers of intellectually disabled adults wanting to be sex partners might justifiably decide to not stop them having (safe etc) sex.

[233] Except in an unlikely case such as:- After a disaster, the only humans left in the universe are a few fertile pro-truth females and one able but unwilling homosexual man. The only way to ensure a pro-truth world is to force the man to donate sperm. This would be unselfish rape, not done for pleasure. The man would be selfish.

[234] An exception would be, e.g., an adult for whom sex would only cause pain, due to some physical abnormality.

[235] A general point:- There is no justification for acting via a predisposition just because it is a predisposition. The above criticisms of nature-based morality apply here. A predisposition or preference is just an inclination. It is not a necessity, as in it being survival-necessary for us to have oxygen. There is no justification for acting via, e.g., a  predisposition to violence or selfishness. We can choose to resist or redirect a predisposition. In a sense, much of this book is redirection of an aggressive predisposition.

[236] Religion needs to be censored, indeed ruled out, except as delusional beliefs to be studied in a rationally critical way, or  rationally humorous way, as in some Monty Python films.

[237] At another time Ken may have different dominant or effective beliefs, and regret a previous intended act. This is not a problem for the present point. It is a problem for anyone aiming for long-term belief-consistency.              

[238] I’m using terms such as  ‘intentional’ to exclude such things as impulsive acts, because they are not reflected on, i.e., considered in relation to one’s reflected-on beliefs. Impulsive acts are close to unconscious and hence unintended acts.

[239] Perhaps somehow, by chance, a false belief concerning some end might help one achieve the end. But, on-average, or overall, they fail. Truth, and hence being somewhat pro-truth, is necessary. E.g., suppose a moral theory’s end is ‘Enjoy life — eat delicious food, drink fine wine, have much sex, and so on’. It will not help to achieve that end if, e.g., one believes that putrid mud or poison is delicious food, that gravel or a dog is fine wine, or that sex only involves cutting string.

[240] The point is more obvious if ‘best’ is explicitly defined as ‘most justifiably’, which means ‘most epistemically justifiably’.

[241] Groundwork, RPAp 402

[242] Elsewhere he says things which can seem inconsistent with (1). However, I’m trying to argue from what I think he mostly says, or most explicitly and clearly says. At times he is very obscure, and can here plausibly be interpreted in conflicting ways.

[243] Groundwork RPAp 453-4

[244] Mary Gregor (1996) (trans and ed) The Metaphysics Of Morals Cambridge Univ Press. p 15-16. AK (RPA) 6:223 (Gregor uses ‘AK’ to mean the Academy’s editions of Kant’s work, i.e.,  the Royal Prussian Academy’s editions, whereas I use ‘RPA’ for the same.)

[245] Mary Gregor (1996) (transl and ed) The Metaphysics Of Morals Cambridge Univ Press. P 15-16 AK (RPA) 6:223

[246] op. cit., p 16, footnote.

[247] AK (RPA) 8:347 & 373, and their footnotes. From www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm

[248] E.g., Groundwork RPAp 408

[249] Groundwork RPAp 439, according to a typical translation, here in Great Books of the Western World.

[250] See, e.g., The Collins German Dictionary. 2nd ed. Harper-Collins. 1991.

[251] See, e.g., The Collins German Dictionary. 2nd ed. Harper-Collins. 1991.

[252] However, in Part I, Chapter 4, I point out certain insoluble problems involved in the notion that a maxim is the most general rule in an area.

[253] E.g., Metaphysics of Morals AK (RPA) 6: 390. Gregor (ed) p 153