PART II

Title: Anti-Morality, Truth And Peace: Beyond Kant And Others — A New Theory.

(Replacing Moral Philosophy, And Morality Or Ethics, With

 An Epistemic, Science-Based Theory.)

Key Words: Moral, Philosophy, Ethics, Epistemology, Science.

Author:  Kym Farrand, 2004.

(Philosophy Department, Flinders University, South Australia)

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 PART I: EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS WITH MORAL THEORIES: NO THEORY CAN BE KNOWN TO BE TRUE OR CLOSE TO TRUTH.

PART II: A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS WITH MORAL THEORIES.

PART II: CHAPTER 1: A SUGGESTED SINGLE, ULTIMATE, PRACTICABLE EPISTEMIC STANDARD AND ASSOCIATED END.

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 1: Preliminary Points Concerning What The Standard And End Might Be And How They Can Be Justified Or Defended; And Some Possible Problems.

The overall issue in Part II is: ‘If we are to have an epistemically justifiable practical theory, we need to apply the ultimate standard of epistemic justifiability in our lives as a whole (if that standard exists)’. (The alternative to this, as argued in Part I, is to live via some unjustifiable standard. Part I argued that the only coherent meaning of ‘(un)justifiable’ is ‘epistemically (un)justifiable’.)

Part I implies we need a practical theory with a single ultimate standard and associated end which are epistemically justifiable or as close to truth as possible for a practical theory. Any such standard and end also need to be specific enough to at least imply unambiguous practicable guidelines for our lives as a whole. For this and other, epistemic reasons, as argued in Part I, the standard and associated end must be universally applicable and not involve contradictions. I’ll argue that there is such a standard and end.

One way to discover them is to begin from the abstract notions here, e.g., ‘truth as such’, then look at all general types of specific notions within the abstract. This is like a typical search for, say, a book or socks in an unfamiliar bedroom, which best begins by looking round the whole room, then focuses on just some specific places within the room after finding that looking in other places is unfruitful.

(It is important to remember that this section’s points are only preliminary. They also tend to be only very general or abstract. This short section’s evidence or arguments need to and will be greatly added to. This is done in several subsequent sections. Section 2 has a much more practical focus, with simple, familiar examples. Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter contain the most important explanations, defences and justificatory points.)

On with the search:-

This search begins by discussing the abstract notion, truth. However, as explained above, e.g., in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, because this book’s aim is a practical theory, practicable in life as a whole, the discussion at least implicitly focuses on practicable truth — or beliefs which are, for us, sufficient knowledge because we can rely on them in practice. (Because this section is preliminary, and because the present context does not require it, it is not till later, mostly in footnotes, that ‘practicable truth’ is explained further than via Part I’s explanations and the following example of it:- We can know that water flows downhill, due to gravity, unless something opposes gravity, e.g., a pump, and use such knowledge to reliably place and store water in dams.) So, it is practicable truth which is the at least implicit focus of the following discussions:-

The next few paragraphs’ abstract points here will be argued to be sound, but only as abstract points. That is, because the discussion is merely introductory and very abstract, it has potential problems regarding specifics. E.g., an abstract notion can be interpreted to mean contradictory specific things. For instance:-

The notion ‘freedom’, as it stands, is abstract. It can be interpreted to specifically mean contradictory things in practice. E.g., the capitalist’s ‘freedom to get rich by making others poor’ versus the socialist’s ‘freedom of  all from being made poor by others’; Stalin’s ‘freedom to have anyone he disliked murdered, including innocents’ versus ‘freedom from the threat of murder, especially for innocents’; Jeremy’s freedom to play loud music conflicts with his neighbour’s (wish to have) freedom from noise while studying; and so on. It is one thing to try to justify an abstract notion, such as ‘Be free’ or ‘Seek truth’. It can be quite a different matter to try to explain and justify this rather than that specific interpretation of the abstract notion.

Such potential problems are dealt with when the search for an epistemically non-problematic theory focuses on specifics. But we begin with the abstract discussion, involving truth as such:-

Discovering truth is the reason for any directly epistemic enterprise as such, e.g., science. The inherent end of all directly epistemic enterprises as such is the abstract notion, ‘truth’, or truth as such — as opposed to truths about specific things[85]. (As explained early in Part I, in such sentences ‘knowledge’ can be substituted for ‘truths’.) Directly epistemically justifiable methods as such, as in science, can only seek truth or knowledge. Inherently, they cannot aim to achieve the end, ‘falsehoods’, or any end other than truth.

The most general positive points of this book so far can be summarised as follows:- The only thing which is epistemically justifiable as such is the epistemically justifiable as such. The only epistemically justifiable abstract end is truth as such. Therefore, it is epistemically justifiable to seek truth. A practical theory concerns our choices. An epistemically justifiable practical theory requires us to choose to seek truth. (However, I’ll argue that it also indirectly requires and permits us to do much more than that.)

To seek truth as such is to be pro- ‘truth-as-such’ (as opposed to seeking truths about some further, specific issue.) To choose to seek truth is to be pro-truth. To intend to seek truth, and to act on this intention, is to be pro-truth. So, the abstract standard or criterion via which we can assess whether something, X, is epistemically justifiable, is: ‘Is X pro-truth?’.

Concluding recent points:- The only epistemically justifiable practical theory seems to be a pro-truth practical theory. The ‘assessment version’ of that theory’s standard is ‘Is X pro-truth?’. The ‘prescriptive version’ is ‘Be pro-truth’. The abstract arguments so far seem to suggest that the associated end is ‘truth as such’.

So, abstractly speaking, an epistemically justifiable practice is a pro-truth practice: it aims at the end, truth[86]. That is, regarding epistemically justifiable thinking, ‘pro-truth’ is short for at least something like ‘pro-discovering-truth’ or ‘pro-learning-knowledge’. And regarding (other, publicly observable) epistemically justifiable practices, ‘pro-truth’ is short for at least something like ‘practices which help us learn or discover the truth’. (E.g., observation is a practice needed to help us directly discover practicable truth[87]. The indirectly epistemically justifiable practices here, some of which are briefly introduced soon, involve one’s life-as-a-whole. The two chapters after this argue this in detail, stressing that this crucially involves emotions, virtues and a type of flourishing.)

Concluding that introductory discussion:- Clearly, a pro-truth theory, because it aims at truth, and is epistemically justifiable, is as close to truth as is possible for a practical theory. And a practical theory as close as possible to truth is what this book is seeking. So here we have a brief, introductory, abstract (and hence largely incomplete) justification of pro-truth theory.

Here, perhaps, we have the beginnings or part of a solution to the epistemic problems, discussed in Part I, which all moral theories have. Perhaps, building on that beginning, we can come to know that the end advocated by one practical theory is epistemically justifiable, and hence as objective as possible for a practical theory. This single end would imply just one, holistic duty, i.e., a duty covering the area ‘life-as-a-whole’. The duty would be ‘Be pro-truth’. This, if sufficiently specific, would solve all problems involving conflicts — problems Part I showed that Kant and other moral theories cannot avoid. Thence, perhaps, we can know how to justifiably live.

Or can we?:-

Various possible problems present themselves here. They are due to the abstract nature of that suggested beginning of a solution. A crucial issue regarding practicability is: if one aims to practise pro-truth theory, which specific truths does this involve?:-

These are practicable truths-about-something. (These were discussed in a footnote near the beginning of this section.) We cannot in practice just be pro- ‘the truth’ or pro- ‘truth as such’. The notion ‘truth as such’ is as abstract and in-itself as ambiguous as Kant’s UCI[88]. In practice we can only know and be pro- some specific truth(s), e.g., via learning truths about fruit-growing.

So, on a first, abstract, view, the standard, ‘Be pro-truth’, could seem to involve epistemic problems as insoluble as those with the too-limited, too-formal or abstract epistemic basis[89] of Kant’s theory. If one chooses to live a fully pro-truth life, this could seem to oblige one to always focus only on learning truths, or knowledge. This aim seems too limited. With this, the abstract nature of the pro-truth standard as it stands could allow epistemically insoluble conflicts — e.g., regarding choosing among the infinite number of specific truths one could learn. ‘Be pro-truth’, as it abstractly stands, supplies no unambiguous, epistemically justifiable way to choose among them.

Or, the theory could seem to suggest that one should or is permitted to learn simply any specific truths. E.g., it could suggest it is equally epistemically justifiable or permissible to dedicate one’s life to either (1) learning truths about the colour and decoration of the bottle-top of every type of bottle ever made which has/had a bottle-top; or (2) learning how to cure diseases. If it is justifiable to learn either of (1) and (2), namely equally justifiable, this permits us to choose between them via chance, e.g., via coin-tossing, or via some other epistemically arbitrary method. This paragraph applies to choosing among all truths; an individual cannot possibly learn all truths. Choices must be made.

That possible problem suggests others. E.g., if humans are to focus only on acquiring knowledge, or any type of knowledge, how can they be motivated to do so? Pro-truth theory might only or mostly advocate dull, narrow, cerebral tasks. Wouldn’t a theory advocating such things as love, sex and happiness be better in relation to motivatability? Pro-truth theory may be too motivationally problematic to be put into practice.

Perhaps some further investigation of the pro-truth standard and related end will solve those possible problems. This chapter will further investigate the standard and end in three related explanatory ways. Much more also needs to be said regarding justification of the standard, and that investigation involves this too. A preview:-

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 1.1: A Preview Of The Following Investigation And Of The Rest Of The Book.

First, in Section 2, there is a fairly simple investigation. Secondly, in Section 3, a more complex investigation. Those two investigations complement each other by beginning from or focusing on different aspects of the notion, ‘epistemic justifiability’. Thirdly, those investigations and the justificatory points in Section 1 are supplemented by further justificatory points in Section 4 of this chapter, after a context has been developed for those further points. Again, Sections 3 and 4 are, I think, the most important. Section 4 attempts something which is probably surprising or incredible to those who are rational and critical concerning moral philosophy: Section 4 attempts to show that, for an epistemically justifiable practical theory, there is inherently overwhelming empirical evidence for that theory’s epistemic standard. (This is not really surprising when contexted in the notion that an epistemically justifiable standard inherently relates to evidence.)

Section 4, in combination with Sections 1, 2 and 3, completes what is hopefully sufficient epistemic justification of the standard and related end, and, thence, of the theory. The combination of Sections 1-4 develops the overall view Part I suggests is needed to show there is an epistemically justifiable practical theory. However, if that combination is not sufficient, Section 5 supplements that attempt at justification. If Sections 1-4 are sufficient, Section 5 is optional. Also, near the end of the book there is a further, optional chapter on justification. This is near the end, and is optional, because the present chapter is probably sufficient — and something more important needs to be discussed before making theoretical points which are probably only of minor, supplementary use regarding justification.

That more important discussion gives representative examples of the specifics of the theory’s practicability and motivatability, covering all areas of human life. These are indirectly epistemically justifiable specifics (as opposed to directly epistemically justifiable practices, such as observing evidence for/against scientific hypotheses). Some such indirectly justifiable specifics are briefly mentioned in the next section, and in Sections 3 and 4 of the present chapter, as doing so is one essential aspect of its further investigations. The next two chapters are a much longer discussion of such indirectly pro-truth specifics.

The next chapter begins that discussion by arguing that, to be practicable, a pro-truth theory would inherently consider the full range of human motivations or emotions, and that such things as freedom, love, sex and happiness can be pro-truth. I argue that a type of flourishing is involved, along with great individual autonomy. Being optimally pro-truth cannot be a dull, narrow, cerebral task, or one only achievable by perfectly rational beings, devoid of emotion.

But now, the first further explanatory and justificatory investigation of the standard:-

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 2: A Further, Simple Investigation Of The Standard And End.

Firstly, again, this section needs to be combined with the next two. The next section begins from and focuses explicitly mostly on direct epistemic justifiability as such, a rather theoretical focus. The present section’s investigation begins from and focuses explicitly mostly on the practical notion, ‘Be pro-truth’. (The various focuses used in the justificatory sections are complementary or equivalent. One focus moves from the directly epistemically justifiable to the indirectly epistemically justifiable, e.g., from the notion, ‘learning scientific pro-truth truths’, to what is needed in practice in life-as-a-whole so that we have the ability and/or motivation and/or opportunity to learn them. Another focus moves in something like the opposite direction. Here the discussion begins by asking, ‘What would we need to practise in life-as-a-whole if science could provide a single fundamental epistemically justifiable standard applicable to life-as-a-whole?’, and from there moves to investigating whether science can provide such a standard. Another focus-direction involves asking, ‘Does science have a single fundamental epistemically justifiable standard?, and if so, is it applicable to life-as-a-whole?. Either focus-direction would lead us to the practical implications of any such standard. Whichever focus or focus-direction is used below, the others are implicit.) Now, the focus beginning with the practical notion, ‘Be pro-truth’:-

An obvious question here is: ‘If a person is to primarily be pro-truth, which truths would this person primarily focus on?’.

Firstly, a short answer:- That pro-truth question is parallel to asking: ‘If a person is to primarily be pro-health, which truths would this person primarily focus on?’. Clearly, the person would focus primarily on truths which help the person be healthy. These are pro-health truths. In sum, this parallel health question can be restated as ‘Which truths are pro-health?’, to which the answer is ‘Pro-health truths’. Therefore, that pro-truth question can be restated as: ‘Which truths are pro-truth?’. The answer is obvious: ‘Pro-truth truths’.

That question is also parallel to asking, ‘Which cars are green?’. It is rationally undeniable, or epistemically justifiable, that a true answer is: ‘Green cars’. It is true that green cars are green. Formally, the question is: ‘Which Xs are Xs of type Y?’, from which it logically or analytically follows that ‘Xs of type Y are Xs of type Y’. Thence, if we ask ‘Which truths are truths of a pro-truth type?’, it logically follows that ‘Pro-truth type truths are truths of a pro-truth type’.

In sum, the prescriptive standard, ‘Be pro-truth’, involves learning only pro-truth truths. These are the only truths which can help persons be pro-truth.

(Soon I’ll argue that being pro-truth involves much more than just learning pro-truth truths. I’ll argue that it also involves practising them, in life-as-a-whole. Only pro-truth truths give persons knowledge of the diet, society, emotions, education and so on needed to help persons optimally further learn and practise pro-truth truths. To really be pro-truth, such dietary etc knowledge needs to be put into practice.)

Secondly, a longer answer:-

As explained in Part I, the only fully rational or fully epistemically justifiable view involves an overall view. The following answer will make explicit the implicit overall viewpoint involved in this chapter so far, and, thence, the crucial distinction between (1) an abstract view as well as a narrowest view of epistemic justifiability, which only consider direct epistemic justification, as in science, and, hence, only truth or knowledge as such, and (2) an overall view of epistemic justifiability, which considers both the directly and the indirectly epistemically justifiable. This involves considering how our practices and other things affect the very existence of the directly epistemically justifiable for us, namely knowledge. The overall view can see potential contradictions concerning that affecting, and that they involve (1).

Clearly, as argued in Part I, a fully epistemically justifiable enterprise involves no contradictions[90]. The opposite of contradiction or conflict can be called ‘harmony[91]’. Consider the issue, ‘Which truths would a pro-truth person focus on?’. I’ll argue that the only truths which harmonise with being pro-truth are pro-truth truths:-

An overall view of truths or epistemic justifiability divides truths into ‘pro-truth truths’, ‘a-truth truths’ and ‘anti-truth truths’. This is because an overall view, unlike the narrowest view, sees that, in relation to any one thing, all else has, respectively, either a positive (harmonious), or a neutral, or a negative (contradictory[92] or oppositional) relationship. Pro-truth truths[93] are truths which are put into practice to help us maintain or increase persons’ ability and/or motivation and/or opportunity[94] to be pro-truth, i.e., to be epistemically justifiable. A simplified example:-

Suppose the child Susan learns the following truth: ‘You need to eat a certain amount of vitamin C in order to stay alive’. This is for Susan a potentially pro-truth truth. It would become an actual pro-truth truth for Susan if she eats that amount in the context of spending her life primarily aiming to be pro-truth. E.g., she could later learn how to design bike-helmets which are more effective in avoiding brain-damage which will negatively affect cyclists’ ability to learn and practise other pro-truth truths.

Those cyclists’ safe travelling is another specific example of a pro-truth practice. Again, as will be argued further, such practices are indirectly epistemically justifiable, as opposed to directly epistemically justifiable practices such as science.

Summarising those points in other words, along with some related implied points soon to be developed:- Pro-truth theory, because it takes the overall view, considers everything about the beings who can best[95] make the directly epistemically justifiable exist, namely in human knowledge. With this, if the epistemically justifiable is to exist at all, or to exist more than minimally, it is epistemically justifiable to consider how humans live. It seems epistemically justifiable for the epistemically justifiable to exist. It would seem to be increasingly epistemically justifiable if the epistemically justifiable (e.g., knowledge) increasingly exists. So, from an overall viewpoint, pro-truth or pro-knowledge theory is and needs to be a holistic (overall) practical theory. (It needs to be universally applicable and applied.) It is a pro-truth practical truth that we cannot arrive at the end ‘Pro-truth truth’, or increasingly do so, namely via us learning pro-knowledge knowledge, unless we practise the knowledge which makes that learning possible. The latter knowledge is pro-knowledge knowledge used as a means to more knowledge of the same type. So, apart from just learning, we need to practise innumerable other things, such as doing what is needed to keep us alive and sufficiently healthy to do such learning. So, for us, the epistemically justifiable practical end is ‘learn and practise pro-truth truths’. Regarding which practices harmonise with pro-truth truth, the only possible candidate is practices involved in the learning and practising of pro-truth truths. E.g., practices which help humans discover pro-truth truth include eating a certain diet and avoiding serious head injuries, so as to be alive and have one’s brain working optimally in order to learn pro-truth truths. These are examples of the innumerable practical implications of the pro-truth standard. An epistemically justifiable overall view sees it is epistemically justifiable to apply all those (its) implications overall, i.e., over all of life, universally.

Some conclusions so far:- The notion of overall harmony in relation to the notion, ‘pro-truth’, implies an ongoing positive causal interrelationship among all pro-truth things, including all our thoughts and thereby-intended actions. That diet, eating it, that learning and those helmets are pro-truth things.

More on those conclusions:-

Above it was said that ‘Be pro-truth’, as it abstractly stands, could suggest we should only be pro- learning truths as such, namely any truths, e.g., as in  (1) learning truths about the colour and decoration of the bottle-top of every type of bottle ever made which has/had a bottle-top; and/or (2) learning how to cure diseases. The present investigation discriminates epistemically justifiably among all truths. E.g., regarding (1) and (2), only (2) involves learning a potentially pro-truth truth[96]:-

(2) can harmonise with other pro-truth things in various ways. E.g., suppose Annette learns how to cure a disease which would kill some persons who otherwise would learn and practise other pro-truth truths. Clearly, here Annette harmonises with pro-truth truth, i.e., with those persons achieving pro-truth things. If she dedicated her life to bottle-top truths, this would contradict, not harmonise with, the pro-truth end. Those potentially increasingly pro-truth persons she could have saved would die. To contradict the epistemically justifiable is clearly unjustifiable. (Again, as argued in Part I, ‘(un)justifiable’ can coherently only mean ‘epistemically (un)justifiable’.)

Anything that conflicts with the pro-truth is ‘anti-truth’. The anti-truth involves factors which mean persons are less pro-truth than they would otherwise be. Dedicating one’s life to bottle-top truths, or to killing potentially pro-truth cyclists, are anti-truth practices. They are practices involving negative effects on someone’s ability, motivation or opportunity to be pro-truth. As implied in Part I, it is also anti-truth to believe a moral theory. That is, as explicitly argued in Part I, this is epistemically unjustifiable because any moral belief  is an unverifiable, un-evidenced belief. And, as with the (moral) aim of being a bottle-top expert, all moral belief involves the believer aiming at an end other than the epistemically justifiable, pro-truth end. (Similarly for religious beliefs.)

Recent points suggest we need to distinguish between (i) the above abstract notions of an epistemically justifiable standard and associated end, along with a too narrow concept of what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means in relation to ‘Be pro-truth’, and (ii) an overall and hence non-self-contradictory concept or view here:-

If the notion ‘truth’ in ‘Be pro-truth’ is interpreted as abstractly and/or as narrowly as possible, it can suggest that bottle-top truths and the like are epistemically justified, period. It suggests that such in-practice anti-truth truths are as epistemically justifiable as pro-truth truths. I’m arguing that an overall view shows that those two types of truth are equally directly epistemically justifiable, but are not equal regarding indirect epistemic justifiability. This is because the pursuing of anti-truth truths contradicts the pursuing of pro-truth truths. E.g., if Annette dedicates herself to pursuing bottle-top truths, she in-practice stops herself being dedicated to pursuing pro-truth medical truths.

Here too it is clear that the practical, or how one lives, needs to be considered when we rationally investigate what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means in relation to ‘Be pro-truth’. Then we can have an overall or holistic and hence contradictionless view here. An overall view considers both direct and indirect epistemic justifiability. As argued in Part I, the contradictory cannot be as epistemically justifiable as possible, and an overall view is as epistemically justifiable as possible. The narrowest conception here is too narrow, because it allows such contradictions. Similarly for any abstract notion here. They allow the notion ‘Be pro-truth’ to include being anti-truth, via viewing both anti-truth truth and pro-truth truth as epistemically justifiable as possible.

To be as epistemically justifiable as possible clearly involves being epistemically justifiable in practice and without the epistemically justifiable being contradicted in practice, or by anyone’s practices. This involves an overall view of epistemic justifiability and of ‘Be pro-truth’. This means holistically considering the effects of pursuing one type of truth or knowledge on the pursuing of another type, and of implementing one type rather than another. So it means considering everything that happens in practice. It means considering both the directly and the indirectly epistemically justifiable. It means considering the end, ‘epistemic justification’, and the means to that end. It means considering how one does live and should live. This includes considering how one affects others, and vice versa. If Annette dedicates herself to bottle-top truths, this can affect other, potentially or actually pro-truth persons very differently than if she discovers how to cure their diseases. This is another aspect of an overall view. As explained in Part I, the only fully rational or fully epistemically justifiable view is an overall view.

It is epistemically justifiable in the abstract or narrowest sense to learn truths as such. But if we all learnt only anti-truth truths, in practice soon there would be no person alive to learn any truths at all. E.g., if we  all spend our whole lives pursuing bottle-top truths and the like, no-one will have the pro-truth knowledge needed to keep us healthy, fed and so on. So, because it is epistemically justifiable in the narrowest sense to learn truths as such, even in that sense it would be epistemically un-justifiable here to regard all truths as equal via, say, tossing a coin to choose what truths to learn — because we could thereby choose anti-truth truths. If we only learnt anti-truth truths, there would soon be no learning of truths. There’d be no epistemic justification because there would be no-one alive to do anything epistemically justifiable. Pursuing some knowledge can contradict (the existence of) knowledge.

In sum, just learning truths as such is not as epistemically justifiable as possible. To be as epistemically justifiable as possible, i.e., universally, we need to learn and practise only pro-truth truths.

This is even more obvious if we go beyond that narrowest, cognitive, ‘learn-only’ view, and consider the claim that it is epistemically justifiable to learn, as well as practise, any truths or knowledge at all. Applying that just-mentioned alleged permissibility of tossing a coin to this claim, the toss could allow us to learn and practise only anti-knowledge knowledge. This involves knowledge of how to destroy all beings capable of acquiring any knowledge. If we only learnt and practised the (potentially) anti-truth truths here, there would be no knowledge (i.e., of truths). There would be no beings alive capable of knowledge. So that claim or view is also too narrow. It is not as epistemically justifiable as possible, because it can license contradicting the (existence of the) epistemically justifiable, namely knowledge.

The situation regarding such too-narrow views, and hence the abstract view which can suggest them, is analogous to the following parable:- This concerns six blind persons investigating the appearance of an elephant. Each felt only part of the elephant. The person who touched the tail said, “An elephant is like a rope”. The person who touched the chest contradicted that view, concluding that an elephant is like a boulder. And so on. Each person’s view is too narrowly focused. Going from the abstract notion, ‘truth’, to the notion that it is pro-truth to learn, or learn and practise, any specific truth, is also a case of a too-narrowly focused search, involving contradictions. (Part I also shows that something similar applies to learning and practising whatever knowledge is needed to practise this or that moral theory.) An overall view, e.g., via seeing and touching all of an elephant, is needed for an as epistemically justifiable as possible description of an elephant’s appearance. Similarly regarding an overall view of what ‘Be pro-truth’ or ‘epistemically justifiable’ means.

The narrowest view of an elephant, or of epistemic justifiability, only gives us part of a truth. The part is necessary but not sufficient for the truth. More needs to be combined with the part, to give us the truth. The narrowest view of what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means can imply only part of what ‘as epistemically justifiable as possible’ means. A view which only considers part of X can contradict the overall, true  view of X. (The general point here is discussed further in the next, complementary section. The present section needs to be contexted within the overall justification given by Sections 1-4.)

Concluding recent points:-

Near the beginning of this section I wrote: “[There is a] crucial distinction between (1) an abstract view as well as a narrowest view of epistemic justifiability, which only consider direct epistemic justification and, hence, only truth or knowledge as such, and (2) an overall view of epistemic justifiability, which considers both the directly and the indirectly epistemically justifiable. This involves considering how our practices and other things affect the very existence of the directly epistemically justifiable for us, namely knowledge. The overall view can see potential contradictions here, involving (1).” The previous abstract discussion and the narrowest views of epistemic justifiability are not as epistemically justifiable as possible in that, regarding specifics, they can license contradictions. The only overall epistemically justifiable view here involves the overall investigation of what ‘Be pro-truth’ means, explained earlier in this section. And recent discussion has also taken us from the abstract standard, ‘Be pro-truth’, and associated abstract end, ‘truth’, to what can be called ‘the general (as opposed to abstract[97]), non-self-contradictory, practical, overall standard and end’, namely ‘Learn and practise pro-truth truths (universally)’. Here the standard and end harmonise perfectly: they are identical. The investigation so far also seems to suggest that a careful consideration of ‘Be pro-truth’ and, hence, related notions, might imply guidelines sufficiently practicable for applying pro-truth theory to life as a whole. The suggestion is that that general end can imply practicable specifics universally.

To make that suggestion firmer, and to get a more overall view, we need to investigate another notion related to the notion ‘Be pro-truth’. So, temporarily, that is probably enough discussion of the pro-truth and the anti-truth. Next, the pro-truth and the a-truth:-

Again, an overall examination of the concept ‘pro-truth’ leads to the truth that, in relation to truth, all else is either pro-truth, anti-truth or a-truth. More generally, that examination involves the insight that, regarding any one thing, all else has, respectively, either a positive, a negative or a neutral relationship to it. Regarding some possible event, e.g., a plant growing, each other thing or event either, respectively, helps the possible event to occur, hinders its occurrence, or has no affect on it. The prescription, ‘Be pro-truth’, implies that we are justifiably permitted to do a-truth things, and have a-truth aspects, because they have no affect on humanity’s ability, motivation or opportunity to be pro-truth. The a-truth has a neutral causal relationship to the pro-truth. Importantly here, a deep, overall examination shows that, to be pro-truth, we must treat the a-truth as neutral. For instance:-

Sally and Jim both know it is pro-truth to not smoke, to eat healthy food, and get sufficient rest, because the human brain needs a certain[98] quantity and quality of various things, and not others, in order for the brain to work optimally regarding learning and practising pro-truth truths. The gender of Sally and Jim is irrelevant regarding the truth of that pro-truth knowledge concerning smoking etc. Their gender here is a-truth. Similarly, suppose Sally and Jim both learn that 1+2 is 3. The truth of ‘1+2=3’ has nothing to do with their gender. ‘1+2=3’ is not true only for females, becoming untrue when a male believes it; and vice versa. Gender has no affect here. So, in order to be pro-truth here, i.e., regarding the directly epistemically justifiable ‘1+2=3’, we need to do something indirectly epistemically justifiable, namely ignore or treat as neutral the sex of the persons involved.

In sum, a sufficiently deep, overall examination of what it means to be pro-truth implies yet another practicable guideline: be non-sexist. (Sexism is anti-truth via being anti- the truth that the a-truth is irrelevant regarding known truths as such.)

Sally and Jim’s case shows that, when humans treat the directly epistemically justifiable, e.g., ‘1+2=3’, as epistemically justifiable, to do so they must also take more than a very narrow view of what is epistemically justifiable. At least implicitly, they must consider things in life-as-a-whole, e.g., persons’ gender, via being non-sexist. At least in such cases, they must at least implicitly know it is epistemically justifiable to treat the a-truth as the a-truth, via being non-sexist. So, at least here, they at least implicitly know that pro-truth theory is justified. (Otherwise, e.g., they’d believe that ‘1+2=3’ is true only when Sally says so, and believe that ‘1+2=3’ is false if Jim says that 1+2 is 3. This and related points supply just one example of evidence for pro-truth theory. Here it is evidence needed to support that at least implicit knowledge concerning non-sexism. As will be increasingly shown, an epistemically justifiable practical theory is the only evidenced practical theory.) The justifiability of such non-sexism is an obvious pro-truth truth. (To be non-sexist is to practise that pro-truth truth. Again, an overall interpretation of ‘Be pro-truth’ considers both the learning and the practising of pro-truth truth.)

The same general argument or guideline here can apply to persons’ race, sexuality, food preferences, clothing, age and many other things[99]. That is, it can apply to what a person unalterably is, or was born as, as well as to many choices persons make. E.g., whether Melanie prefers to hear jazz rather than opera can be irrelevant regarding humanity’s ability, motivation and opportunity to discover pro-truth truth.

The above suggests there is only one epistemically justifiable ultimate end for us. This is ‘Be pro-truth’ — interpreted as ‘Learn and practise pro-truth truths’. Yet, irrelevant to achieving that end, one can have innumerable a-truth ends. (The irrelevance means these diverse ends cannot conflict with the end, ‘Be pro-truth’[100].) E.g., an a-truth end for Melanie could be to enjoy jazz, when, e.g., she is too tired to do pro-truth agricultural research. Or, while doing that research it can be an a-truth end for her to wear jeans and a T-shirt instead of the voluntary uniform supplied by the research institute, or to have a peach pie for lunch instead of, say, her usual (equivalently nutritionally-pro-truth) apricot pie. Such examples take us yet farther into life as a whole, implying many freedoms, permitting great diversity. To be pro-truth involves respecting a-truth freedom via not discriminating against many things.

Essential here is the notion that doing or being anything a-truth has no affect on humanity’s being pro-truth. That is, the aim ‘Be pro-truth’ is achievable regardless of what a-truth things exist or are done. However, recent points suggest that this ‘regardless’ or ‘irrelevance’ does not mean the issues here are always unimportant. E.g., as with Sally and Jim’s genders, it is very important to treat the a-truth as irrelevant to truth, via being non-sexist.

Indeed, unavoidably, we cannot be pro-truth or epistemically justified without having various a-truth aspects. To be pro-truth, a human must exist. And so, e.g., any human must have a sex, a race and height. Such things can be a-truth[101]. So, in that unavoidable sense too, it is an important part of being pro-truth to accept the a-truth via treating the a-truth as the a-truth, namely as neutral. Indeed, regarding being directly epistemically justified, it is more than important. It is crucial: as shown by the case of Sally, Jim and ‘1+2=3’, to do otherwise is to be anti-truth and epistemically unjustified, i.e., wrong.

In sum, there is an inextricable interrelationship between being pro-truth and treating the a-truth as a-truth. Still, an overall view shows that the importance of treating the a-truth as a-truth is derivative. It derives from the epistemic importance (justifiability) of being pro-truth. That is, logically, and epistemically justifiably, the epistemic, cognitive understanding of the justifiability of being pro-truth is primary. Primarily, or firstly, one’s aim or end needs to be pro-truth or epistemically justified, and hence, or thereafter, one treats the a-truth as a-truth; not vice versa.

This prioritising and derivative importance becomes especially clear when we consider a-truth ends, namely a-truth things we can choose, e.g., to enjoy this or that a-truth music. (These are things we can do, but need not do — as opposed to things we unalterably or unavoidably are, e.g., you just are of a certain age.):-

If one is pro-truth regarding life-as-a-whole, then one would intentionally always only do either pro-truth or a-truth things. Yet, from an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, the single ultimate pro-truth end inherently has top priority: all other acceptable ends are only acceptable in relation to it. With this, they have lower priority. That is, inherently, they are achievable only if doing so does not disaffect achieving the pro-truth end. So, the pro-truth end is the primary end, and one’s a-truth ends are secondary in that they come under that primary notion. Thence, achieving the pro-truth end is a duty, whereas a-truth ends are simply permitted, as distinct from being duties[102]. Duties have higher priority than the permissible. (This is discussed further, later.)

Concluding recent points:- A deep, overall examination of the concept ‘Be pro-truth’ leads us to the concept ‘a-truth’ — and thereby to other practicable implications. The concept ‘pro-truth’ implicitly involves the a-truth. With this, the term ‘Be pro-truth’ can be understood as an abbreviation for: ‘Primarily, always be pro-truth, which includes treating the a-truth as a-truth; secondarily, i.e., irrelevant to that, and along with that, do any a-truth thing you like. Never be anti-truth’. Something like this summarises the expanded, overall, general version of ‘Be pro-truth’.

This section’s investigation so far has introduced the notions of the a-truth and the anti-truth in relation to the pro-truth. I’ll finish this section with some more practicable implications of pro-truth theory, interrelating all three notions. A simplified example:-

For all persons to be optimally pro-truth, they need the resources to do so. These include food, education, safety and so on. All such resources need to be considered within an overall context, via an overall view. Consider food. The context regarding food includes agricultural sustainability within global environmental sustainability. Many factors are involved here. They include human population size. Above a certain population level, there will be anti-truth effects on our environment. These include a decreased sustainability of agriculture. There would eventually be less food per person. People with insufficient food cannot be optimally pro-truth. So this would be anti-truth overpopulation.

There is also a pro-truth lower population limit. E.g., without a certain number of (willing and able) persons, there could not be an economy of sufficient scale to optimally efficiently produce pro-truth resources, such as food, e.g., via tractors. Education would suffer, e.g., by there being insufficient persons and hence resources to build and fund an optimally pro-truth education system, including high-quality universities, capable, e.g., of producing competent tractor designers and agricultural and environmental scientists. Similarly for medical resources, e.g., sophisticated hospitals. And so on.

This raises the issue, discussed in Part I, Chapter 2, that social contract theories and most moral theories insolubly face: ‘Why should there be persons, or human society, at all?’. Pro-truth theory alone can solve this in an epistemically justifiable way:- Humans are the potentially most pro-truth species on Earth, due to their cerebral capacity and related factors. So a zero or too-low human population would be anti-truth, and hence epistemically unjustifiable.

In sum, there is an optimally pro-truth population range. This practical implication leads onto the implication which is my primary concern here:-

Within that optimal population range, food and other pro-truth resources need to be shared in the most pro-truth way. Here, where aspects of persons are a-truth, e.g., their race, birthplace, sexuality and gender[103], these aspects need to be treated as irrelevant regarding how such sharing is to be done. Sharing also needs to be global, i.e., universally applied. E.g., there is no epistemic justification for one race, or persons born in one place, e.g., a nation, to have an excess of food and other resources, meaning that other persons have insufficient. This is in the context that there is no epistemic justification for the existence of separate, at least potentially conflicting, nations — or any other at least potentially conflicting groups. A united, pro-truth world is needed. (However, because there are nations at present (2004), they need to be considered[104].)

The general practical implication here is that being pro-truth involves being entirely unselfish. Suppose Harry knows that others’ resources are insufficient for them to be optimally pro-truth, that those persons would be more pro-truth if they had more resources, and that his resources are more than sufficient for him here. Here it is epistemically justified for Harry to share. It is a pro-truth duty. Similarly for nations, socio-economic classes and so on.

Concluding remarks here:- Hopefully that investigation of ‘Be pro-truth’ is sufficient to show it is at least possible that the expanded, overall version of this standard is as epistemically justifiable as possible, and could, if investigated carefully, imply sufficiently specific guidelines for a practical theory.

Yet this section needs to be supplemented by the next two, in order to show that it is highly plausible that those aims have been fulfilled. (And, after that, there are more, related, justificatory points.):-

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 3: A Related, More Complex Further Investigation Of The Standard And End.

The previous investigation mostly concentrated explicitly on an overall view of what ‘Be pro-truth’ means. The present section’s complementary investigation focuses on this in relation to an overall view of practicable[105] truth or knowledge as a whole — via considering direct practicable epistemic justifiability as a whole. That is, here we look at practicable science much more. (Familiar or simple examples are used.)

Again, the overall issue contexting this investigation is: ‘If we are to have an epistemically justifiable practical theory, we need to apply the ultimate standard of epistemic justifiability universally, in our lives as a whole’. (The alternative to this, as argued in Part I, is to live via some unjustifiable standard. Part I argued that the only coherent meaning of ‘(un)justifiable’ is ‘epistemically (un)justifiable’.)

This section aims, firstly, to find a single, fundamental or ultimate standard underlying all epistemic justifiability of practicable knowledge[106]; and, secondly, to better show that this standard implies the practicable guidelines arrived at in a complementary way by the previous section.

What might this standard or form be? As far as I can presently see, the only available candidate[107] must be something like: ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth  as-a-whole’. As this term is needed often below, and is long, it will normally be shortened to ‘U H/I E/T’.

Before explaining why I think U H/I E/T is the standard, I should mention the following:- U H/I E/T, as it stands, is abstract or formal. So it could have the possible problems the abstract version of ‘Be pro-truth’ has. They may not be able to be solved for U H/I E/T. This could be because U H/I E/T is being claimed to be the ultimate standard of science, and hence of scientific laws — and the same general type of claim is what Kant made regarding his UCI[108], a standard which Part I argued is inadequate as a practical standard. However, I’ll argue that possible problems regarding U H/I E/T’s abstract nature can also be solved. And I’ll argue that U H/I E/T includes but goes justifiably beyond Kant’s UCI’s interrelation of the epistemic notions he uses, namely non-contradiction and universal applicability — and that this makes U H/I E/T an epistemically better standard, and makes it applicable to life-as-a-whole in a way which avoids Kant’s major problems here.

But before that and other such defences of U H/I E/T can be presented, it needs to be shown that U H/I E/T really is the most general standard of epistemic justification. This will of course show that U H/I E/T is epistemically justifiable. (The following attempt at this will show that U H/I E/T is somewhat similar to Quine’s ‘web of belief’[109] and Whewell’s ‘consilience’[110], and to Kant’s notions of non-contradiction and universal applicability.):-

To achieve this section’s first aim, the focus is an overall view of direct epistemic justifiability of practicable truth as-a-whole[111]. This fits with the aim of finding a standard underlying all practicable epistemic justifiability, because, as argued above, truth or knowledge is the aim of any directly epistemically justifiable enterprise as such, as in science; and, clearly, truth is directly epistemically justifiable. With this, a standard underlying or applicable regarding all practicable epistemic justifiability must be applicable to practicable truth as-a-whole. As will be argued further later, this includes pro-truth truths, which include the truth that it is indirectly epistemically justifiable to learn and practise pro-truth truths. And that truth is a way of summarising pro-truth theory.

The holistic, truth as-a-whole focus here obviously involves the overall view argued above to be the most rational or most epistemically justifiable. And because we are seeking the most general or overall standard involved in epistemic justification, we need to investigate truth or epistemic justifiability as a whole.

Practicable truth as-a-whole is the sphere of practicable science as such. So, it is to practicable science  we turn for evidence regarding the nature of the fundamental or most general standard of practicable epistemic justification:-

In Part I, science was used as the exemplary case of epistemic justifiability. But the history of science shows much revision, involving many errors. This could suggest that all science is epistemically questionable, as Feyerabend[112] often claims. E.g., Ptolemy’s astronomy was radically revised (proven wrong) by Kepler, Galileo and others, and their theories were revised by Newton, whose theory was revised (proven to have limited applicability, i.e., proven wrong in some areas) by Einstein; and now Einstein is being somewhat revised. However, such developments tended to be not just errors. They involved correction and/or reduction of errors, i.e., an increase in epistemic justifiability in that scientists got closer to the truth. As explained by authors such as Alan Chalmers and George Couvalis[113], to epistemically justifiably criticise, confirm or disconfirm or improve on an allegedly true scientific theory, we can only use science[114]. E.g., Newton’s theory predicted expected events, e.g., eclipses, much more accurately than previous theories could, and Newton predicted events unexpected by any other theory at the time. Similarly for Einstein’s improvement on Newton, showing that Newton’s theory was reliably predictive but only in a limited area, not across the whole universe. Who else but a scientist, such as Einstein, could have discovered the complex detailed evidence or mathematical physics to prove that Newton’s theory needed to be improved on?

Importantly, all persons (except perhaps the severely intellectually disabled), including skeptics of science, do at least simple epistemically justifiable revisions of (alleged or faulty) science by science. E.g., as mentioned in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, we see such things as a stick or an arm apparently bent by it being put partly in water; but we would reject such illusions via simple, more reliable scientific observations, involving an overall view. E.g., you could grip with both hands all of a straight stick in water, then out of water, feeling it stay straight, and place in water a glass rod, which will break if bent only quarter as much as water apparently bends things — along with studying refraction. You at least implicitly do some such revision when you watch your arm go under water to reach a sink or bath plug, soap or other object. Similarly:- Suppose a car you are in, stopped at traffic lights among other cars, seems to roll backwards. You can use simple science to prove you are not moving back. You can, e.g., observe a nearby car, away from which you are apparently moving, and see if it, and your car, are stationary relative to something you know is not moving, e.g., a tree or building. Your observation that the other car is moving forward relative to a fixed object proves that it is only apparent that you are moving backward. You’ve used science to show that there was merely an illusion of movement, due to the other car moving forward relative to your stopped car. And so on.

In sum, our everyday, simple science, and the pains-taking, self-critical revision of complex science, shows that science is an exemplary case of epistemic justifiability or of long-term increasing epistemic justifiability via science — not a case of never getting closer to truth. Unlike with moral theory, science can and is using epistemically justifiable methods to improve the epistemic justifiability of its content. Further here:-

Apart from the just-mentioned improvements, in a great many other areas there is plenty of evidence to show that, regarding practicability, science is sufficiently close to the truth. There is not space in a book with the intended audience and scope of this one to go into great supporting detail here. Other authors, such as Alan Chalmers and George Couvalis, can be referred to if such detail is required. Also, some such details were mentioned in Part I, or certain other details there can be adapted to support the present point. (E.g., vehicles scientists send into space are on-average increasingly reliably getting closer to their increasingly difficult targets, e.g., more distant targets. More and more diseases are being cured. Technologically better cars, music-systems, computers and other machines are being invented. If they break down, we have the knowledge to understand why, and to reliably repair them. And so on.) Later, in support of other, related points, details are given which can also be adapted to support the present point. But now, this book needs to move on, accepting the present point that science is a self-improving enterprise which, in at least many areas, is, for practicable purposes, sufficiently close to the truth, or moving closer to the truth.

In conclusion here, it seems highly plausible to take an overall view of modern practicable science as the best available way to discover a single ultimate epistemically justifiable practicable standard, possibly applicable in our lives-as-a-whole. Science is a part of our lives[115] — science is a human practice, and hence its fundamental standard may be applicable to other human practices, making them epistemically justifiable too. This is the main positive theme or hope of this book.

The growth of knowledge has involved many applications of epistemically justified specific standards[116] or ideas in one area to some other area(s), and something very similar is basically what this book is attempting. The general principle here is nothing new, and its application has often been very fruitful. E.g., Gregor Mendel and others applied mathematical epistemic standards to differences and similarities among offspring across generations. This gave us the foundation of modern genetics. And, thence, via applications of standards or methods or ideas in areas such as biochemistry and X-ray crystallography to that foundation, we now have gene therapy and so on. Alan Chalmers[117] tells how Archimedes’s work in maths and physics could be fruitfully applied across areas, e.g., from statics to dynamics. There are many such examples[118]. The historical and related discussions beginning two paragraphs below will give more examples, from within science. But before that, an example of how values in science implied by the standard, ‘Be epistemically justifiable’, can be applied to life-as-a-whole. This is a preliminary example of what the historical discussion is leading up to:-

When being objective, Lee, a scientist, treats impartially all those aspects of fellow scientists which are irrelevant to their objectivity. E.g., Lee would not reject or accept hypotheses because they are proposed by someone of this or that race, gender, sexuality and so on. Lee would assess others’ hypotheses purely via the epistemic merits of the theories, e.g., via looking only at the evidence. So, within science, objective scientists apply a pro-truth standard. This standard, ‘Be epistemically justifiable’, because it implies treating the a-truth as a-truth, involves the non-racist etc values internal to human epistemically justifiable science. Lee applies this scientific standard to persons doing science. Yet such standards or values are clearly applicable to our lives generally. They can be applied to racism or sexism in the media and entertainment sectors, to employment policies, to apartheid politics, to ethnic cleansing and so on. In sum, it is nonsense to claim that a theory or standard or values applicable in one area cannot be applied in other areas. Similarly, in order to objectively seek truth, scientists must be alive and hence at least implicitly value being alive and things needed to keep them alive, e.g., sufficient food, rest and health. To be optimally objective involves various such resources and hence the at least implicit valuing of them. Again, obviously, to be epistemically justifiable even in the narrow sense of being objective scientists, the scientists must in practice value many things in their lives-as-a-whole. So, outside the laboratory or wherever they do their directly epistemically justifiable things, they also need to be epistemically justifiable or pro-truth in many indirect ways. Thence, so do many other persons, e.g., the farmers and health-workers etc providing the food etc the scientists need[119].

Those points concern innumerable specific values or standards. I’m seeking a single general standard covering all such specific values or standards. What single general standard applies across all practicable science, i.e., practicable truth as-a-whole? The following historical development begins the argument that it is U H/I E/T, namely, ‘universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth  as-a-whole’. (The discussion is simplified, but not over-simplified.):-

(This paragraph is an interpretation of work by William Whewell[120].) Long ago it was observed that planets moved round the sun, that tides rose and fell, that water runs downhill, that letting go of a stone held above the ground resulted in the stone moving towards the ground, and so on. No-one properly knew how such events were caused. The events also seemed separate. E.g., what could tides rising have to do with Neptune going round the sun, or what could either of these have to do with falling stones? The answer is not obvious. Later, Isaac Newton realised that, universally, there is harmony among such apparently separate and sometimes apparently contradictory events. Newton realised that gravity was involved in causing them all. So, among the rising and falling of tides, the falling only of released stones, and the non-rising and non-falling of orbiting planets, there is harmony: a unifying causal explanation. One law, the law of gravity, fundamentally[121] explains them all. (Whewell’s uses one of his made-up words, ‘consilience’, here : descriptions of apparently separate, conflicting events are reconciled or ‘consiliated’.)

It is important to note that here it is merely perceptions being discussed — not truths. This becomes clear when we consider perceptions which are illusions. E.g., consider again seeing an arm or stick appearing to bend when partly placed in water. The law of refraction is the practicable truth here, or sufficiently near to it for practical purposes such as reliably picking up coins dropped in a creek. Refraction explains the apparent bending. But, according to our perception as such, a stick is bent by water, and straightened when entirely in air. If perception always gave us the truth, it would be true that water and air have such effects. But, as Fodor points out[122], we have encapsulated (inflexible, unreflective) perceptual modules in our brains. As suggested in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, the real truth is only discoverable via informed higher-level cognitive reflection on what our perceptual modules present to our consciousness. This rational reflection uses scientific knowledge gained via other, more overall observations, to overrule the bent-stick observation. E.g., we can line the stick up with our arm, partly submerge both, and feel that neither bends, in that our arm would break if truly bent thus. We can learn, via other observations, about refraction through glass, water and so on — and reliably use the truth here in practice, e.g., in making spectacles. Via those and related processes, we cognitively harmonise all our observations or perceptions within the entire area where refraction applies. Then, our knowledge of all the separate truths within the area, e.g., truths concerning spectacles, prisms, sticks and dropped coins, will not be contradictory. Then, we realise that, as with looking through spectacles, the observation of a stick apparently bending was an observation of refraction, namely of a truth — not an observation of a stick bending.

That is, from an overall, harmonising view, the observation is known to not really contradict the truth. The unreflective observation is known to be a too-narrow view, and hence not as epistemically justifiable as possible. Similarly regarding the ‘car apparently rolling back’ example. Again, only science can correct errors in alleged or faulty science, avoiding contradictions or disharmony. Perceptions can sometimes contradict each other; truths cannot.

In sum, sensations or perceptions are at a low level in the neural hierarchy involved in our coming to have practicable scientific knowledge. A set of consistent perceptions, as in consistently seeing a stick apparently bend in water, is necessary for knowledge — but is not sufficient. Much more is needed, especially knowledge of a law (truth) inherently giving a harmonious explanation of  those and all other observations in an area, via higher-level cognitive interpretation of all the observations. This gives us an overall, epistemically justifiable view.

Perceptions or observations then, lack that overall view. They can be called a ‘part of a practicable truth’. Only an overall view can give us the truth. (The parable of blind persons each perceiving only part of an elephant is relevant here. All they could truthfully say is, “The part I’m feeling is like a ...”.)

Importantly, as suggested in the previous section, this ‘part-of-truth’ notion also applies to the narrowest views of epistemic justifiability and of ‘Be pro-truth’ relative to the overall view. A scientific part-of-truth can only become as epistemically justifiable as possible via a harmonising process, involving additions or qualifications made by a reflective, overall view. Separate parts of a truth are only truly or epistemically justifiably reconcilable via or under a high-level, explanatory, covering or overall truth or law. This means that overall epistemic justifiability involves only pro-truth truths, and involves both direct and indirect epistemic justifiability, both the  pro-truth and treating the a-truth as the a-truth, and so on. The present section is arguing that the general point here applies to U H/I E/T[123], namely that U H/I E/T is the overall formal truth or standard regarding or covering all practicable scientific truth. So far it seems possible that at least the ‘U H E/T’ in U H/I E/T is involved. Further:-

That general point, concerning harmony, can be shown to apply to all other apparently separate or contradictory events. E.g., a balloon greatly inflated with air will, when released in air, fall slowly down, but an equally inflated basketball, of equal volume, when released in air, will fall faster; but both will rise very fast if released deep under water, unlike a solid lead sphere the same volume and shape as the basketball; and the balloon will rise in air when inflated with helium, though the basketball will not; and so on. All such apparently conflicting events come harmoniously under one (set of) principle(s): all are explainable via the set of laws involved in the principle, ‘gravity, involving the distances and masses involved, in relation to, e.g., laws concerning air pressure, volume, uplifting air-currents, weak air-resistance, hydrophysics and floatation’.

Consider the observation, ‘The balloon fell slower in air than the basketball’. This is a part-of-truth in that the truth also involves: ‘The balloon fell slower than the basketball because, though gravity affects both similarly, the lighter balloon was much more affected by uplifting air currents and air resistance than was the basketball’. Only the overall view, involving a harmonising law or set of laws, can give us the truth here. Again, there is harmony within each truth-as-a-whole in this area.

There is also harmony across time[124], regarding the way each law of nature operates in every relevantly similar situation. The U and H in U H/I E/T apply here too. All else equal, any one cause (or set of causes) will harmoniously produce the same effect, universally across time. If today you fall off a cliff from which many have fallen to their deaths over many centuries, you’ll fall in much the same way, with much the same result, all else equal (e.g., if, like the others, you are not wearing a parachute).

Harmony also applies regarding practicable maths and practicable logic. (These are involved in practicable science.) E.g., it is practicable to add two tennis balls to one tennis ball and get three balls, and this harmonises with 2+4 balls making 6, with 30+60 balls making 90, and so on. That is, in practicable arithmetic there is non-contradiction. E.g., because X is X, hence 1+1+1 is 1+1+1, i.e., 1+2 is 3, and so ‘1+2=3’ plus ‘1+2=3’, i.e., doubling ‘1+2=3’, gives us ‘2+4 is 6 balls’, and so on. That is, from ‘X is X’ we can eventually get 30+60 balls making 90, and any other true practicable sum. This is because non-contradiction means 1=1, and hence means 1+1=1+1, and combining this makes 1+1+1=1+1+1, i.e., ‘1+2=3’, and so on. In sum (no pun intended), there is harmony, involving practicable logic’s principle of non-contradiction, within all practicable arithmetic and so on.

The overall conclusion here is that there is harmony within every area within practicable truth as-a-whole. So, at least, the ‘U H (universal harmony)’ in U H/I E/T is involved in direct epistemic justification as a whole, namely within all areas. Next I’ll discuss the ‘I’ (irrelevance) in U H/I E/T. I’ll argue that, where there is not harmony, there is only irrelevance. That is, U H/I E/T applies, namely: universally there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole:-

An overall view shows there is harmony within every area, but not harmony among every area. Some things or areas within science’s truths-as-a-whole are irrelevant to each other, as opposed to being harmonious with each other:-

Harmony among scientific truths concerning practicable events involves relevance, via one thing, e.g., gravity, having the same fundamental affect in all relevant situations. That is, gravity is relevant to all the tidal, orbital etc events mentioned above via being causally involved in them all. Irrelevance among practicable scientific truths means that what causes one thing does not cause or affect the other. Here there is neither a harmonious relationship nor a disharmonious or conflicting relationship. Here there is a neutral relationship. Here the events or things have zero relevance to each other. E.g:-

Consider three basketballs of the same mass, same volume, in effectively the same place on Earth, and so on, i.e., equal in all ways. Suppose we move one basketball to the moon, and one into space where the gravitational forces of the moon and Earth balance each other. Such changes or differences will cause each basketball to do different things (though all explainable via the one principle, involving gravity). E.g., a basketball dropped on the moon will drop slower than if dropped on Earth, all else equal; and the other moved ball will be suspended in space. Yet if we change the colour of a basketball, this in itself will have no effect on how gravity affects the ball. The colour is irrelevant to gravity operating in a universally harmonious way. That is, causing a change in colour does not cause gravity to affect the ball differently. There is a neutral (zero) causal relationship between colour and gravitational effects. Not all things in the universe are connected to each other, affecting each other, or basically in the same area[125].

Similarly, all else equal, causing a change in the way you travel or sing is irrelevant regarding cubes having six sides. And if you write ‘1+2=3’, this sum remains a truth, regardless of whether you cause it to be written in pencil, paint or chalk, and regardless of whether you are male or female. There are many other such examples. In sum, within practicable truth as-a-whole, there is either harmony or irrelevance, never disharmony or contradiction. U H/I E/T applies.

There can of course be disharmony between events, via one event causally-contradicting (stopping) another. E.g., the event ‘not watering the plant’ can be disharmonious with the (possible) event: ‘the plant staying alive’. But that is no problem regarding U H/I E/T. Such disharmony is somewhat like the recently-discussed merely possibly apparent disharmony between a tide rising and a stone falling. The sense in which there is disharmony among events does not negate U H/I E/T. That is, the general law concerning truth as-a-whole or scientific laws does not include the phase, ‘either harmony or irrelevance or disharmony’. Any disharmony among (actual/possible) events is caused by the same, harmonious laws. E.g., universally, it is a law that if plants never again get water, this contradicts (stops) their existence: they are thereby caused to die. There is fundamental harmony among all ‘never again water’ and ‘plant not staying alive’ events. A general issue here is: ‘Mutually-opposing forces do not mean mutually-contradictory laws’:-

Science shows there can only be disharmony in the sense of causal contradiction among events, the contradiction being caused by opposition between forces described by laws which, harmoniously, apply universally. By contrast, contradiction among the laws would mean one of the laws (truths) involved is caused to stop applying: it would not apply universally harmoniously. Opposition among forces cannot involve contradictory truths. The principle of causal contradiction is ‘Not both X and not-X simultaneously’. E.g., a plant cannot simultaneously be (caused to be) both watered and not watered, and you cannot simultaneously jump and not jump. These are truths. Contradictory truths concerning the laws here would be, e.g., ‘Gravity applies universally’ and ‘Gravity does not apply universally’. But, e.g., the law of gravity is not caused to stop operating by the laws involved in us using our leg muscles to jump (or not jump). Or vice versa. ‘Opposition’ or ‘opposing forces’ means just what it says: e.g., here, both the force of gravity (X) and the leg-muscle force (Y) apply simultaneously. This X and Y can apply simultaneously, but not this X and not-X., i.e., gravity and the absence of gravity. Conflict here, i.e., contradiction, would mean there’d be either gravity or, due to a conflicting (leg-muscle) law operating, no gravity. Yet when we jump, gravity keeps operating. So there is no contradiction among laws. (The same of course applies regarding the law(s) describing muscle force.) It is not a truth that there are conflicting or disharmonious laws. Instead of laws conflicting, it is the force of gravity which opposes our jumping forever upwards, and the force of our muscles etc which opposes gravity, allowing us to jump. Such opposition means, e.g., that the event ‘jumping over the moon’ is contradicted (stopped) because gravity successfully opposes our weaker leg-muscles propelling us that far.

The inherently non-contradictory laws (truths) involved state that opposition between forces involves a balance between the forces, not an ending of one force by the other. They state that the balance can change, depending on the strength of the forces. Our leg-muscle force is not strong enough to propel us into orbit, where there would be a long-term stable balance between our motion and gravity’s effect. So when we jump upwards we rise, for no more than about two metres, then we momentarily stop because here the balance involves equal forces. Then we come back to Earth, instead of staying suspended in orbit, because gravity has kept operating with the same force and our leg-muscle force is weaker. Rocket-propelling forces can be strong enough to reach the orbital type of balance. If there was contradiction among laws rather than an oppositional balance between forces here, the satellite or whatever would not stay in orbit.

In other words, there is a law stating that forces described by laws can combine to have a mutually-caused effect. Contradictory things cannot combine. (E.g., we cannot have a person simultaneously both jump up and not jump. It’s only one or the other. We can have a jump involving a simultaneous combination of gravity and leg-muscle forces.)

Combined forces can either oppose, or, they can co-operate and in that sense harmonise. (Or events can be irrelevant to each other, as in the event ‘changing a basketball’s colour’ being irrelevant to the event ‘how the basketball is affected by gravity’.) Examples of how events or forces can harmonise in the practical sense, ‘co-operation’:-

The events, ‘Eating X’, ‘Eating Y’ (and other foods), ‘Exercising in way E’, ‘Sleeping in way S’ and other events, can co-operate or harmonise regarding causing the end, ‘Optimum pro-truth health’.  Someone on a cliff-side can use their leg muscles to push themselves downwards. They can combine their leg-muscle force with the force of gravity to move even faster towards the ground than via gravity alone. (Or, of course, leg muscles can be used to oppose oneself falling off a cliff, and stop the possible event, ‘falling’.) [126]

Recent points concerning opposition versus contradiction can be adapted to include the issue of co-operating forces versus (any claim that there are) mutually-contradictory forces, and to the issue of events or forces irrelevant to each other not contradicting each other. So, whether there is harmony in the sense of co-operating forces, or disharmony in the sense of opposing forces, or irrelevance among events or forces[127], this is irrelevant regarding the laws (truths) harmoniously describing the forces which cause events. (This is another way in which there is universally either irrelevance or harmony regarding the laws (overall truths) explaining all practicable events, as in U H/I E/T. The laws concern truths as-a-whole, as in U H/I E/T.)

Summarising and concluding here:-

Events or things, which are explainable by laws, can contradict. (They can causally contradict each other, as in the event, ‘Fred using leg muscles to jump back from the crumbling cliff edge’, stopping the (possible) event, ‘Fred falling over the cliff’.) However, the forces described by the laws which explain events cannot contradict. Forces can oppose but not contradict (stop) each other. And the laws (truths) as such cannot either contradict or oppose each other. There can only be universal harmony or irrelevance here, namely regarding all epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole, i.e., as in U H/I E/T.

It is only forces explainable by non-conflicting laws which can oppose each other. It is not the laws or truths as such which oppose each other. It is the harmonious operation of each law and associated force(s) here which explains the opposition or oppositional balances among forces.

This issue is important because, if the most general epistemic standard is ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance or disharmony regarding the epistemically justifiable or practicable truth as-a-whole’, this would mean it is epistemically justifiable to be both anti-truth and pro-truth. This would mean that an epistemically justifiable practical theory, a pro-truth theory, is a self-contradictory theory. It would be a theory which an overall, rational view would see as epistemically un-justifiable. This situation would be incoherent. Hence it was important to resolve that issue.

Summarising this section so far:- This section (and, equivalently but less explicitly, the previous section,) seeks a single, general standard underlying epistemic justifiability and all possible practicable truths as-a-whole. This standard or form must apply regardless of whether events the truths or laws describe involve one event contradicting another, or events co-operating with or irrelevant to each other. This form or standard seems to be U H/I E/T. There seems to be only (i) harmony regarding the operation of each law, namely within the area where a law applies; or (ii) irrelevance among laws, namely among areas, as with gravity and colour. (i) and (ii) mean non-conflict.

Hence, this of course applies to knowledge concerning practicable truth as-a-whole. And it applies among specific truths: each truth is or comes under a law (or a set of laws). U H/I E/T then, applies to all practicable truths, and hence to directly epistemic things such as science.

Those conclusions suggest that this section’s first aim has been achieved, namely to show that U H/I E/T is the most general or ultimate epistemic standard. Next, a discussion leading up to the achieving of this section’s second aim — to show that it is highly plausible that U H/I E/T can be applied to the whole how-should-one-live sphere:-

The term ‘universally’ in U H/I E/T implies that it is indirectly epistemically justifiable to consider everything which does or might affect our being epistemically justifiable. This is also implied by an overall view of epistemic justifiability. This means considering both all our thoughts and all our (other, publicly observable[128]) practices. That is, U H/I E/T suggests a holistic practical theory. U H/I E/T does not just concern thinking or knowledge as such, the perhaps only obvious focus of an unexamined ‘Be pro-truth’ or narrowest view of epistemic justifiability[129]. So, U H/I E/T involves both the learning and the practising of pro-truth truth. Otherwise, as U H/I E/T also suggests, a person would not universally be in harmony with pro-truth truth, with the type of truth which is as epistemically justifiable as possible. So, the person’s choices and life would not be as epistemically justifiable as possible.

In sum, U H/I E/T does not just apply regarding direct epistemic justifiability; it also applies regarding indirect epistemic justifiability — it applies universally, i.e., to both, as  the ‘U’ in U H/I E/T implies. It is the standard of epistemic justification, and so it is the standard of direct and indirect epistemic justification.

An adaptation of some arguments from the previous section also make that point:-

Direct epistemic justification concerns truths as such. Indirect epistemic justifiability concerns whether each directly epistemically justified truth is knowledge used in a pro-truth way. U H/I E/T then, applies in a narrow way to direct epistemic justification, and in an overall way regarding the relation (harmony) between indirect and direct epistemic justification. Yet the standard as such is the same. (An analogy:- The standard, ‘Be multi-coloured’, can be applied narrowly, e.g., to only the shirt worn by the lead singer in an opera. But that standard can also be applied to the opera’s visual aspects overall, i.e., to all other costumes, each piece of scenery, etc.)

Also, U H/I E/T is the standard of all practicable truth — and indirectly epistemically justifiable, pro-truth truths are practicable truths. Similarly:- U H/I E/T has been shown to be the standard of practicable truth as-a-whole. And pro-truth truths are within that whole. So U H/I E/T is the standard regarding all pro-truth truths[130]. They include the overall truth that it is as epistemically justifiable (e.g., contradictionless) as possible to learn and practise only pro-truth truths — in life-as-a-whole. This truth is a way of summarising pro-truth theory (and this makes the theory knowledge). So, because U H/I E/T is the standard of practicable truth as-a-whole, it is the standard of indirect epistemic justification. Hence it is epistemically justifiable to apply U H/I E/T, or pro-truth theory(’s standard), universally, to life-as-a-whole.

If we think it is epistemically justifiable to have an epistemically justifiable theory in life generally, we need to apply U H/I E/T universally. (Or we could simply ask, “Can the fundamental standard of epistemic justification be applied to life as-a-whole?” (which, if it can be, would make life-as-a-whole an epistemically justifiable enterprise).) And it seems the standard can be applied universally, because, e.g., as the previous section suggests, achieving the directly epistemically justifiable implies there are (indirectly epistemically justifiable) things we need in order to be directly epistemically justifiable, and these concern life as-a-whole. This is exemplified by the previous section’s Sally, Jim and ‘1+2=3’ in relation to non-sexism, and the present section’s example of the non-sexist etc scientist Lee, and those sections’ implications regarding those persons need to eat, be safe, healthy etc. A general point here is that U H/I E/T seems applicable to life-as-a-whole because U H/I E/T is equivalent to the previous section’s expanded version of ‘Be pro-truth’ — which the previous section shows could be applied to life-as-a-whole:-

Consider a conclusion implied by recent points: ‘U H/I E/T implies that overall epistemically justifiability involves universally acting only in ways either harmonious with or irrelevant regarding the notion, ‘Learn and practise pro-truth truths’.’ Arguments in the previous section also show that being as epistemically justifiable as possible means learning and practising only pro-truth truths. That is, U H/I E/T also implies it is epistemically unjustifiable to do that which conflicts with truth, i.e., the anti-truth — which means that only pro-truth truths should be learnt and practised. These practices include treating the a-truth as a-truth[131]. Therefore, arguments in this and the previous section mean that U H/I E/T is equivalent to an overall, deeply-examined interpretation of ‘Be pro-truth’. As argued above, ‘Be pro-truth’ is short for something like ‘Do only either the pro-truth or the a-truth, never the anti-truth’. So, U H/I E/T has the same implications as ‘Be pro-truth’, including its universally practicable guidelines.

To further show that U H/I E/T is equivalent to ‘Be pro-truth’, we only have to note the following:- To be harmonious with the truth is to be pro-truth, and to do that which is irrelevant to the truth is to do that which is a-truth. To do only that which is either in harmony with or irrelevant to the truth is to never do the anti-truth. And so on, as in the previous section. That is, an investigation focusing on the most general or fundamental standard of direct epistemic justifiability or practicable truth also gives us the previous section’s practicable guidelines.

The main justificatory conclusion of this chapter so far is: U H/I E/T or, equivalently, ‘Be pro-truth’, is the only fully epistemically justifiable fundamental or ultimate standard. This suggests that this gives us an absolute, objective, authority for pro-truth practical theory — as far as is possible.

Summarising Sections 1-3:- Their investigation not only epistemically justifies that standard and associated end. It also epistemically justifies applying it universally. The term ‘universally’ in U H/I E/T includes our choices concerning our lives as a whole. Our choices, our practices, are part of the universe. When our choices and hence intended practices are universally either in harmony with or irrelevant to pro-truth truth, there will universally be either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability; and vice versa. That is, only then, for us, in practice and in theory, will there be U H/I E/T.

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 4: Other, Related, Empirical Justificatory Points.

Above, the following was stated: “Science is a part of our lives — science is a human practice, and hence its standard may be applicable to other human practices, making them epistemically justifiable too.” Section 1-3’s examples of specific practical implications of pro-truth theory show that science’s ultimate standard is indeed applicable to other areas. The next chapter gives many more such examples. Yet, before that, the standard seems to need further justification. The present section will complement the above justificatory points with one more, related, important justificatory argument. (Then, after a short optional section supplementing Sections 1-4, and a short optional section which revisits Kant, the rest of the book is mostly highly practical.)

The further justification:-

There is empirical (i.e., observable) evidence for pro-truth theory’s most general standard, and hence for the theory. The evidence given above for the standard could seem to only consist of arguments, of words, but, as will be representatively shown, these at least implicitly refer to publicly observable evidence. Inherently, as argued in Part I, no moral theory’s standard could be supported by empirical evidence. Inherently, a theory based on practicable science’s standard is supported by empirical evidence:-

The above arguments’ examples, concerning gravity, colour and so on, confirming the nature of that standard, concern observable things or effects, e.g., basketballs and gravitational effects. The basic point is that the universal harmony etc referred to in U H/I E/T involves universal harmony etc concerning observations. This is because practicable truths are observable truths. E.g., we can harmoniously observe that, universally, no matter how hard we try, we cannot throw a basketball up to make it rise endlessly; and we can harmoniously observe that, universally, we cannot change the colour of a basketball and thereby, all else equal, have evidence that colour is relevant to gravity’s effects on the ball. So because all such representative empirical evidence confirms what practicable science’s most general standard is, this is sufficient empirical evidence to justify the claim that there is an empirically justifiable standard regarding practicable truth as-a-whole. Because that standard is applicable in life-as-a-whole, that evidence is empirical evidence for (the basis of) a practical theory which is epistemically justifiable, namely a theory as close to publicly observable truth as is practicable for a theory concerning how one should live. Here alone can we have an epistemically justifiable, evidenced practical theory.

In sum:- As argued in Part I, ‘justified’ means ‘justified via evidence’, i.e., epistemically justified. Therefore, only an epistemically justifiable practical theory is justifiable, and justified. Justified true belief, or justified belief based on or positively related to truth, is knowledge or close to knowledge. Therefore, pro-truth theory is as close to being knowledge as is possible for a practical theory. It alone has overall epistemic authority.

Another example, making the implications of those examples concerning empirical evidence more explicit:-

Samantha, a scientist, on a motoring holiday, leading a convoy of  twelve cars, looks for a nice picnic spot. She stops at the bottom of a hill. The ground here is level, so the hungry drivers leave their cars in neutral gear, do not bother to apply hand-brakes, and rush towards a picnic table. Much to everyone’s surprise, nine cars start to roll uphill. Nearby, a stream rolls downhill, and a bird searching for food moves some pebbles, which also roll downhill. The cars’ uphill movement apparently contradicts all the science Samantha knows concerning gravity. U H/I E/T seems threatened. All persons there are amazed.

(They can catch up with the cars, and do so, parking them again, using the hand-brakes.)

Mark, who knows little of science, says, “The only cars that did not roll uphill are green. So the colour green must stop them rolling uphill. Here gravity must only work on green cars”. He tries hard to lift the green cars, but cannot. He says, “I cannot lift them. So, yes, gravity still works on these cars.”

Samantha, as a scientist, at least implicitly knows that U H/I E/T is the most general standard of practicable science. So she thinks Mark’s suggestion must be wrong, as she knows colour is (or used to be) irrelevant regarding gravity’s effects. But at first she cannot think of a better explanation than Mark’s. (Perhaps, she thinks, the principle (law?) of induction has stopped operating harmoniously.) Yet, because she at least implicitly applies U H/I E/T, she looks more closely at the green cars, comparing them with the others. She tries to lift all the cars. She discovers the green and non-green cars are about the same mass, same size, and so on. So she looks at their other aspects. She also looks at and round the hill carefully.

She finds that the green cars all belong to one family, who work for a new, small-scale manufacturer of specialist cars. This family gets the cars very cheap, so they bought three. The cars have special plastic bodies, and the manufacturing process makes the plastic green. The other parts which in normal cars are steel, are mostly ceramic and aluminium. The cars which rolled uphill are normal cars, i.e., with steel bodies and engines. Samantha notices a sign, mostly hidden by a roadside bush. The sign says: ‘Magnetic Hill: If you sit in your vehicle at the bottom of this hill, in neutral, with no brakes applied, your car will roll uphill, defying gravity! (The hilltop is mostly a giant magnetic rock.)’[132].

Samantha realises she initially did not have a sufficiently overall view of the situation. Now she feels relieved, because she’d suffered what psychologists call ‘cognitive dissonance’, due to apparently finding that U H/I E/T did not apply here. Apparently, the law of gravity was contradicted, and the only initial (partial) evidence was that colour seemed causally associated with how gravity apparently worked on cars here.

Now she remembers that magnets, (like leg muscles,) can oppose gravity, and that the enormous magnetic rock  she now knows to constitute most of the top of the hill would make a mostly steel car roll upwards in certain conditions.

She also realises that, if the law of gravity did not also apply to cars here, then, e.g., each car would have easily risen off the ground when she tried to lift it. So she observes that colour has remained irrelevant regarding gravity affecting all cars of about the same mass in the same way. And so on.

In sum, Samantha sought the relevant harmony and irrelevance with the rest of nature here, implied by U H/I E/T, and soon found it. That is, she observed that U H/I E/T is practicable nature’s most general standard. She found further harmonious empirical evidence to confirm that U H/I E/T is the most general or ultimate standard regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable science’s truths as-a-whole. She found that there are not some practicable truths or one standard applying in only part of that whole, or universe, and, contradicting this, other practicable truths or some other standard(s) applying in the other part(s).

The main point here is supported by all empirical evidence (contexted via a sufficiently overall, empirically-evidenced viewpoint