Title: Anti-Morality, Truth And Peace: Beyond Kant And Others

PART II: A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS WITH MORAL THEORIES.

PART II: CHAPTER 1: A SUGGESTED SINGLE, ULTIMATE, PRACTICABLE EPISTEMIC STANDARD AND ASSOCIATED END.

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 1: Preliminary Points Concerning What The Standard And End Might Be And How They Can Be Justified Or Defended; And Some Possible Problems.

The overall issue in Part II is: ‘If we are to have an epistemically justifiable practical theory, we need to apply the ultimate standard of epistemic justifiability in our lives as a whole (if that standard exists)’. (The alternative to this, as argued in Part I, is to live via some unjustifiable standard. Part I argued that the only coherent meaning of ‘(un)justifiable’ is ‘epistemically (un)justifiable’.)

Part I implies we need a practical theory with a single ultimate standard and associated end which are epistemically justifiable or as close to truth as possible for a practical theory. Any such standard and end also need to be specific enough to at least imply unambiguous practicable guidelines for our lives as a whole. For this and other, epistemic reasons, as argued in Part I, the standard and associated end must be universally applicable and not involve contradictions. I’ll argue that there is such a standard and end.

One way to discover them is to begin from the abstract notions here, e.g., ‘truth as such’, then look at all general types of specific notions within the abstract. This is like a typical search for, say, a book or socks in an unfamiliar bedroom, which best begins by looking round the whole room, then focuses on just some specific places within the room after finding that looking in other places is unfruitful.

(It is important to remember that this section’s points are only preliminary. They also tend to be only very general or abstract. This short section’s evidence or arguments need to and will be greatly added to. This is done in several subsequent sections. Section 2 has a much more practical focus, with simple, familiar examples. Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter contain the most important explanations, defences and justificatory points.)

This search begins by discussing the abstract notion, truth. However, as explained above, e.g., in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, because this book’s aim is a practical theory, practicable in life as a whole, the discussion at least implicitly focuses on practicable truth — or beliefs which are, for us, sufficient knowledge because we can rely on them in practice. (Because this section is preliminary, and because the present context does not require it, it is not till later, mostly in footnotes, that ‘practicable truth’ is explained further than via Part I’s explanations and the following example of it:- We can know that water flows downhill, due to gravity, unless something opposes gravity, e.g., a pump, and use such knowledge to reliably place and store water in dams.) So, it is practicable truth which is the at least implicit focus of the following discussions:-

The next few paragraphs’ abstract points here will be argued to be sound, but only as abstract points. That is, because the discussion is merely introductory and very abstract, it has potential problems regarding specifics. E.g., an abstract notion can be interpreted to mean contradictory specific things. For instance:-

The notion ‘freedom’, as it stands, is abstract. It can be interpreted to specifically mean contradictory things in practice. E.g., the capitalist’s ‘freedom to get rich by making others poor’ versus the socialist’s ‘freedom of all from being made poor by others’; Stalin’s ‘freedom to have anyone he disliked murdered, including innocents’ versus ‘freedom from the threat of murder, especially for innocents’; Jeremy’s freedom to play loud music conflicts with his neighbour’s (wish to have) freedom from noise while studying; and so on. It is one thing to try to justify an abstract notion, such as ‘Be free’ or ‘Seek truth’. It can be quite a different matter to try to explain and justify this rather than that specific interpretation of the abstract notion.

Such potential problems are dealt with when the search for an epistemically non-problematic theory focuses on specifics. But we begin with the abstract discussion, involving truth as such:-

Discovering truth is the reason for any directly epistemic enterprise as such, e.g., science. The inherent end of all directly epistemic enterprises as such is the abstract notion, ‘truth’, or truth as such — as opposed to truths about specific things[85]. (As explained early in Part I, in such sentences ‘knowledge’ can be substituted for ‘truths’.) Directly epistemically justifiable methods as such, as in science, can only seek truth or knowledge. Inherently, they cannot aim to achieve the end, ‘falsehoods’, or any end other than truth.

The most general positive points of this book so far can be summarised as follows:- The only thing which is epistemically justifiable as such is the epistemically justifiable as such. The only epistemically justifiable abstract end is truth as such. Therefore, it is epistemically justifiable to seek truth. A practical theory concerns our choices. An epistemically justifiable practical theory requires us to choose to seek truth. (However, I’ll argue that it also indirectly requires and permits us to do much more than that.)

To seek truth as such is to be pro- ‘truth-as-such’ (as opposed to seeking truths about some further, specific issue.) To choose to seek truth is to be pro-truth. To intend to seek truth, and to act on this intention, is to be pro-truth. So, the abstract standard or criterion via which we can assess whether something, X, is epistemically justifiable, is: ‘Is X pro-truth?’.

Concluding recent points:- The only epistemically justifiable practical theory seems to be a pro-truth practical theory. The ‘assessment version’ of that theory’s standard is ‘Is X pro-truth?’. The ‘prescriptive version’ is ‘Be pro-truth’. The abstract arguments so far seem to suggest that the associated end is ‘truth as such’.

So, abstractly speaking, an epistemically justifiable practice is a pro-truth practice: it aims at the end, truth[86]. That is, regarding epistemically justifiable thinking, ‘pro-truth’ is short for at least something like ‘pro-discovering-truth’ or ‘pro-learning-knowledge’. And regarding (other, publicly observable) epistemically justifiable practices, ‘pro-truth’ is short for at least something like ‘practices which help us learn or discover the truth’. (E.g., observation is a practice needed to help us directly discover practicable truth[87]. The indirectly epistemically justifiable practices here, some of which are briefly introduced soon, involve one’s life-as-a-whole. The two chapters after this argue this in detail, stressing that this crucially involves emotions, virtues and a type of flourishing.)

Concluding that introductory discussion:- Clearly, a pro-truth theory, because it aims at truth, and is epistemically justifiable, is as close to truth as is possible for a practical theory. And a practical theory as close as possible to truth is what this book is seeking. So here we have a brief, introductory, abstract (and hence largely incomplete) justification of pro-truth theory.

Here, perhaps, we have the beginnings or part of a solution to the epistemic problems, discussed in Part I, which all moral theories have. Perhaps, building on that beginning, we can come to know that the end advocated by one practical theory is epistemically justifiable, and hence as objective as possible for a practical theory. This single end would imply just one, holistic duty, i.e., a duty covering the area ‘life-as-a-whole’. The duty would be ‘Be pro-truth’. This, if sufficiently specific, would solve all problems involving conflicts — problems Part I showed that Kant and other moral theories cannot avoid. Thence, perhaps, we can know how to justifiably live.

Various possible problems present themselves here. They are due to the abstract nature of that suggested beginning of a solution. A crucial issue regarding practicability is: if one aims to practise pro-truth theory, which specific truths does this involve?:-

These are practicable truths-about-something. (These were discussed in a footnote near the beginning of this section.) We cannot in practice just be pro- ‘the truth’ or pro- ‘truth as such’. The notion ‘truth as such’ is as abstract and in-itself as ambiguous as Kant’s UCI[88]. In practice we can only know and be pro- some specific truth(s), e.g., via learning truths about fruit-growing.

So, on a first, abstract, view, the standard, ‘Be pro-truth’, could seem to involve epistemic problems as insoluble as those with the too-limited, too-formal or abstract epistemic basis[89] of Kant’s theory. If one chooses to live a fully pro-truth life, this could seem to oblige one to always focus only on learning truths, or knowledge. This aim seems too limited. With this, the abstract nature of the pro-truth standard as it stands could allow epistemically insoluble conflicts — e.g., regarding choosing among the infinite number of specific truths one could learn. ‘Be pro-truth’, as it abstractly stands, supplies no unambiguous, epistemically justifiable way to choose among them.

Or, the theory could seem to suggest that one should or is permitted to learn simply any specific truths. E.g., it could suggest it is equally epistemically justifiable or permissible to dedicate one’s life to either (1) learning truths about the colour and decoration of the bottle-top of every type of bottle ever made which has/had a bottle-top; or (2) learning how to cure diseases. If it is justifiable to learn either of (1) and (2), namely equally justifiable, this permits us to choose between them via chance, e.g., via coin-tossing, or via some other epistemically arbitrary method. This paragraph applies to choosing among all truths; an individual cannot possibly learn all truths. Choices must be made.

That possible problem suggests others. E.g., if humans are to focus only on acquiring knowledge, or any type of knowledge, how can they be motivated to do so? Pro-truth theory might only or mostly advocate dull, narrow, cerebral tasks. Wouldn’t a theory advocating such things as love, sex and happiness be better in relation to motivatability? Pro-truth theory may be too motivationally problematic to be put into practice.

Perhaps some further investigation of the pro-truth standard and related end will solve those possible problems. This chapter will further investigate the standard and end in three related explanatory ways. Much more also needs to be said regarding justification of the standard, and that investigation involves this too. A preview:-

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 1.1: A Preview Of The Following Investigation And Of The Rest Of The Book.

First, in Section 2, there is a fairly simple investigation. Secondly, in Section 3, a more complex investigation. Those two investigations complement each other by beginning from or focusing on different aspects of the notion, ‘epistemic justifiability’. Thirdly, those investigations and the justificatory points in Section 1 are supplemented by further justificatory points in Section 4 of this chapter, after a context has been developed for those further points. Again, Sections 3 and 4 are, I think, the most important. Section 4 attempts something which is probably surprising or incredible to those who are rational and critical concerning moral philosophy: Section 4 attempts to show that, for an epistemically justifiable practical theory, there is inherently overwhelming empirical evidence for that theory’s epistemic standard. (This is not really surprising when contexted in the notion that an epistemically justifiable standard inherently relates to evidence.)

Section 4, in combination with Sections 1, 2 and 3, completes what is hopefully sufficient epistemic justification of the standard and related end, and, thence, of the theory. The combination of Sections 1-4 develops the overall view Part I suggests is needed to show there is an epistemically justifiable practical theory. However, if that combination is not sufficient, Section 5 supplements that attempt at justification. If Sections 1-4 are sufficient, Section 5 is optional. Also, near the end of the book there is a further, optional chapter on justification. This is near the end, and is optional, because the present chapter is probably sufficient — and something more important needs to be discussed before making theoretical points which are probably only of minor, supplementary use regarding justification.

That more important discussion gives representative examples of the specifics of the theory’s practicability and motivatability, covering all areas of human life. These are indirectly epistemically justifiable specifics (as opposed to directly epistemically justifiable practices, such as observing evidence for/against scientific hypotheses). Some such indirectly justifiable specifics are briefly mentioned in the next section, and in Sections 3 and 4 of the present chapter, as doing so is one essential aspect of its further investigations. The next two chapters are a much longer discussion of such indirectly pro-truth specifics.

The next chapter begins that discussion by arguing that, to be practicable, a pro-truth theory would inherently consider the full range of human motivations or emotions, and that such things as freedom, love, sex and happiness can be pro-truth. I argue that a type of flourishing is involved, along with great individual autonomy. Being optimally pro-truth cannot be a dull, narrow, cerebral task, or one only achievable by perfectly rational beings, devoid of emotion.

But now, the first further explanatory and justificatory investigation of the standard:-

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 2: A Further, Simple Investigation Of The Standard And End.

Firstly, again, this section needs to be combined with the next two. The next section begins from and focuses explicitly mostly on direct epistemic justifiability as such, a rather theoretical focus. The present section’s investigation begins from and focuses explicitly mostly on the practical notion, ‘Be pro-truth’. (The various focuses used in the justificatory sections are complementary or equivalent. One focus moves from the directly epistemically justifiable to the indirectly epistemically justifiable, e.g., from the notion, ‘learning scientific pro-truth truths’, to what is needed in practice in life-as-a-whole so that we have the ability and/or motivation and/or opportunity to learn them. Another focus moves in something like the opposite direction. Here the discussion begins by asking, ‘What would we need to practise in life-as-a-whole if science could provide a single fundamental epistemically justifiable standard applicable to life-as-a-whole?’, and from there moves to investigating whether science can provide such a standard. Another focus-direction involves asking, ‘Does science have a single fundamental epistemically justifiable standard?, and if so, is it applicable to life-as-a-whole?. Either focus-direction would lead us to the practical implications of any such standard. Whichever focus or focus-direction is used below, the others are implicit.) Now, the focus beginning with the practical notion, ‘Be pro-truth’:-

An obvious question here is: ‘If a person is to primarily be pro-truth, which truths would this person primarily focus on?’.

Firstly, a short answer:- That pro-truth question is parallel to asking: ‘If a person is to primarily be pro-health, which truths would this person primarily focus on?’. Clearly, the person would focus primarily on truths which help the person be healthy. These are pro-health truths. In sum, this parallel health question can be restated as ‘Which truths are pro-health?’, to which the answer is ‘Pro-health truths’. Therefore, that pro-truth question can be restated as: ‘Which truths are pro-truth?’. The answer is obvious: ‘Pro-truth truths’.

That question is also parallel to asking, ‘Which cars are green?’. It is rationally undeniable, or epistemically justifiable, that a true answer is: ‘Green cars’. It is true that green cars are green. Formally, the question is: ‘Which Xs are Xs of type Y?’, from which it logically or analytically follows that ‘Xs of type Y are Xs of type Y’. Thence, if we ask ‘Which truths are truths of a pro-truth type?’, it logically follows that ‘Pro-truth type truths are truths of a pro-truth type’.

In sum, the prescriptive standard, ‘Be pro-truth’, involves learning only pro-truth truths. These are the only truths which can help persons be pro-truth.

(Soon I’ll argue that being pro-truth involves much more than just learning pro-truth truths. I’ll argue that it also involves practising them, in life-as-a-whole. Only pro-truth truths give persons knowledge of the diet, society, emotions, education and so on needed to help persons optimally further learn and practise pro-truth truths. To really be pro-truth, such dietary etc knowledge needs to be put into practice.)

As explained in Part I, the only fully rational or fully epistemically justifiable view involves an overall view. The following answer will make explicit the implicit overall viewpoint involved in this chapter so far, and, thence, the crucial distinction between (1) an abstract view as well as a narrowest view of epistemic justifiability, which only consider direct epistemic justification, as in science, and, hence, only truth or knowledge as such, and (2) an overall view of epistemic justifiability, which considers both the directly and the indirectly epistemically justifiable. This involves considering how our practices and other things affect the very existence of the directly epistemically justifiable for us, namely knowledge. The overall view can see potential contradictions concerning that affecting, and that they involve (1).

Clearly, as argued in Part I, a fully epistemically justifiable enterprise involves no contradictions[90]. The opposite of contradiction or conflict can be called ‘harmony[91]’. Consider the issue, ‘Which truths would a pro-truth person focus on?’. I’ll argue that the only truths which harmonise with being pro-truth are pro-truth truths:-

An overall view of truths or epistemic justifiability divides truths into ‘pro-truth truths’, ‘a-truth truths’ and ‘anti-truth truths’. This is because an overall view, unlike the narrowest view, sees that, in relation to any one thing, all else has, respectively, either a positive (harmonious), or a neutral, or a negative (contradictory[92] or oppositional) relationship. Pro-truth truths[93] are truths which are put into practice to help us maintain or increase persons’ ability and/or motivation and/or opportunity[94] to be pro-truth, i.e., to be epistemically justifiable. A simplified example:-

Suppose the child Susan learns the following truth: ‘You need to eat a certain amount of vitamin C in order to stay alive’. This is for Susan a potentially pro-truth truth. It would become an actual pro-truth truth for Susan if she eats that amount in the context of spending her life primarily aiming to be pro-truth. E.g., she could later learn how to design bike-helmets which are more effective in avoiding brain-damage which will negatively affect cyclists’ ability to learn and practise other pro-truth truths.

Those cyclists’ safe travelling is another specific example of a pro-truth practice. Again, as will be argued further, such practices are indirectly epistemically justifiable, as opposed to directly epistemically justifiable practices such as science.

Summarising those points in other words, along with some related implied points soon to be developed:- Pro-truth theory, because it takes the overall view, considers everything about the beings who can best[95] make the directly epistemically justifiable exist, namely in human knowledge. With this, if the epistemically justifiable is to exist at all, or to exist more than minimally, it is epistemically justifiable to consider how humans live. It seems epistemically justifiable for the epistemically justifiable to exist. It would seem to be increasingly epistemically justifiable if the epistemically justifiable (e.g., knowledge) increasingly exists. So, from an overall viewpoint, pro-truth or pro-knowledge theory is and needs to be a holistic (overall) practical theory. (It needs to be universally applicable and applied.) It is a pro-truth practical truth that we cannot arrive at the end ‘Pro-truth truth’, or increasingly do so, namely via us learning pro-knowledge knowledge, unless we practise the knowledge which makes that learning possible. The latter knowledge is pro-knowledge knowledge used as a means to more knowledge of the same type. So, apart from just learning, we need to practise innumerable other things, such as doing what is needed to keep us alive and sufficiently healthy to do such learning. So, for us, the epistemically justifiable practical end is ‘learn and practise pro-truth truths’. Regarding which practices harmonise with pro-truth truth, the only possible candidate is practices involved in the learning and practising of pro-truth truths. E.g., practices which help humans discover pro-truth truth include eating a certain diet and avoiding serious head injuries, so as to be alive and have one’s brain working optimally in order to learn pro-truth truths. These are examples of the innumerable practical implications of the pro-truth standard. An epistemically justifiable overall view sees it is epistemically justifiable to apply all those (its) implications overall, i.e., over all of life, universally.

Some conclusions so far:- The notion of overall harmony in relation to the notion, ‘pro-truth’, implies an ongoing positive causal interrelationship among all pro-truth things, including all our thoughts and thereby-intended actions. That diet, eating it, that learning and those helmets are pro-truth things.

Above it was said that ‘Be pro-truth’, as it abstractly stands, could suggest we should only be pro- learning truths as such, namely any truths, e.g., as in (1) learning truths about the colour and decoration of the bottle-top of every type of bottle ever made which has/had a bottle-top; and/or (2) learning how to cure diseases. The present investigation discriminates epistemically justifiably among all truths. E.g., regarding (1) and (2), only (2) involves learning a potentially pro-truth truth[96]:-

(2) can harmonise with other pro-truth things in various ways. E.g., suppose Annette learns how to cure a disease which would kill some persons who otherwise would learn and practise other pro-truth truths. Clearly, here Annette harmonises with pro-truth truth, i.e., with those persons achieving pro-truth things. If she dedicated her life to bottle-top truths, this would contradict, not harmonise with, the pro-truth end. Those potentially increasingly pro-truth persons she could have saved would die. To contradict the epistemically justifiable is clearly unjustifiable. (Again, as argued in Part I, ‘(un)justifiable’ can coherently only mean ‘epistemically (un)justifiable’.)

Anything that conflicts with the pro-truth is ‘anti-truth’. The anti-truth involves factors which mean persons are less pro-truth than they would otherwise be. Dedicating one’s life to bottle-top truths, or to killing potentially pro-truth cyclists, are anti-truth practices. They are practices involving negative effects on someone’s ability, motivation or opportunity to be pro-truth. As implied in Part I, it is also anti-truth to believe a moral theory. That is, as explicitly argued in Part I, this is epistemically unjustifiable because any moral belief is an unverifiable, un-evidenced belief. And, as with the (moral) aim of being a bottle-top expert, all moral belief involves the believer aiming at an end other than the epistemically justifiable, pro-truth end. (Similarly for religious beliefs.)

Recent points suggest we need to distinguish between (i) the above abstract notions of an epistemically justifiable standard and associated end, along with a too narrow concept of what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means in relation to ‘Be pro-truth’, and (ii) an overall and hence non-self-contradictory concept or view here:-

If the notion ‘truth’ in ‘Be pro-truth’ is interpreted as abstractly and/or as narrowly as possible, it can suggest that bottle-top truths and the like are epistemically justified, period. It suggests that such in-practice anti-truth truths are as epistemically justifiable as pro-truth truths. I’m arguing that an overall view shows that those two types of truth are equally directly epistemically justifiable, but are not equal regarding indirect epistemic justifiability. This is because the pursuing of anti-truth truths contradicts the pursuing of pro-truth truths. E.g., if Annette dedicates herself to pursuing bottle-top truths, she in-practice stops herself being dedicated to pursuing pro-truth medical truths.

Here too it is clear that the practical, or how one lives, needs to be considered when we rationally investigate what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means in relation to ‘Be pro-truth’. Then we can have an overall or holistic and hence contradictionless view here. An overall view considers both direct and indirect epistemic justifiability. As argued in Part I, the contradictory cannot be as epistemically justifiable as possible, and an overall view is as epistemically justifiable as possible. The narrowest conception here is too narrow, because it allows such contradictions. Similarly for any abstract notion here. They allow the notion ‘Be pro-truth’ to include being anti-truth, via viewing both anti-truth truth and pro-truth truth as epistemically justifiable as possible.

To be as epistemically justifiable as possible clearly involves being epistemically justifiable in practice and without the epistemically justifiable being contradicted in practice, or by anyone’s practices. This involves an overall view of epistemic justifiability and of ‘Be pro-truth’. This means holistically considering the effects of pursuing one type of truth or knowledge on the pursuing of another type, and of implementing one type rather than another. So it means considering everything that happens in practice. It means considering both the directly and the indirectly epistemically justifiable. It means considering the end, ‘epistemic justification’, and the means to that end. It means considering how one does live and should live. This includes considering how one affects others, and vice versa. If Annette dedicates herself to bottle-top truths, this can affect other, potentially or actually pro-truth persons very differently than if she discovers how to cure their diseases. This is another aspect of an overall view. As explained in Part I, the only fully rational or fully epistemically justifiable view is an overall view.

It is epistemically justifiable in the abstract or narrowest sense to learn truths as such. But if we all learnt only anti-truth truths, in practice soon there would be no person alive to learn any truths at all. E.g., if we all spend our whole lives pursuing bottle-top truths and the like, no-one will have the pro-truth knowledge needed to keep us healthy, fed and so on. So, because it is epistemically justifiable in the narrowest sense to learn truths as such, even in that sense it would be epistemically un-justifiable here to regard all truths as equal via, say, tossing a coin to choose what truths to learn — because we could thereby choose anti-truth truths. If we only learnt anti-truth truths, there would soon be no learning of truths. There’d be no epistemic justification because there would be no-one alive to do anything epistemically justifiable. Pursuing some knowledge can contradict (the existence of) knowledge.

In sum, just learning truths as such is not as epistemically justifiable as possible. To be as epistemically justifiable as possible, i.e., universally, we need to learn and practise only pro-truth truths.

This is even more obvious if we go beyond that narrowest, cognitive, ‘learn-only’ view, and consider the claim that it is epistemically justifiable to learn, as well as practise, any truths or knowledge at all. Applying that just-mentioned alleged permissibility of tossing a coin to this claim, the toss could allow us to learn and practise only anti-knowledge knowledge. This involves knowledge of how to destroy all beings capable of acquiring any knowledge. If we only learnt and practised the (potentially) anti-truth truths here, there would be no knowledge (i.e., of truths). There would be no beings alive capable of knowledge. So that claim or view is also too narrow. It is not as epistemically justifiable as possible, because it can license contradicting the (existence of the) epistemically justifiable, namely knowledge.

The situation regarding such too-narrow views, and hence the abstract view which can suggest them, is analogous to the following parable:- This concerns six blind persons investigating the appearance of an elephant. Each felt only part of the elephant. The person who touched the tail said, “An elephant is like a rope”. The person who touched the chest contradicted that view, concluding that an elephant is like a boulder. And so on. Each person’s view is too narrowly focused. Going from the abstract notion, ‘truth’, to the notion that it is pro-truth to learn, or learn and practise, any specific truth, is also a case of a too-narrowly focused search, involving contradictions. (Part I also shows that something similar applies to learning and practising whatever knowledge is needed to practise this or that moral theory.) An overall view, e.g., via seeing and touching all of an elephant, is needed for an as epistemically justifiable as possible description of an elephant’s appearance. Similarly regarding an overall view of what ‘Be pro-truth’ or ‘epistemically justifiable’ means.

The narrowest view of an elephant, or of epistemic justifiability, only gives us part of a truth. The part is necessary but not sufficient for the truth. More needs to be combined with the part, to give us the truth. The narrowest view of what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means can imply only part of what ‘as epistemically justifiable as possible’ means. A view which only considers part of X can contradict the overall, true view of X. (The general point here is discussed further in the next, complementary section. The present section needs to be contexted within the overall justification given by Sections 1-4.)

Near the beginning of this section I wrote: “[There is a] crucial distinction between (1) an abstract view as well as a narrowest view of epistemic justifiability, which only consider direct epistemic justification and, hence, only truth or knowledge as such, and (2) an overall view of epistemic justifiability, which considers both the directly and the indirectly epistemically justifiable. This involves considering how our practices and other things affect the very existence of the directly epistemically justifiable for us, namely knowledge. The overall view can see potential contradictions here, involving (1).” The previous abstract discussion and the narrowest views of epistemic justifiability are not as epistemically justifiable as possible in that, regarding specifics, they can license contradictions. The only overall epistemically justifiable view here involves the overall investigation of what ‘Be pro-truth’ means, explained earlier in this section. And recent discussion has also taken us from the abstract standard, ‘Be pro-truth’, and associated abstract end, ‘truth’, to what can be called ‘the general (as opposed to abstract[97]), non-self-contradictory, practical, overall standard and end’, namely ‘Learn and practise pro-truth truths (universally)’. Here the standard and end harmonise perfectly: they are identical. The investigation so far also seems to suggest that a careful consideration of ‘Be pro-truth’ and, hence, related notions, might imply guidelines sufficiently practicable for applying pro-truth theory to life as a whole. The suggestion is that that general end can imply practicable specifics universally.

To make that suggestion firmer, and to get a more overall view, we need to investigate another notion related to the notion ‘Be pro-truth’. So, temporarily, that is probably enough discussion of the pro-truth and the anti-truth. Next, the pro-truth and the a-truth:-

Again, an overall examination of the concept ‘pro-truth’ leads to the truth that, in relation to truth, all else is either pro-truth, anti-truth or a-truth. More generally, that examination involves the insight that, regarding any one thing, all else has, respectively, either a positive, a negative or a neutral relationship to it. Regarding some possible event, e.g., a plant growing, each other thing or event either, respectively, helps the possible event to occur, hinders its occurrence, or has no affect on it. The prescription, ‘Be pro-truth’, implies that we are justifiably permitted to do a-truth things, and have a-truth aspects, because they have no affect on humanity’s ability, motivation or opportunity to be pro-truth. The a-truth has a neutral causal relationship to the pro-truth. Importantly here, a deep, overall examination shows that, to be pro-truth, we must treat the a-truth as neutral. For instance:-

Sally and Jim both know it is pro-truth to not smoke, to eat healthy food, and get sufficient rest, because the human brain needs a certain[98] quantity and quality of various things, and not others, in order for the brain to work optimally regarding learning and practising pro-truth truths. The gender of Sally and Jim is irrelevant regarding the truth of that pro-truth knowledge concerning smoking etc. Their gender here is a-truth. Similarly, suppose Sally and Jim both learn that 1+2 is 3. The truth of ‘1+2=3’ has nothing to do with their gender. ‘1+2=3’ is not true only for females, becoming untrue when a male believes it; and vice versa. Gender has no affect here. So, in order to be pro-truth here, i.e., regarding the directly epistemically justifiable ‘1+2=3’, we need to do something indirectly epistemically justifiable, namely ignore or treat as neutral the sex of the persons involved.

In sum, a sufficiently deep, overall examination of what it means to be pro-truth implies yet another practicable guideline: be non-sexist. (Sexism is anti-truth via being anti- the truth that the a-truth is irrelevant regarding known truths as such.)

Sally and Jim’s case shows that, when humans treat the directly epistemically justifiable, e.g., ‘1+2=3’, as epistemically justifiable, to do so they must also take more than a very narrow view of what is epistemically justifiable. At least implicitly, they must consider things in life-as-a-whole, e.g., persons’ gender, via being non-sexist. At least in such cases, they must at least implicitly know it is epistemically justifiable to treat the a-truth as the a-truth, via being non-sexist. So, at least here, they at least implicitly know that pro-truth theory is justified. (Otherwise, e.g., they’d believe that ‘1+2=3’ is true only when Sally says so, and believe that ‘1+2=3’ is false if Jim says that 1+2 is 3. This and related points supply just one example of evidence for pro-truth theory. Here it is evidence needed to support that at least implicit knowledge concerning non-sexism. As will be increasingly shown, an epistemically justifiable practical theory is the only evidenced practical theory.) The justifiability of such non-sexism is an obvious pro-truth truth. (To be non-sexist is to practise that pro-truth truth. Again, an overall interpretation of ‘Be pro-truth’ considers both the learning and the practising of pro-truth truth.)

The same general argument or guideline here can apply to persons’ race, sexuality, food preferences, clothing, age and many other things[99]. That is, it can apply to what a person unalterably is, or was born as, as well as to many choices persons make. E.g., whether Melanie prefers to hear jazz rather than opera can be irrelevant regarding humanity’s ability, motivation and opportunity to discover pro-truth truth.

The above suggests there is only one epistemically justifiable ultimate end for us. This is ‘Be pro-truth’ — interpreted as ‘Learn and practise pro-truth truths’. Yet, irrelevant to achieving that end, one can have innumerable a-truth ends. (The irrelevance means these diverse ends cannot conflict with the end, ‘Be pro-truth’[100].) E.g., an a-truth end for Melanie could be to enjoy jazz, when, e.g., she is too tired to do pro-truth agricultural research. Or, while doing that research it can be an a-truth end for her to wear jeans and a T-shirt instead of the voluntary uniform supplied by the research institute, or to have a peach pie for lunch instead of, say, her usual (equivalently nutritionally-pro-truth) apricot pie. Such examples take us yet farther into life as a whole, implying many freedoms, permitting great diversity. To be pro-truth involves respecting a-truth freedom via not discriminating against many things.

Essential here is the notion that doing or being anything a-truth has no affect on humanity’s being pro-truth. That is, the aim ‘Be pro-truth’ is achievable regardless of what a-truth things exist or are done. However, recent points suggest that this ‘regardless’ or ‘irrelevance’ does not mean the issues here are always unimportant. E.g., as with Sally and Jim’s genders, it is very important to treat the a-truth as irrelevant to truth, via being non-sexist.

Indeed, unavoidably, we cannot be pro-truth or epistemically justified without having various a-truth aspects. To be pro-truth, a human must exist. And so, e.g., any human must have a sex, a race and height. Such things can be a-truth[101]. So, in that unavoidable sense too, it is an important part of being pro-truth to accept the a-truth via treating the a-truth as the a-truth, namely as neutral. Indeed, regarding being directly epistemically justified, it is more than important. It is crucial: as shown by the case of Sally, Jim and ‘1+2=3’, to do otherwise is to be anti-truth and epistemically unjustified, i.e., wrong.

In sum, there is an inextricable interrelationship between being pro-truth and treating the a-truth as a-truth. Still, an overall view shows that the importance of treating the a-truth as a-truth is derivative. It derives from the epistemic importance (justifiability) of being pro-truth. That is, logically, and epistemically justifiably, the epistemic, cognitive understanding of the justifiability of being pro-truth is primary. Primarily, or firstly, one’s aim or end needs to be pro-truth or epistemically justified, and hence, or thereafter, one treats the a-truth as a-truth; not vice versa.

This prioritising and derivative importance becomes especially clear when we consider a-truth ends, namely a-truth things we can choose, e.g., to enjoy this or that a-truth music. (These are things we can do, but need not do — as opposed to things we unalterably or unavoidably are, e.g., you just are of a certain age.):-

If one is pro-truth regarding life-as-a-whole, then one would intentionally always only do either pro-truth or a-truth things. Yet, from an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, the single ultimate pro-truth end inherently has top priority: all other acceptable ends are only acceptable in relation to it. With this, they have lower priority. That is, inherently, they are achievable only if doing so does not disaffect achieving the pro-truth end. So, the pro-truth end is the primary end, and one’s a-truth ends are secondary in that they come under that primary notion. Thence, achieving the pro-truth end is a duty, whereas a-truth ends are simply permitted, as distinct from being duties[102]. Duties have higher priority than the permissible. (This is discussed further, later.)

Concluding recent points:- A deep, overall examination of the concept ‘Be pro-truth’ leads us to the concept ‘a-truth’ — and thereby to other practicable implications. The concept ‘pro-truth’ implicitly involves the a-truth. With this, the term ‘Be pro-truth’ can be understood as an abbreviation for: ‘Primarily, always be pro-truth, which includes treating the a-truth as a-truth; secondarily, i.e., irrelevant to that, and along with that, do any a-truth thing you like. Never be anti-truth’. Something like this summarises the expanded, overall, general version of ‘Be pro-truth’.

This section’s investigation so far has introduced the notions of the a-truth and the anti-truth in relation to the pro-truth. I’ll finish this section with some more practicable implications of pro-truth theory, interrelating all three notions. A simplified example:-

For all persons to be optimally pro-truth, they need the resources to do so. These include food, education, safety and so on. All such resources need to be considered within an overall context, via an overall view. Consider food. The context regarding food includes agricultural sustainability within global environmental sustainability. Many factors are involved here. They include human population size. Above a certain population level, there will be anti-truth effects on our environment. These include a decreased sustainability of agriculture. There would eventually be less food per person. People with insufficient food cannot be optimally pro-truth. So this would be anti-truth overpopulation.

There is also a pro-truth lower population limit. E.g., without a certain number of (willing and able) persons, there could not be an economy of sufficient scale to optimally efficiently produce pro-truth resources, such as food, e.g., via tractors. Education would suffer, e.g., by there being insufficient persons and hence resources to build and fund an optimally pro-truth education system, including high-quality universities, capable, e.g., of producing competent tractor designers and agricultural and environmental scientists. Similarly for medical resources, e.g., sophisticated hospitals. And so on.

This raises the issue, discussed in Part I, Chapter 2, that social contract theories and most moral theories insolubly face: ‘Why should there be persons, or human society, at all?’. Pro-truth theory alone can solve this in an epistemically justifiable way:- Humans are the potentially most pro-truth species on Earth, due to their cerebral capacity and related factors. So a zero or too-low human population would be anti-truth, and hence epistemically unjustifiable.

In sum, there is an optimally pro-truth population range. This practical implication leads onto the implication which is my primary concern here:-

Within that optimal population range, food and other pro-truth resources need to be shared in the most pro-truth way. Here, where aspects of persons are a-truth, e.g., their race, birthplace, sexuality and gender[103], these aspects need to be treated as irrelevant regarding how such sharing is to be done. Sharing also needs to be global, i.e., universally applied. E.g., there is no epistemic justification for one race, or persons born in one place, e.g., a nation, to have an excess of food and other resources, meaning that other persons have insufficient. This is in the context that there is no epistemic justification for the existence of separate, at least potentially conflicting, nations — or any other at least potentially conflicting groups. A united, pro-truth world is needed. (However, because there are nations at present (2004), they need to be considered[104].)

The general practical implication here is that being pro-truth involves being entirely unselfish. Suppose Harry knows that others’ resources are insufficient for them to be optimally pro-truth, that those persons would be more pro-truth if they had more resources, and that his resources are more than sufficient for him here. Here it is epistemically justified for Harry to share. It is a pro-truth duty. Similarly for nations, socio-economic classes and so on.

Concluding remarks here:- Hopefully that investigation of ‘Be pro-truth’ is sufficient to show it is at least possible that the expanded, overall version of this standard is as epistemically justifiable as possible, and could, if investigated carefully, imply sufficiently specific guidelines for a practical theory.

Yet this section needs to be supplemented by the next two, in order to show that it is highly plausible that those aims have been fulfilled. (And, after that, there are more, related, justificatory points.):-

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 3: A Related, More Complex Further Investigation Of The Standard And End.

The previous investigation mostly concentrated explicitly on an overall view of what ‘Be pro-truth’ means. The present section’s complementary investigation focuses on this in relation to an overall view of practicable[105] truth or knowledge as a whole — via considering direct practicable epistemic justifiability as a whole. That is, here we look at practicable science much more. (Familiar or simple examples are used.)

Again, the overall issue contexting this investigation is: ‘If we are to have an epistemically justifiable practical theory, we need to apply the ultimate standard of epistemic justifiability universally, in our lives as a whole’. (The alternative to this, as argued in Part I, is to live via some unjustifiable standard. Part I argued that the only coherent meaning of ‘(un)justifiable’ is ‘epistemically (un)justifiable’.)

This section aims, firstly, to find a single, fundamental or ultimate standard underlying all epistemic justifiability of practicable knowledge[106]; and, secondly, to better show that this standard implies the practicable guidelines arrived at in a complementary way by the previous section.

What might this standard or form be? As far as I can presently see, the only available candidate[107] must be something like: ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’. As this term is needed often below, and is long, it will normally be shortened to ‘U H/I E/T’.

Before explaining why I think U H/I E/T is the standard, I should mention the following:- U H/I E/T, as it stands, is abstract or formal. So it could have the possible problems the abstract version of ‘Be pro-truth’ has. They may not be able to be solved for U H/I E/T. This could be because U H/I E/T is being claimed to be the ultimate standard of science, and hence of scientific laws — and the same general type of claim is what Kant made regarding his UCI[108], a standard which Part I argued is inadequate as a practical standard. However, I’ll argue that possible problems regarding U H/I E/T’s abstract nature can also be solved. And I’ll argue that U H/I E/T includes but goes justifiably beyond Kant’s UCI’s interrelation of the epistemic notions he uses, namely non-contradiction and universal applicability — and that this makes U H/I E/T an epistemically better standard, and makes it applicable to life-as-a-whole in a way which avoids Kant’s major problems here.

But before that and other such defences of U H/I E/T can be presented, it needs to be shown that U H/I E/T really is the most general standard of epistemic justification. This will of course show that U H/I E/T is epistemically justifiable. (The following attempt at this will show that U H/I E/T is somewhat similar to Quine’s ‘web of belief’[109] and Whewell’s ‘consilience’[110], and to Kant’s notions of non-contradiction and universal applicability.):-

To achieve this section’s first aim, the focus is an overall view of direct epistemic justifiability of practicable truth as-a-whole[111]. This fits with the aim of finding a standard underlying all practicable epistemic justifiability, because, as argued above, truth or knowledge is the aim of any directly epistemically justifiable enterprise as such, as in science; and, clearly, truth is directly epistemically justifiable. With this, a standard underlying or applicable regarding all practicable epistemic justifiability must be applicable to practicable truth as-a-whole. As will be argued further later, this includes pro-truth truths, which include the truth that it is indirectly epistemically justifiable to learn and practise pro-truth truths. And that truth is a way of summarising pro-truth theory.

The holistic, truth as-a-whole focus here obviously involves the overall view argued above to be the most rational or most epistemically justifiable. And because we are seeking the most general or overall standard involved in epistemic justification, we need to investigate truth or epistemic justifiability as a whole.

Practicable truth as-a-whole is the sphere of practicable science as such. So, it is to practicable science we turn for evidence regarding the nature of the fundamental or most general standard of practicable epistemic justification:-

In Part I, science was used as the exemplary case of epistemic justifiability. But the history of science shows much revision, involving many errors. This could suggest that all science is epistemically questionable, as Feyerabend[112] often claims. E.g., Ptolemy’s astronomy was radically revised (proven wrong) by Kepler, Galileo and others, and their theories were revised by Newton, whose theory was revised (proven to have limited applicability, i.e., proven wrong in some areas) by Einstein; and now Einstein is being somewhat revised. However, such developments tended to be not just errors. They involved correction and/or reduction of errors, i.e., an increase in epistemic justifiability in that scientists got closer to the truth. As explained by authors such as Alan Chalmers and George Couvalis[113], to epistemically justifiably criticise, confirm or disconfirm or improve on an allegedly true scientific theory, we can only use science[114]. E.g., Newton’s theory predicted expected events, e.g., eclipses, much more accurately than previous theories could, and Newton predicted events unexpected by any other theory at the time. Similarly for Einstein’s improvement on Newton, showing that Newton’s theory was reliably predictive but only in a limited area, not across the whole universe. Who else but a scientist, such as Einstein, could have discovered the complex detailed evidence or mathematical physics to prove that Newton’s theory needed to be improved on?

Importantly, all persons (except perhaps the severely intellectually disabled), including skeptics of science, do at least simple epistemically justifiable revisions of (alleged or faulty) science by science. E.g., as mentioned in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, we see such things as a stick or an arm apparently bent by it being put partly in water; but we would reject such illusions via simple, more reliable scientific observations, involving an overall view. E.g., you could grip with both hands all of a straight stick in water, then out of water, feeling it stay straight, and place in water a glass rod, which will break if bent only quarter as much as water apparently bends things — along with studying refraction. You at least implicitly do some such revision when you watch your arm go under water to reach a sink or bath plug, soap or other object. Similarly:- Suppose a car you are in, stopped at traffic lights among other cars, seems to roll backwards. You can use simple science to prove you are not moving back. You can, e.g., observe a nearby car, away from which you are apparently moving, and see if it, and your car, are stationary relative to something you know is not moving, e.g., a tree or building. Your observation that the other car is moving forward relative to a fixed object proves that it is only apparent that you are moving backward. You’ve used science to show that there was merely an illusion of movement, due to the other car moving forward relative to your stopped car. And so on.

In sum, our everyday, simple science, and the pains-taking, self-critical revision of complex science, shows that science is an exemplary case of epistemic justifiability or of long-term increasing epistemic justifiability via science — not a case of never getting closer to truth. Unlike with moral theory, science can and is using epistemically justifiable methods to improve the epistemic justifiability of its content. Further here:-

Apart from the just-mentioned improvements, in a great many other areas there is plenty of evidence to show that, regarding practicability, science is sufficiently close to the truth. There is not space in a book with the intended audience and scope of this one to go into great supporting detail here. Other authors, such as Alan Chalmers and George Couvalis, can be referred to if such detail is required. Also, some such details were mentioned in Part I, or certain other details there can be adapted to support the present point. (E.g., vehicles scientists send into space are on-average increasingly reliably getting closer to their increasingly difficult targets, e.g., more distant targets. More and more diseases are being cured. Technologically better cars, music-systems, computers and other machines are being invented. If they break down, we have the knowledge to understand why, and to reliably repair them. And so on.) Later, in support of other, related points, details are given which can also be adapted to support the present point. But now, this book needs to move on, accepting the present point that science is a self-improving enterprise which, in at least many areas, is, for practicable purposes, sufficiently close to the truth, or moving closer to the truth.

In conclusion here, it seems highly plausible to take an overall view of modern practicable science as the best available way to discover a single ultimate epistemically justifiable practicable standard, possibly applicable in our lives-as-a-whole. Science is a part of our lives[115] — science is a human practice, and hence its fundamental standard may be applicable to other human practices, making them epistemically justifiable too. This is the main positive theme or hope of this book.

The growth of knowledge has involved many applications of epistemically justified specific standards[116] or ideas in one area to some other area(s), and something very similar is basically what this book is attempting. The general principle here is nothing new, and its application has often been very fruitful. E.g., Gregor Mendel and others applied mathematical epistemic standards to differences and similarities among offspring across generations. This gave us the foundation of modern genetics. And, thence, via applications of standards or methods or ideas in areas such as biochemistry and X-ray crystallography to that foundation, we now have gene therapy and so on. Alan Chalmers[117] tells how Archimedes’s work in maths and physics could be fruitfully applied across areas, e.g., from statics to dynamics. There are many such examples[118]. The historical and related discussions beginning two paragraphs below will give more examples, from within science. But before that, an example of how values in science implied by the standard, ‘Be epistemically justifiable’, can be applied to life-as-a-whole. This is a preliminary example of what the historical discussion is leading up to:-

When being objective, Lee, a scientist, treats impartially all those aspects of fellow scientists which are irrelevant to their objectivity. E.g., Lee would not reject or accept hypotheses because they are proposed by someone of this or that race, gender, sexuality and so on. Lee would assess others’ hypotheses purely via the epistemic merits of the theories, e.g., via looking only at the evidence. So, within science, objective scientists apply a pro-truth standard. This standard, ‘Be epistemically justifiable’, because it implies treating the a-truth as a-truth, involves the non-racist etc values internal to human epistemically justifiable science. Lee applies this scientific standard to persons doing science. Yet such standards or values are clearly applicable to our lives generally. They can be applied to racism or sexism in the media and entertainment sectors, to employment policies, to apartheid politics, to ethnic cleansing and so on. In sum, it is nonsense to claim that a theory or standard or values applicable in one area cannot be applied in other areas. Similarly, in order to objectively seek truth, scientists must be alive and hence at least implicitly value being alive and things needed to keep them alive, e.g., sufficient food, rest and health. To be optimally objective involves various such resources and hence the at least implicit valuing of them. Again, obviously, to be epistemically justifiable even in the narrow sense of being objective scientists, the scientists must in practice value many things in their lives-as-a-whole. So, outside the laboratory or wherever they do their directly epistemically justifiable things, they also need to be epistemically justifiable or pro-truth in many indirect ways. Thence, so do many other persons, e.g., the farmers and health-workers etc providing the food etc the scientists need[119].

Those points concern innumerable specific values or standards. I’m seeking a single general standard covering all such specific values or standards. What single general standard applies across all practicable science, i.e., practicable truth as-a-whole? The following historical development begins the argument that it is U H/I E/T, namely, ‘universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’. (The discussion is simplified, but not over-simplified.):-

(This paragraph is an interpretation of work by William Whewell[120].) Long ago it was observed that planets moved round the sun, that tides rose and fell, that water runs downhill, that letting go of a stone held above the ground resulted in the stone moving towards the ground, and so on. No-one properly knew how such events were caused. The events also seemed separate. E.g., what could tides rising have to do with Neptune going round the sun, or what could either of these have to do with falling stones? The answer is not obvious. Later, Isaac Newton realised that, universally, there is harmony among such apparently separate and sometimes apparently contradictory events. Newton realised that gravity was involved in causing them all. So, among the rising and falling of tides, the falling only of released stones, and the non-rising and non-falling of orbiting planets, there is harmony: a unifying causal explanation. One law, the law of gravity, fundamentally[121] explains them all. (Whewell’s uses one of his made-up words, ‘consilience’, here : descriptions of apparently separate, conflicting events are reconciled or ‘consiliated’.)

It is important to note that here it is merely perceptions being discussed — not truths. This becomes clear when we consider perceptions which are illusions. E.g., consider again seeing an arm or stick appearing to bend when partly placed in water. The law of refraction is the practicable truth here, or sufficiently near to it for practical purposes such as reliably picking up coins dropped in a creek. Refraction explains the apparent bending. But, according to our perception as such, a stick is bent by water, and straightened when entirely in air. If perception always gave us the truth, it would be true that water and air have such effects. But, as Fodor points out[122], we have encapsulated (inflexible, unreflective) perceptual modules in our brains. As suggested in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, the real truth is only discoverable via informed higher-level cognitive reflection on what our perceptual modules present to our consciousness. This rational reflection uses scientific knowledge gained via other, more overall observations, to overrule the bent-stick observation. E.g., we can line the stick up with our arm, partly submerge both, and feel that neither bends, in that our arm would break if truly bent thus. We can learn, via other observations, about refraction through glass, water and so on — and reliably use the truth here in practice, e.g., in making spectacles. Via those and related processes, we cognitively harmonise all our observations or perceptions within the entire area where refraction applies. Then, our knowledge of all the separate truths within the area, e.g., truths concerning spectacles, prisms, sticks and dropped coins, will not be contradictory. Then, we realise that, as with looking through spectacles, the observation of a stick apparently bending was an observation of refraction, namely of a truth — not an observation of a stick bending.

That is, from an overall, harmonising view, the observation is known to not really contradict the truth. The unreflective observation is known to be a too-narrow view, and hence not as epistemically justifiable as possible. Similarly regarding the ‘car apparently rolling back’ example. Again, only science can correct errors in alleged or faulty science, avoiding contradictions or disharmony. Perceptions can sometimes contradict each other; truths cannot.

In sum, sensations or perceptions are at a low level in the neural hierarchy involved in our coming to have practicable scientific knowledge. A set of consistent perceptions, as in consistently seeing a stick apparently bend in water, is necessary for knowledge — but is not sufficient. Much more is needed, especially knowledge of a law (truth) inherently giving a harmonious explanation of those and all other observations in an area, via higher-level cognitive interpretation of all the observations. This gives us an overall, epistemically justifiable view.

Perceptions or observations then, lack that overall view. They can be called a ‘part of a practicable truth’. Only an overall view can give us the truth. (The parable of blind persons each perceiving only part of an elephant is relevant here. All they could truthfully say is, “The part I’m feeling is like a ...”.)

Importantly, as suggested in the previous section, this ‘part-of-truth’ notion also applies to the narrowest views of epistemic justifiability and of ‘Be pro-truth’ relative to the overall view. A scientific part-of-truth can only become as epistemically justifiable as possible via a harmonising process, involving additions or qualifications made by a reflective, overall view. Separate parts of a truth are only truly or epistemically justifiably reconcilable via or under a high-level, explanatory, covering or overall truth or law. This means that overall epistemic justifiability involves only pro-truth truths, and involves both direct and indirect epistemic justifiability, both the pro-truth and treating the a-truth as the a-truth, and so on. The present section is arguing that the general point here applies to U H/I E/T[123], namely that U H/I E/T is the overall formal truth or standard regarding or covering all practicable scientific truth. So far it seems possible that at least the ‘U H E/T’ in U H/I E/T is involved. Further:-

That general point, concerning harmony, can be shown to apply to all other apparently separate or contradictory events. E.g., a balloon greatly inflated with air will, when released in air, fall slowly down, but an equally inflated basketball, of equal volume, when released in air, will fall faster; but both will rise very fast if released deep under water, unlike a solid lead sphere the same volume and shape as the basketball; and the balloon will rise in air when inflated with helium, though the basketball will not; and so on. All such apparently conflicting events come harmoniously under one (set of) principle(s): all are explainable via the set of laws involved in the principle, ‘gravity, involving the distances and masses involved, in relation to, e.g., laws concerning air pressure, volume, uplifting air-currents, weak air-resistance, hydrophysics and floatation’.

Consider the observation, ‘The balloon fell slower in air than the basketball’. This is a part-of-truth in that the truth also involves: ‘The balloon fell slower than the basketball because, though gravity affects both similarly, the lighter balloon was much more affected by uplifting air currents and air resistance than was the basketball’. Only the overall view, involving a harmonising law or set of laws, can give us the truth here. Again, there is harmony within each truth-as-a-whole in this area.

There is also harmony across time[124], regarding the way each law of nature operates in every relevantly similar situation. The U and H in U H/I E/T apply here too. All else equal, any one cause (or set of causes) will harmoniously produce the same effect, universally across time. If today you fall off a cliff from which many have fallen to their deaths over many centuries, you’ll fall in much the same way, with much the same result, all else equal (e.g., if, like the others, you are not wearing a parachute).

Harmony also applies regarding practicable maths and practicable logic. (These are involved in practicable science.) E.g., it is practicable to add two tennis balls to one tennis ball and get three balls, and this harmonises with 2+4 balls making 6, with 30+60 balls making 90, and so on. That is, in practicable arithmetic there is non-contradiction. E.g., because X is X, hence 1+1+1 is 1+1+1, i.e., 1+2 is 3, and so ‘1+2=3’ plus ‘1+2=3’, i.e., doubling ‘1+2=3’, gives us ‘2+4 is 6 balls’, and so on. That is, from ‘X is X’ we can eventually get 30+60 balls making 90, and any other true practicable sum. This is because non-contradiction means 1=1, and hence means 1+1=1+1, and combining this makes 1+1+1=1+1+1, i.e., ‘1+2=3’, and so on. In sum (no pun intended), there is harmony, involving practicable logic’s principle of non-contradiction, within all practicable arithmetic and so on.

The overall conclusion here is that there is harmony within every area within practicable truth as-a-whole. So, at least, the ‘U H (universal harmony)’ in U H/I E/T is involved in direct epistemic justification as a whole, namely within all areas. Next I’ll discuss the ‘I’ (irrelevance) in U H/I E/T. I’ll argue that, where there is not harmony, there is only irrelevance. That is, U H/I E/T applies, namely: universally there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole:-

An overall view shows there is harmony within every area, but not harmony among every area. Some things or areas within science’s truths-as-a-whole are irrelevant to each other, as opposed to being harmonious with each other:-

Harmony among scientific truths concerning practicable events involves relevance, via one thing, e.g., gravity, having the same fundamental affect in all relevant situations. That is, gravity is relevant to all the tidal, orbital etc events mentioned above via being causally involved in them all. Irrelevance among practicable scientific truths means that what causes one thing does not cause or affect the other. Here there is neither a harmonious relationship nor a disharmonious or conflicting relationship. Here there is a neutral relationship. Here the events or things have zero relevance to each other. E.g:-

Consider three basketballs of the same mass, same volume, in effectively the same place on Earth, and so on, i.e., equal in all ways. Suppose we move one basketball to the moon, and one into space where the gravitational forces of the moon and Earth balance each other. Such changes or differences will cause each basketball to do different things (though all explainable via the one principle, involving gravity). E.g., a basketball dropped on the moon will drop slower than if dropped on Earth, all else equal; and the other moved ball will be suspended in space. Yet if we change the colour of a basketball, this in itself will have no effect on how gravity affects the ball. The colour is irrelevant to gravity operating in a universally harmonious way. That is, causing a change in colour does not cause gravity to affect the ball differently. There is a neutral (zero) causal relationship between colour and gravitational effects. Not all things in the universe are connected to each other, affecting each other, or basically in the same area[125].

Similarly, all else equal, causing a change in the way you travel or sing is irrelevant regarding cubes having six sides. And if you write ‘1+2=3’, this sum remains a truth, regardless of whether you cause it to be written in pencil, paint or chalk, and regardless of whether you are male or female. There are many other such examples. In sum, within practicable truth as-a-whole, there is either harmony or irrelevance, never disharmony or contradiction. U H/I E/T applies.

There can of course be disharmony between events, via one event causally-contradicting (stopping) another. E.g., the event ‘not watering the plant’ can be disharmonious with the (possible) event: ‘the plant staying alive’. But that is no problem regarding U H/I E/T. Such disharmony is somewhat like the recently-discussed merely possibly apparent disharmony between a tide rising and a stone falling. The sense in which there is disharmony among events does not negate U H/I E/T. That is, the general law concerning truth as-a-whole or scientific laws does not include the phase, ‘either harmony or irrelevance or disharmony’. Any disharmony among (actual/possible) events is caused by the same, harmonious laws. E.g., universally, it is a law that if plants never again get water, this contradicts (stops) their existence: they are thereby caused to die. There is fundamental harmony among all ‘never again water’ and ‘plant not staying alive’ events. A general issue here is: ‘Mutually-opposing forces do not mean mutually-contradictory laws’:-

Science shows there can only be disharmony in the sense of causal contradiction among events, the contradiction being caused by opposition between forces described by laws which, harmoniously, apply universally. By contrast, contradiction among the laws would mean one of the laws (truths) involved is caused to stop applying: it would not apply universally harmoniously. Opposition among forces cannot involve contradictory truths. The principle of causal contradiction is ‘Not both X and not-X simultaneously’. E.g., a plant cannot simultaneously be (caused to be) both watered and not watered, and you cannot simultaneously jump and not jump. These are truths. Contradictory truths concerning the laws here would be, e.g., ‘Gravity applies universally’ and ‘Gravity does not apply universally’. But, e.g., the law of gravity is not caused to stop operating by the laws involved in us using our leg muscles to jump (or not jump). Or vice versa. ‘Opposition’ or ‘opposing forces’ means just what it says: e.g., here, both the force of gravity (X) and the leg-muscle force (Y) apply simultaneously. This X and Y can apply simultaneously, but not this X and not-X., i.e., gravity and the absence of gravity. Conflict here, i.e., contradiction, would mean there’d be either gravity or, due to a conflicting (leg-muscle) law operating, no gravity. Yet when we jump, gravity keeps operating. So there is no contradiction among laws. (The same of course applies regarding the law(s) describing muscle force.) It is not a truth that there are conflicting or disharmonious laws. Instead of laws conflicting, it is the force of gravity which opposes our jumping forever upwards, and the force of our muscles etc which opposes gravity, allowing us to jump. Such opposition means, e.g., that the event ‘jumping over the moon’ is contradicted (stopped) because gravity successfully opposes our weaker leg-muscles propelling us that far.

The inherently non-contradictory laws (truths) involved state that opposition between forces involves a balance between the forces, not an ending of one force by the other. They state that the balance can change, depending on the strength of the forces. Our leg-muscle force is not strong enough to propel us into orbit, where there would be a long-term stable balance between our motion and gravity’s effect. So when we jump upwards we rise, for no more than about two metres, then we momentarily stop because here the balance involves equal forces. Then we come back to Earth, instead of staying suspended in orbit, because gravity has kept operating with the same force and our leg-muscle force is weaker. Rocket-propelling forces can be strong enough to reach the orbital type of balance. If there was contradiction among laws rather than an oppositional balance between forces here, the satellite or whatever would not stay in orbit.

In other words, there is a law stating that forces described by laws can combine to have a mutually-caused effect. Contradictory things cannot combine. (E.g., we cannot have a person simultaneously both jump up and not jump. It’s only one or the other. We can have a jump involving a simultaneous combination of gravity and leg-muscle forces.)

Combined forces can either oppose, or, they can co-operate and in that sense harmonise. (Or events can be irrelevant to each other, as in the event ‘changing a basketball’s colour’ being irrelevant to the event ‘how the basketball is affected by gravity’.) Examples of how events or forces can harmonise in the practical sense, ‘co-operation’:-

The events, ‘Eating X’, ‘Eating Y’ (and other foods), ‘Exercising in way E’, ‘Sleeping in way S’ and other events, can co-operate or harmonise regarding causing the end, ‘Optimum pro-truth health’. Someone on a cliff-side can use their leg muscles to push themselves downwards. They can combine their leg-muscle force with the force of gravity to move even faster towards the ground than via gravity alone. (Or, of course, leg muscles can be used to oppose oneself falling off a cliff, and stop the possible event, ‘falling’.) [126]

Recent points concerning opposition versus contradiction can be adapted to include the issue of co-operating forces versus (any claim that there are) mutually-contradictory forces, and to the issue of events or forces irrelevant to each other not contradicting each other. So, whether there is harmony in the sense of co-operating forces, or disharmony in the sense of opposing forces, or irrelevance among events or forces[127], this is irrelevant regarding the laws (truths) harmoniously describing the forces which cause events. (This is another way in which there is universally either irrelevance or harmony regarding the laws (overall truths) explaining all practicable events, as in U H/I E/T. The laws concern truths as-a-whole, as in U H/I E/T.)

Events or things, which are explainable by laws, can contradict. (They can causally contradict each other, as in the event, ‘Fred using leg muscles to jump back from the crumbling cliff edge’, stopping the (possible) event, ‘Fred falling over the cliff’.) However, the forces described by the laws which explain events cannot contradict. Forces can oppose but not contradict (stop) each other. And the laws (truths) as such cannot either contradict or oppose each other. There can only be universal harmony or irrelevance here, namely regarding all epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole, i.e., as in U H/I E/T.

It is only forces explainable by non-conflicting laws which can oppose each other. It is not the laws or truths as such which oppose each other. It is the harmonious operation of each law and associated force(s) here which explains the opposition or oppositional balances among forces.

This issue is important because, if the most general epistemic standard is ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance or disharmony regarding the epistemically justifiable or practicable truth as-a-whole’, this would mean it is epistemically justifiable to be both anti-truth and pro-truth. This would mean that an epistemically justifiable practical theory, a pro-truth theory, is a self-contradictory theory. It would be a theory which an overall, rational view would see as epistemically un-justifiable. This situation would be incoherent. Hence it was important to resolve that issue.

Summarising this section so far:- This section (and, equivalently but less explicitly, the previous section,) seeks a single, general standard underlying epistemic justifiability and all possible practicable truths as-a-whole. This standard or form must apply regardless of whether events the truths or laws describe involve one event contradicting another, or events co-operating with or irrelevant to each other. This form or standard seems to be U H/I E/T. There seems to be only (i) harmony regarding the operation of each law, namely within the area where a law applies; or (ii) irrelevance among laws, namely among areas, as with gravity and colour. (i) and (ii) mean non-conflict.

Hence, this of course applies to knowledge concerning practicable truth as-a-whole. And it applies among specific truths: each truth is or comes under a law (or a set of laws). U H/I E/T then, applies to all practicable truths, and hence to directly epistemic things such as science.

Those conclusions suggest that this section’s first aim has been achieved, namely to show that U H/I E/T is the most general or ultimate epistemic standard. Next, a discussion leading up to the achieving of this section’s second aim — to show that it is highly plausible that U H/I E/T can be applied to the whole how-should-one-live sphere:-

The term ‘universally’ in U H/I E/T implies that it is indirectly epistemically justifiable to consider everything which does or might affect our being epistemically justifiable. This is also implied by an overall view of epistemic justifiability. This means considering both all our thoughts and all our (other, publicly observable[128]) practices. That is, U H/I E/T suggests a holistic practical theory. U H/I E/T does not just concern thinking or knowledge as such, the perhaps only obvious focus of an unexamined ‘Be pro-truth’ or narrowest view of epistemic justifiability[129]. So, U H/I E/T involves both the learning and the practising of pro-truth truth. Otherwise, as U H/I E/T also suggests, a person would not universally be in harmony with pro-truth truth, with the type of truth which is as epistemically justifiable as possible. So, the person’s choices and life would not be as epistemically justifiable as possible.

In sum, U H/I E/T does not just apply regarding direct epistemic justifiability; it also applies regarding indirect epistemic justifiability — it applies universally, i.e., to both, as the ‘U’ in U H/I E/T implies. It is the standard of epistemic justification, and so it is the standard of direct and indirect epistemic justification.

An adaptation of some arguments from the previous section also make that point:-

Direct epistemic justification concerns truths as such. Indirect epistemic justifiability concerns whether each directly epistemically justified truth is knowledge used in a pro-truth way. U H/I E/T then, applies in a narrow way to direct epistemic justification, and in an overall way regarding the relation (harmony) between indirect and direct epistemic justification. Yet the standard as such is the same. (An analogy:- The standard, ‘Be multi-coloured’, can be applied narrowly, e.g., to only the shirt worn by the lead singer in an opera. But that standard can also be applied to the opera’s visual aspects overall, i.e., to all other costumes, each piece of scenery, etc.)

Also, U H/I E/T is the standard of all practicable truth — and indirectly epistemically justifiable, pro-truth truths are practicable truths. Similarly:- U H/I E/T has been shown to be the standard of practicable truth as-a-whole. And pro-truth truths are within that whole. So U H/I E/T is the standard regarding all pro-truth truths[130]. They include the overall truth that it is as epistemically justifiable (e.g., contradictionless) as possible to learn and practise only pro-truth truths — in life-as-a-whole. This truth is a way of summarising pro-truth theory (and this makes the theory knowledge). So, because U H/I E/T is the standard of practicable truth as-a-whole, it is the standard of indirect epistemic justification. Hence it is epistemically justifiable to apply U H/I E/T, or pro-truth theory(’s standard), universally, to life-as-a-whole.

If we think it is epistemically justifiable to have an epistemically justifiable theory in life generally, we need to apply U H/I E/T universally. (Or we could simply ask, “Can the fundamental standard of epistemic justification be applied to life as-a-whole?” (which, if it can be, would make life-as-a-whole an epistemically justifiable enterprise).) And it seems the standard can be applied universally, because, e.g., as the previous section suggests, achieving the directly epistemically justifiable implies there are (indirectly epistemically justifiable) things we need in order to be directly epistemically justifiable, and these concern life as-a-whole. This is exemplified by the previous section’s Sally, Jim and ‘1+2=3’ in relation to non-sexism, and the present section’s example of the non-sexist etc scientist Lee, and those sections’ implications regarding those persons need to eat, be safe, healthy etc. A general point here is that U H/I E/T seems applicable to life-as-a-whole because U H/I E/T is equivalent to the previous section’s expanded version of ‘Be pro-truth’ — which the previous section shows could be applied to life-as-a-whole:-

Consider a conclusion implied by recent points: ‘U H/I E/T implies that overall epistemically justifiability involves universally acting only in ways either harmonious with or irrelevant regarding the notion, ‘Learn and practise pro-truth truths’.’ Arguments in the previous section also show that being as epistemically justifiable as possible means learning and practising only pro-truth truths. That is, U H/I E/T also implies it is epistemically unjustifiable to do that which conflicts with truth, i.e., the anti-truth — which means that only pro-truth truths should be learnt and practised. These practices include treating the a-truth as a-truth[131]. Therefore, arguments in this and the previous section mean that U H/I E/T is equivalent to an overall, deeply-examined interpretation of ‘Be pro-truth’. As argued above, ‘Be pro-truth’ is short for something like ‘Do only either the pro-truth or the a-truth, never the anti-truth’. So, U H/I E/T has the same implications as ‘Be pro-truth’, including its universally practicable guidelines.

To further show that U H/I E/T is equivalent to ‘Be pro-truth’, we only have to note the following:- To be harmonious with the truth is to be pro-truth, and to do that which is irrelevant to the truth is to do that which is a-truth. To do only that which is either in harmony with or irrelevant to the truth is to never do the anti-truth. And so on, as in the previous section. That is, an investigation focusing on the most general or fundamental standard of direct epistemic justifiability or practicable truth also gives us the previous section’s practicable guidelines.

The main justificatory conclusion of this chapter so far is: U H/I E/T or, equivalently, ‘Be pro-truth’, is the only fully epistemically justifiable fundamental or ultimate standard. This suggests that this gives us an absolute, objective, authority for pro-truth practical theory — as far as is possible.

Summarising Sections 1-3:- Their investigation not only epistemically justifies that standard and associated end. It also epistemically justifies applying it universally. The term ‘universally’ in U H/I E/T includes our choices concerning our lives as a whole. Our choices, our practices, are part of the universe. When our choices and hence intended practices are universally either in harmony with or irrelevant to pro-truth truth, there will universally be either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability; and vice versa. That is, only then, for us, in practice and in theory, will there be U H/I E/T.

Above, the following was stated: “Science is a part of our lives — science is a human practice, and hence its standard may be applicable to other human practices, making them epistemically justifiable too.” Section 1-3’s examples of specific practical implications of pro-truth theory show that science’s ultimate standard is indeed applicable to other areas. The next chapter gives many more such examples. Yet, before that, the standard seems to need further justification. The present section will complement the above justificatory points with one more, related, important justificatory argument. (Then, after a short optional section supplementing Sections 1-4, and a short optional section which revisits Kant, the rest of the book is mostly highly practical.)

There is empirical (i.e., observable) evidence for pro-truth theory’s most general standard, and hence for the theory. The evidence given above for the standard could seem to only consist of arguments, of words, but, as will be representatively shown, these at least implicitly refer to publicly observable evidence. Inherently, as argued in Part I, no moral theory’s standard could be supported by empirical evidence. Inherently, a theory based on practicable science’s standard is supported by empirical evidence:-

The above arguments’ examples, concerning gravity, colour and so on, confirming the nature of that standard, concern observable things or effects, e.g., basketballs and gravitational effects. The basic point is that the universal harmony etc referred to in U H/I E/T involves universal harmony etc concerning observations. This is because practicable truths are observable truths. E.g., we can harmoniously observe that, universally, no matter how hard we try, we cannot throw a basketball up to make it rise endlessly; and we can harmoniously observe that, universally, we cannot change the colour of a basketball and thereby, all else equal, have evidence that colour is relevant to gravity’s effects on the ball. So because all such representative empirical evidence confirms what practicable science’s most general standard is, this is sufficient empirical evidence to justify the claim that there is an empirically justifiable standard regarding practicable truth as-a-whole. Because that standard is applicable in life-as-a-whole, that evidence is empirical evidence for (the basis of) a practical theory which is epistemically justifiable, namely a theory as close to publicly observable truth as is practicable for a theory concerning how one should live. Here alone can we have an epistemically justifiable, evidenced practical theory.

In sum:- As argued in Part I, ‘justified’ means ‘justified via evidence’, i.e., epistemically justified. Therefore, only an epistemically justifiable practical theory is justifiable, and justified. Justified true belief, or justified belief based on or positively related to truth, is knowledge or close to knowledge. Therefore, pro-truth theory is as close to being knowledge as is possible for a practical theory. It alone has overall epistemic authority.

Another example, making the implications of those examples concerning empirical evidence more explicit:-

Samantha, a scientist, on a motoring holiday, leading a convoy of twelve cars, looks for a nice picnic spot. She stops at the bottom of a hill. The ground here is level, so the hungry drivers leave their cars in neutral gear, do not bother to apply hand-brakes, and rush towards a picnic table. Much to everyone’s surprise, nine cars start to roll uphill. Nearby, a stream rolls downhill, and a bird searching for food moves some pebbles, which also roll downhill. The cars’ uphill movement apparently contradicts all the science Samantha knows concerning gravity. U H/I E/T seems threatened. All persons there are amazed.

(They can catch up with the cars, and do so, parking them again, using the hand-brakes.)

Mark, who knows little of science, says, “The only cars that did not roll uphill are green. So the colour green must stop them rolling uphill. Here gravity must only work on green cars”. He tries hard to lift the green cars, but cannot. He says, “I cannot lift them. So, yes, gravity still works on these cars.”

Samantha, as a scientist, at least implicitly knows that U H/I E/T is the most general standard of practicable science. So she thinks Mark’s suggestion must be wrong, as she knows colour is (or used to be) irrelevant regarding gravity’s effects. But at first she cannot think of a better explanation than Mark’s. (Perhaps, she thinks, the principle (law?) of induction has stopped operating harmoniously.) Yet, because she at least implicitly applies U H/I E/T, she looks more closely at the green cars, comparing them with the others. She tries to lift all the cars. She discovers the green and non-green cars are about the same mass, same size, and so on. So she looks at their other aspects. She also looks at and round the hill carefully.

She finds that the green cars all belong to one family, who work for a new, small-scale manufacturer of specialist cars. This family gets the cars very cheap, so they bought three. The cars have special plastic bodies, and the manufacturing process makes the plastic green. The other parts which in normal cars are steel, are mostly ceramic and aluminium. The cars which rolled uphill are normal cars, i.e., with steel bodies and engines. Samantha notices a sign, mostly hidden by a roadside bush. The sign says: ‘Magnetic Hill: If you sit in your vehicle at the bottom of this hill, in neutral, with no brakes applied, your car will roll uphill, defying gravity! (The hilltop is mostly a giant magnetic rock.)’[132].

Samantha realises she initially did not have a sufficiently overall view of the situation. Now she feels relieved, because she’d suffered what psychologists call ‘cognitive dissonance’, due to apparently finding that U H/I E/T did not apply here. Apparently, the law of gravity was contradicted, and the only initial (partial) evidence was that colour seemed causally associated with how gravity apparently worked on cars here.

Now she remembers that magnets, (like leg muscles,) can oppose gravity, and that the enormous magnetic rock she now knows to constitute most of the top of the hill would make a mostly steel car roll upwards in certain conditions.

She also realises that, if the law of gravity did not also apply to cars here, then, e.g., each car would have easily risen off the ground when she tried to lift it. So she observes that colour has remained irrelevant regarding gravity affecting all cars of about the same mass in the same way. And so on.

In sum, Samantha sought the relevant harmony and irrelevance with the rest of nature here, implied by U H/I E/T, and soon found it. That is, she observed that U H/I E/T is practicable nature’s most general standard. She found further harmonious empirical evidence to confirm that U H/I E/T is the most general or ultimate standard regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable science’s truths as-a-whole. She found that there are not some practicable truths or one standard applying in only part of that whole, or universe, and, contradicting this, other practicable truths or some other standard(s) applying in the other part(s).

The main point here is supported by all empirical evidence (contexted via a sufficiently overall, empirically-evidenced viewpoint[133] regarding whatever practicable issue is being investigated — unlike Mark’s too-limited viewpoint, and Samantha’s initial viewpoint). That is, there is no evidence (contexted in that way) reliably disconfirming that U H/I E/T is the standard of practicable truth as-a-whole. So, there is only evidence for, none against, the foundation of pro-truth theory.

Suppose we seek evidence against it, e.g., by trying to prove there is no universal harmony and irrelevance regarding gravity. Here, genuine in-practice deniers or skeptics concerning U H/I E/T would willingly, e.g., step off a cliff, with each such person painted a different colour. With any such test, (going on past experience,) we will only find evidence for U H/I E/T, never against it[134].

This evidence includes evidence that there is for us only that one most general epistemic standard because there is for us only one practicable universe. Recent and many previous points[135] imply there is only evidence showing us there is just one reality or truth as-a-whole for practicable science to understand. If there were different realities or different universes (multiverses) accessible to us in practice, there could be a different ultimate epistemic standard for each truth as-a-whole, for each universe. If so, there would be different truths, different realities, differing empirical evidence, i.e., supporting different truths, for different persons or beings. If there were different practicable truths-as-a-whole, and hence different epistemically justifiable ultimate standards, there would be no single, unambiguous epistemic guide regarding practice. We could not know what to do.

As writers such as George Couvalis[136] suggest, this is for us non-sense: we can not sense (observe) evidence to the contrary. For us, there can be no such evidence. Even if there was, it would be impracticable or unobservable for us[137]. All the practicable evidence we have shows it is nonsense. This book concerns the practicable.

Imagine hypothetical humans or other beings, who at times communicate with and are observable by us, who deny there is one practicable universe, and who claim there are hence different practicable truths-as-a-whole and hence more than one ultimate epistemic standard. For them to have evidence of this, they could also step off cliffs. Before stepping off, they might claim that (1) you and I only see our practicable reality, not the other one(s) they can enter, and that, hence, you and I will see them fall to their death. But, they say, (2) they will be in different realities, and therefore some of them will see themselves as, say, humans or beings floating up, or as flying pancakes, and others will see no cliff edge at all, but a flat plain or ocean on which they walk, and in these realities U H/I E/T does not apply. With this, say, induction or predictability does not apply, e.g., one’s existence as a flying pancake could unpredictably end, via the pancake becoming a piano.

But, even if this happens for them, this is meaningless for us. (If you see a book in front of you now, with words discussing this, instead of seeing something quite different, e.g., a quivering green jelly with purple lemons in it singing Happy Birthday, then you are one of us.) We would all see the same, permanently dead deniers at the bottom of the cliff. For us, there is only one reality, one observable practicable truth as-a-whole, one associated universe, and one ultimate epistemic standard. And this book is only for people who see only this reality, namely us.

Again, there is for us more than sufficient empirical evidence to justify the claim that there is a single empirically justifiable standard regarding practicable truth as-a-whole. Because that standard is applicable in the practical sphere, that evidence is empirical evidence for (the foundation of) a practical theory which is epistemically justifiable, i.e., as close to truth as is practicable for a practical theory. It seems to me that this theory must be at least something like the pro-truth theory being investigated in this chapter. This theory’s authoritative basis is all of practicable truth, and hence all the empirical evidence for practicable truth. What more authority could we realistically ask for? To ask for anything more is impracticable, unknowable — and hence epistemically unjustifiable.

Kant argues plausibly that only one fundamental standard applies across all areas of knowledge or truth[138]. He implies that this includes knowledge concerning any epistemically justifiable theory regarding how one should live. He suggests that, otherwise, knowledge or truth as-a-whole would involve contradictions — and that this is impossible[139]. With this, he says all knowledge is fundamentally a unity. His argument can be re-interpreted via pro-truth theory:-

Wherever we can have practicable knowledge, the same fundamental standard, U H/I E/T, applies. (A reminder: U H/I E/T means ‘universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’.) If we can have knowledge (practicable truth) concerning what to justifiably practise in life-as-a-whole, the fundamental standard here must be the same as that of practicable science, because knowledge is a unity. So, to discover the fundamental epistemic standard applicable to how one should live, we can discover what practicable science’s fundamental standard is. It is U H/I E/T.

This standard must apply to the practicable theories of science, and to the epistemically justifiable practices scientists use to discover those theories. These practices will not conflict with epistemically justifiable practices in life as a whole. Indeed, they are a part of them, a part of the unity. Because knowledge is a unity, and knowledge is justified true belief, hence justifiability is a unity. So the standard of justifiability applies universally. (This is another way of showing that ‘justifiable’ can coherently only mean ‘epistemically justifiable’.)

A conclusion here is that a standard applicable to practicable science can and epistemically justifiably should be applied to the rest of life-as-a-unity, and will apply to the rest of knowledge-as-a-unity, which includes knowledge of that which is epistemically justifiable to do in all of one’s life.

A related conclusion:- The only standard applicable to how-one-should-live, and for which there is overwhelming empirical evidence, has to thereby be the standard of empirical, practicable, science. (The practicable is inherently empirically observable.):-

In Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, something like the rest of this paragraph was stated:- Circular arguments are epistemically problematic if they involve ‘begging the question’, namely arguing without sufficient or any evidence. If Frank begs the question, he assumes that what his argument claims to prove is already proven. Frank, or his argument, merely uses a statement as the alleged evidence for the statement. A non-analytic statement, such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Murder is right’, is epistemically justified only if there is sufficient evidence for it outside of the statement. That is, there needs to be sufficient empirical evidence, or an argument soundly based on such evidence.

As Part I showed, no moral theory is epistemically justifiable[140]. But the evidence for an epistemically justifiable practical theory is an argument soundly based on all empirical, practicable evidence. It is based on the single ultimate standard regarding all practicable truth and the inherently empirical evidence for it, in publicly observable reality. That argument, and various related or supplementary or sub-arguments, are above. (More such arguments are below.)

Part I showed that an aspect of the problematic circularity with morality is an infinite or epistemically vacuous regress. Here, going from the conclusion of a moral argument to its foundation or fundamental premise takes us to an epistemic vacuum. But, with an epistemically justifiable theory, we end up regressing to publicly observable reality, to the epistemically justifiable. We end up with inherently objective evidence from our senses, evidence that the theory’s foundation, the premise and standard, U H/I E/T, is as close to truth as practicable. Only here can a how-should-one-live regress end at an epistemically justifiable stopping point.

1) Near the end of Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, I pointed out that any sound argument, i.e., one with valid form and true content, i.e., an epistemically justifiable argument, is circular — but not problematically circular. So a sound argument epistemically justifying applying the most general standard of epistemic justifiability to life-as-a-whole will be necessarily, but not problematically, circular. E.g., consider the summary-argument:

‘(a) To live by an epistemically justifiable standard, we need to (or it is epistemically justifiable to) apply any single, most general standard of epistemic justification to life-as-a-whole, if it can be so applied. (b) There is such a standard, U H/I E/T. (c) Therefore, via (a), we need to (or it is epistemically justifiable to) apply U H/I E/T in life-as-a-whole.’

Now (a) is circular, fundamentally an analytic truth, because it can be restated as or fundamentally involves something like: ‘An epistemically justifiable life is an epistemically justifiable life’, i.e., X is X. So this is rationally undeniable. But, as it stands it is abstract, and says no more than any moral, allegedly justificatory argument, which ultimately also only says ‘X is X’, as in ‘The morally right thing to do is the morally right thing to do’. Yet (b) involves more than any moral argument can. (b), if it can be justified via evidence outside the statement, is true. This chapter shows that (b) is true (or as close to truth as is practicable). So (c) applies.

Regarding how one should live, only arguments advocating being pro-truth are ultimately firmly grounded on, and justified by, something outside the arguments’ statements as such. They are ultimately grounded on scientific observation, via those statements arguing for the most general standard involved in practicable truth as-a-whole or reality. Part I argued that all moral theories have insoluble epistemic problems: we cannot use a moral theory to tell us how to epistemically justifiably live. Part II’s heading is ‘A Suggested Solution To The Epistemic Problems With Moral Theories’. The suggested solution is to forget moral theories, and seek a practical theory based on that epistemic standard. This theory can be called an ‘epistemic practical’ theory, as opposed to a moral theory. It is epistemically justifiable to regard moral theory as equivalent to uninformed primitive beliefs such as ‘Angry thunder gods cause storms’. Such beliefs have been proven wrong by science. Science’s most general standard, and scientific observation, can also be used to show that moral beliefs can and justifiably should be replaced by arguments based on science. To have a moral belief is to still be in an epistemic Dark Age.

2) The standard(s) and associated end(s) of a moral or practical theory are the essence of the theory’s fundamental aspect, i.e., its foundation-premise or basis. Part II so far makes it very clear that pro-truth theory contains no moral concepts in its foundation. Its standard and identical end are an epistemic concept. Applying that standard involves practices which can also be advocated by moral theories. E.g., it is epistemically justifiable to practise non-sexism and unselfishness, which is also advocated by some moral theories. But this does not mean that pro-truth theory is a moral theory. Only a foundation or basis with moral concepts in it, such as unselfishness, would make pro-truth theory a moral theory. An analogy:- The basic end Dion aims at when he cuts people’s chests open is to enjoy watching them die slowly from loss of blood. The basic end Erica aims at when she cuts people’s chests open is to do life-saving surgery. The practice ‘cutting chests open’ as such is the same for Dion and Erica. They both use a scalpel in the same way. But there can be very different bases and associated ends underlying the same practice, from an overall view. Just because one person practices X for one basic reason, or according to one standard, or to achieve one end, this does not mean that another person doing X has the same fundamental reason, standard or end. With this, Dion’s use of a scalpel does not mean that a scalpel is hence only usable for murder. Similarly, just because pro-truth theory advocates the practice ‘unselfishness’ (or whatever), and some moral theories do too, this does not mean that pro-truth theory is a moral theory. The application of a standard is not the same as the nature of the standard. (Analogously, the (murderous) way in which Dion applies a scalpel does not make a scalpel’s nature ‘Only or fundamentally a murder instrument’.)

Another analogy:- Centuries ago, during a plague, some persons stayed healthy due to avoiding persons they knew had the plague, because those healthy persons had a fundamental belief something like, ‘The sick have an evil aura around them’, often along with believing that a witch, devil or similar put the aura there, and that wearing a cross, onions, rabbit’s foot or similar would stop the witch or whatever from putting the aura on those not yet sick. Many medically-informed modern people also keep away from persons they know have similar diseases, based on the well-evidenced fundamental belief (knowledge) that the diseased persons’ breath , touch or similar contains infectious micro-organisms. That is, two persons can come to the same, correct practical conclusion, e.g., advocating keeping away from persons with a certain disease, but for conflicting fundamental reasons. Similarly, pro-truth theory and a moral theory can advocate the same practice, but for conflicting fundamental reasons.

Another way of explaining this is via distinguishing between means and end(s). Moral theories have a moral concept as their fundamental or ultimate aim or end, e.g., ‘freedom’ or ‘happiness’. But pro-truth’s primary end is ‘Be pro-truth’ or ‘Be epistemically justifiable’ — and practices involving types of freedom and happiness are a means to help achieve that end. The causal chain is the opposite of that involved with moral theories. In moral theories, to achieve a specific end, say ‘happiness from eating certain foods cooked a certain way’, knowledge, i.e., the directly epistemically justifiable, is used as a means to help achieve that end. (E.g., someone needs to know how to get and cook those foods that way.) The end of a moral or practical theory is a fundamental aspect of the theory.

Similarly, a moral theory based on the standard ‘unselfishness’ has unselfishness as its end. For pro-truth theory, unselfishness is a means to optimally achieve the pro-truth end for all.

In sum, here too, it is clear that pro-truth theory is fundamentally and thoroughly an epistemic practical theory, not a moral theory. Part II, Chapters 2 onwards will further demonstrate that distinction between pro-truth theory’s (i) standard or end, and (ii) the means or practices involved in achieving that end. This will further reinforce that conclusion.

3) In Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, the following was said: “An act, X, can be believed to be justified because it comes under some theory, T, which advocates some value, V. E.g., Joseph can believe that the act ‘Freely express your opinion whenever you like’ is justified because he believes in a moral theory which values (his) freedom above all else. But, instead of that particular X, and that value, (i.e., freedom,) innumerable other, mutually conflicting acts and values can be substituted for X and V. Every possible moral theory can thereby be covered. Joseph believes his X is justified. But this only means he at least implicitly thinks X is justified relative to V.” The general point here is that, as Nietzsche pointed out, every statement, including scientific and prescriptive statements, is relative to some viewpoint, perspective or standard. The book so far has shown that both scientific and prescriptive or practical statements can be relative to an epistemically justifiable perspective or standard. This is the only perspective or standard we can know is coherent, cannot involve self-contradiction and problematic circularity, is epistemically unproblematic, and so on. It is the only perspective or standard as close to truth as possible. This perspective is that of the reflective, highest-level overall viewpoint which uses that standard to judge epistemic justifiability.

With this, in the term, ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’, the phrase ‘in relation to’ can be meaningfully substituted for ‘regarding’.

(After the next two, brief, optional sections, the next chapter begins the promised fairly detailed representative discussion of the specific practical implications of that standard for how one should live, in life-as-a-whole.)

PART II, CHAPTER 1, Section 5: Other Points Supplementing The Above Justification.

This section is optional in that its points are only a minor supplement to the above justificatory arguments. If those arguments were convincing, there is no great need to read this section, or to read it as carefully as the previous four sections.

The points here need to be combined with arguments in previous sections of this chapter.

The following points arise from an adaptation of arguments used in ancient Greece. This adapted discussion shows that (i) every conscious person already at least implicitly seeks truth, at least minimally, and considers this is justified; and that, with this, (ii), at least implicitly, we all seek a practical theory which is as close as possible to truth:-

One of various reasons for (i) and (ii) is that whenever we sincerely state something, the statement is unavoidably prefaced at least implicitly with ‘(I believe) it is true that’. E.g., if Tamara says and believes, “It is Sunday”, the ‘is’ in her statement implies that she believes ‘It is true that it is Sunday’. In that this ‘It is true’ preface is unavoidable, it is necessary[141]. So, we are necessarily pro-truth in that we unavoidably intend to state what we believe is the truth. (With this, in the following discussion, terms such as ‘being pro-truth’ will sometimes only mean ‘being pro-truth at least in intention, or being pro-what-I-believe-is-truth’. The belief might be false or untestable.) Some points concerning that at least implicit acceptance of ‘Be pro-truth’:-

A denier of pro-truth theory might explicitly state: ‘There is no justification for being pro-truth’. This implicitly states: ‘I am being pro-truth in that I believe it is the truth that, i.e., I am pro- the truth[142] that, we ought not to be pro-truth’; or, equivalently, ‘It is epistemically justifiable that it is not epistemically justifiable to be epistemically justifiable’. Something like that is their full statement, i.e., their explicit plus implicit statement(s). It involves problematic circularity and self-contradiction.

Clearly, any denier or skeptic of pro-truth theory at least implicitly accepts being pro-truth, and accepts that being pro-truth is epistemically justified. So, their denials or doubts mean a self-contradiction. As explained above, self-contradiction is epistemically problematic, e.g., via the self-contradicters implicitly stating that they are wrong. Pro-truth theory cannot be coherently doubted or rejected. And it must be at least minimally accepted. (This is not the case with any non-epistemic, moral theory.)

Those deniers (nihilists) or skeptics have a problem related to that of deniers or skeptics of all truth, or of all epistemic justifiability — who are hence also deniers or skeptics of the epistemic justifiability of being pro-truth and of the at least minimal necessity of being pro-truth. They deny or doubt there is any truth at all. Yet their full, self-contradictory statement here is something like: ‘It is the truth that there is no truth’. The ‘It is the truth’ phrase involves the stater accepting there is truth while denying there is truth.

Similarly for skeptically explicitly asking, ‘Is there anything epistemically justifiable?’, i.e., ‘Can we know anything?’. The questioner’s full question is something like: ‘Is it epistemically justifiable that anything is epistemically justifiable?’. They assume we can epistemically justifiably discover whether anything is epistemically justifiable. Hence they assume that there is epistemic justifiability.

If a skeptic seeks to push truth or the pro-truth down an infinite regress, the skeptic must at least implicitly ask something like: ‘How do you know there is truth, the epistemically justifiable, or, hence, the pro-truth[143]?’. In asking ‘How do you know?’, they make an assumption related to the former skeptical questioner’s. So they also have the problem of self-contradiction, and are at least minimally pro-truth. The unavoidability of being at least minimally pro-truth is a necessary foundation of thought, namely a presupposition before which we cannot regress. So it stops any attempt at an infinite regress here. This, especially if combined with the relevant point at the end of Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4, is an epistemically justifiable stopping point. Skeptics here unknowingly stop themselves at that stopping point.

(As argued in Part I, moral theories cannot epistemically justifiably stop a regress or avoid an infinite regress. Only an epistemically justifiable theory can.)

Those deniers and skeptics regarding being pro-truth are also pro-truth in that elsewhere too, they often seek, use and hence accept truth. E.g., they must learn and use knowledge of how to get food etc to stay alive, and of how to write or speak about their denials or skepticism. Otherwise, e.g., they’d do something else, in ignorance of the truth. E.g., they’d eat mud or poison instead of bread, hum ‘Happy Birthday’ instead of asking those skeptical questions, and rub their knees instead of writing skeptically about being pro-knowledge. Knowledge is needed by doubters and deniers of knowledge, or they could not know how to stay alive to doubt or deny, and they could not know what a doubt or denial is; and so on. Here too they are self-contradictory, implicitly stating that their and any denials or doubts concerning being pro-truth are wrong.

The conclusion here is:- The only way to not state that your how-should-one-live theory is wrong, or epistemically unjustifiable, is to fully accept pro-truth theory. This gives us an epistemically unquestionable authority or justification for pro-truth theory.

Similar points, and that same conclusion, apply regarding asking ‘How do you know that the epistemically justifiable is really epistemically justifiable?’. Further here, this question asks us to get outside of the epistemically justifiable in order to independently assess its epistemic justifiability. But to epistemically justifiably independently assess epistemic justifiability, we obviously must use epistemically justifiable methods. So that question is incoherent, asking the impossible. To do what is asked would be equivalent to getting outside of our universe to see what it is like. We cannot go to any place or standpoint, S, where S is outside of all there is, because, if we can get to S, S would have to be part of all there is. We cannot get outside our physical universe to observe it independently of it, i.e., from an external viewpoint. We cannot get outside the mental universe consisting of all our present or possible[144] epistemically justifiable assessment-methods and knowledge to assess its epistemic justifiability independent of our methods of assessing epistemic justifiability[145]. If we could, this would be equivalent to your chest being simultaneously both wholly within a shirt and wholly or partly outside of the shirt. This would defy the rationally undeniable principle of non-contradiction, ‘Not both X and not-X’. This is impracticable. Our mind cannot be external to everything internal to it, i.e., inside it.

The unavoidable internality here means a special type of circularity regarding what is, for us, epistemic justifiability as a whole[146]. Recent arguments imply that any circularity involved with epistemic justifiability as a whole is unavoidable, and cannot in-practice involve what is for us an epistemic problem. That is, as far as we can know, and that’s all that is practicable, we can still have sufficiently practicable knowledge, as argued in Part I, e.g., of how to make reliable dams. And because an epistemically justifiable practical theory concerns what to do in practice, that unavoidable circularity is not a problem for pro-truth theory. (Epistemically problematic circularity, as with moral theories, is of course avoidable.)

Related points apply to independently assessing or questioning whether we are necessarily at least minimally pro-truth. Here the question is at least implicitly prefaced by ‘Is it true that ...?’ or ‘How do we know that ...?’. So here, if we are to get a true or correct answer, we must use our methods of assessing epistemic justifiability. Thus we are necessarily, unavoidably, pro-using-them, i.e., pro-truth. We cannot be independent or get outside of using them, or of being pro-truth. (We can only avoid that if we are unconscious or dead.) And, of course, to further ask, ‘How do we know that the epistemically justifiable is really epistemically justifiable?’, and so on, involves or is reducible to asking ‘How do we know?’. So recent paragraph’s points apply: the asker is pro-truth here (and elsewhere).

In sum, any statement and any question involving denying or doubting the epistemically justifiable or that we are necessarily pro-truth, is necessarily, unavoidably, minimally pro-truth. So the conclusion of a few paragraphs ago applies. Further, because we all unavoidably or necessarily think (believe, state, question and so on) via the fundamental presupposition that it is epistemically justified to be pro-truth, then, for us, it is epistemically justified.

Similar points apply to all other sincere statements, i.e., those that do not deny or doubt pro-truth theory. E.g., if you sincerely say, “I should close the door”, you at least implicitly state something like ‘It is true that I should close the door’ or ‘I know (believe, i.e., believe it to be true) that I should close the door’. And if you sincerely state ‘It is raining’, you at least implicitly state ‘It is true that it is raining’. So here you are at least minimally pro-truth. And so on.

Even with insincere statements, such as lies and jokes, there is an at least implicit ‘It is true that’ preface. Suppose Jane knows it is raining, but says to John, “It is not raining”. Jane’s full statement is something like ‘It is true that it is justified or permitted that I lie (or joke) to John by saying ‘It is not raining’’.

We know that lies and jokes are not true. This raises the issue of moral theories, which we also cannot know to be true. (This issue is also raised by Jane. If she thinks it is justified or permissible to lie, say for a selfish reason, here she has a moral theory.):-

Every believer in a moral theory, theory X, at least implicitly states something like: ‘It is true that theory X is justified’. Again, as Quine and Ullian [147] point out, to believe a statement is to believe that it is true. (What else could ‘believe’ mean? If you believe X, you don’t believe that X is false.) So, as with every other true or false statement, believers in a morality are necessarily at least minimally pro-truth. Further, believers in a morality are not just pro-truth in that they believe it is true that their theory is justified. They also believe that their theory as such is true. So they are more than minimally pro-truth. And many believers in a morality are highly pro-truth in that they were keen seekers of truth (i.e., of a true morality) before they came to believe in their particular moral theory. So, believers in a morality, and that means nearly everyone, are for such reasons significantly or highly pro-truth, at least in intention. (Yet, also, they do not believe in being pro-truth in that they have not replaced their epistemically unjustifiable morality with an epistemically justifiable practical theory.) (This paragraph applies to religious beliefs in a similar way.)

In sum, at least implicitly, we all do seek a practical theory which is as close as possible to truth. And pro-truth theory is the only practical theory which is as close as possible to truth.

So, as Quine and Ullian imply, something like recent points tends to apply to believers in anything. And all conscious humans believe in something. At the very least, they presuppositionally believe they are conscious or thinking. And all beliefs are presuppositionally pro-truth.

Concluding recent points:- Humans tend to already be more pro-truth than the unavoidable minimal degree. Yet even if it is only the unavoidable minimal degree, the above arguments concerning self-contradiction would apply to all conscious humans. So, that previous conclusion applies, namely:- The only way to not state that your how-should-one-live theory is wrong, or epistemically unjustifiable, is to fully accept epistemically justifiable, pro-truth theory. This gives us an epistemically unquestionable authority or justification for pro-truth theory.

Those and previous points imply it is incoherent to attack an epistemically justifiable practical theory. An attack not yet explicitly mentioned says: ‘I’ll grant that the theory is epistemically justifiable, but why should one do what is epistemically justifiable?’. The implicit answer to this is above. Explicitly:- The only coherent meaning of ‘What should one do?’, i.e., ‘What is justifiable to do?’, is: ‘What is epistemically justifiable to do?’. Here too, a belief that one is attacking pro-truth theory involves a self-contradiction. It is incoherent to ask, ‘Why is it epistemically justifiable to do the epistemically justifiable?’. This is equivalent to asking ‘Why is a wall a wall?’, ‘Why is three three?’ and so on. The only coherent answer is something like: ‘It just is; three just is three’ or ‘It rationally unquestionably is, because X is X’. If X is not X, all thought would be contradictory, meaningless, incoherent. This point also supports the claim that pro-truth theory has an objective, rationally unquestionable authority.

The previous paragraph, and points leading up to it, give us a way to solve the ‘is-ought’ problem discussed in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3 — a problem moral theories inherently cannot solve. (A related way to solve the is-ought problem is in Part II, Chapter 4.) A reminder:- The problem is that, whatever is the case does not in-itself or necessarily imply what ought to be the case[148]: there seems to be an unbridgeable gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. The solution here, implied by the previous paragraph, is:- ‘That which one ought to do’ is equivalent to ‘That which is epistemically justifiable to do’. Equivalence means there is no gap, no epistemically problematic gap, between this ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Only here is there that equivalence. Inherently epistemically unjustifiable, moral theories cannot involve that equivalence. This solves the is-ought problem as far as is practicable. This further reinforces the notion that pro-truth theory is as rationally unquestionably authoritative as possible for us.

Similarly, it is rationally unquestionable that thinking persons are universally at least minimally pro-truth, and hence that being pro-truth is an absolute for us[149]. There is also no is-ought gap here, because the necessary ‘is’, ‘Be pro-truth’, is also a necessary ‘ought’ here, e.g., as in the unavoidable prefacing and so on mentioned at the start of this section. Because this necessity universally applies, e.g., for all of Kant’s epistemically rational beings, ‘Be pro-truth’ is in Kant’s plausible sense an objective standard. Such points, contexted by others above, imply a further reason to see here an absolute, objective authority for a practical theory.

If we are necessarily pro-truth at least minimally, we contradict ourselves if we are not pro-truth universally, i.e., in all possible spheres or areas. This includes the practical or how-should-one-live sphere. If one avoids self-contradiction by being fully pro-truth, one’s life as-a-whole is harmonious. Here one has found (epistemically justifiable) peace. One is integrated, not disintegrated via conflicts within one’s beliefs-as-a-whole. In that one is thereby integrated, one has (epistemically justifiable) integrity.

(Beginning after the next, short, optional section, there are arguments showing further that this integrity does not mean a narrow uniformity: it involves much diversity and, hence, freedom, of a type which does not conflict with the pro-truth end. I’ll argue that a type of flourishing is involved.)

(If this section is not read, it will probably not significantly matter regarding the book’s positive aim, namely to develop and justify pro-truth theory. After this theoretical section, the next chapter focuses on practical implications of pro-truth theory. If you are only interested in them, you could skip the present section. However, some points here can be interpreted as minor additions to the above justification(s) of pro-truth theory, and so this section may be useful in that way.)

This chapter’s Section 3 abstracted from specific events, namely the contents of scientific laws, in order to find a single, general form underlying all events, i.e., underlying practicable scientific truth-as-a-whole. Kant also abstracts from the specific contents of scientific laws. He claims that all that we thereby discover is the form ‘universal applicability (which inherently involves non-contradiction)’. Attempting to apply that form or standard to morality, Kant expressed it as the UCI, the universalisability version of the (alleged) categorical imperative. (A reminder: the UCI states ‘Act only on a maxim you can at the same time will to be a universal law’.) Kant argues that, after abstracting from all specific contents, is all that is left is the form, ‘Universalisability and non-contradiction’. So, he believed, this is all we can base moral laws on. As argued in Part I, I think this is too limited a basis for an epistemically justifiable action-guiding theory, because it licenses contradictory alleged moral laws, and has other problems.

It seems to me that if we abstract from all the specific contents of practicable scientific laws, i.e., from practicable truth-as-a-whole (as far as we now know it[150]), we get the form U H/I E/T — ‘universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’. This covers both the general notion, ‘practicable truth’, and the form of that general notion. That is, after abstracting from all specific truths, as Kant did, we are left with significantly more than just the form or standard he claims we are left with.

Kant’s theory sometimes vaguely and unintentionally suggests, though never makes explicit, the form, U H/I E/T. And, as shown above, Kant’s suggested universalisability-and-non-contradiction form is clearly included within U H/I E/T. Yet this means Kant’s form or epistemic standard only partly covers what U H/I E/T covers. He does not focus on what ‘epistemically justifiable’ means overall, or as a whole. It is rational to take the overall view of an issue, but Kant does not take an overall view of rationality: (epistemic) rationality exists for and only in relation to its content:-

Kant often implies or says[151] that rationality as such exists in order to increase our knowledge — to help us discover truth. Rationality as such is formal — a method of thinking. What is a method? It is a way of doing something. Methods exist only as a means to do something. Without this, namely the whole point of a method, the method as such has no point or meaning. So it is incoherent to not include the epistemically justifiable aim, content or point of the epistemically justifiable method in the notion ‘epistemically justifiable’. Kant understood only part of the whole here. (The parable of the blind persons and the elephant applies here.) The sole aim or end of reason as such[152] is to discover truth, or knowledge. What else could epistemic rationality as such be for? To lead us only to the false? Or to just exist as an end-in-itself, i.e., in a vacuous, useless state, with no content or purpose, not used to think about anything or achieve anything? This would be like a rational being, say an adding-machine, which cannot add anything, or like someone who claims to be a music composer, but who has never composed any music, i.e., never provided any content regarding that claim. This is incoherent, and incomplete.

A close analogy is perhaps the fact that we cannot have a method of cooking without any inherent end-state, namely cooked food, or without any ingredients, i.e., content. E.g., we cannot describe the method ‘poaching’ meaningfully without referring to contents such as ‘A liquid, which must be used to boil the food’, and ‘Food, which is boiled’, along with the inherent end of the method, namely poached food, e.g., an egg. Equivalently, we can only be (epistemically) rational about some content. The method cannot exist without content. We must use pure rationality to think about, e.g., X and not-X, or ‘1+2=3’. We cannot think without thinking about something, some content, however abstract the content is, as with ‘Not both X and not-X’.

That is, Kant’s claim that a rational form/standard (universalisability-and-non-contradiction) alone is the basis of the true morality misses the overall implications of the fact that rational form must have content, and that this content is truth (or as close to truth as possible, depending on the amount of evidence available[153].) (Evidence is of course also a content of epistemic rationality, because the epistemically justifiable definition of ‘evidence (i.e., for a claim)’ involves something like ‘true statements, or (inherently true) facts, or true (and valid) arguments, (supporting or in harmony with the claim)’. That is, evidence, a content of rational form or method, is also truth.)

In sum:- The end and general content of rational form or method as such is truth (knowledge). If Kant had taken his notion of rationality to its logical or inherent conclusion, or end, he could have arrived at U H/I E/T and pro-truth theory. He explicitly tries to develop an epistemically justifiable practical theory, but did not have a sufficiently overall view of what ‘epistemically justifiable’ and ‘rationality’ mean.

Unlike Kant’s UCI, U H/I E/T includes an end-content which rules out all other (allegedly) justifiable ends, or other contents such as Kant’s alleged moral laws. Unlike Kant’s UCI, U H/I E/T does not license contradictory prescriptions or alleged laws, each involving an end, each end being allegedly equally epistemically justifiable. Neither does U H/I E/T view persons as ends-in-themselves. U H/I E/T rules out anything conflicting with achieving its one ultimate, primary end — the learning and practising of pro-truth truth. Kant could have solved his problems here, by fully developing certain parts of his theory (and rejecting others)[154].

Finally here, a general comment, applicable to other attempts to base a moral theory on rationality, and applicable to some comments in and another possible interpretation of Kant’s theory:-

‘Rationality’, or ‘reason’, could be defined differently, as including both rationality as a method, plus the content of that epistemic method as such, i.e., truth. This combination can also be developed into pro-truth theory, which is more or less what Part II has basically done. That is, by carefully investigating that combination, we can arrive at the epistemically justifiable ultimate end, ‘Be pro-truth’. We cannot justifiably arrive at any other end-content here — not Kant’s rational beings as such, not persons as ends-in-themselves, not happiness, not the slavish achieving of our passions’ aims; and so on.

In conclusion:- Via considering knowledge or truth as something valid for all rational beings, and sufficiently carefully developing the implications of that, the problems with Kant’s theory can be solved as far as is practicable — namely via it being changed into pro-truth theory. (This, however, makes it unrecognisably Kantian. E.g., it focuses on consequences, not just intentions, has only one ultimate practicable end, rejects the UCI as such, and rejects the allegedly equivalent notion of treating persons as ends-in-themselves, i.e., as the ultimate or primary moral end. Hence it rejects any other equivalent versions of the (former or latter) allegedly most general categorical imperative(s). It also sees various emotions (inclinations) as justifiable, as shown below.)

Next, back to the central, positive, practical concern of this book: how, specifically, can one do what is epistemically justifiable in one’s life as a whole, and why would one be motivated to do so?:-

In discussing whether we are able to practise pro-truth theory, some points below are inextricably interrelated with the issue of whether we could be motivated to practise it. So practicability and motivatability are sometimes discussed together.

Above it was argued that, to achieve anything intentionally, we need the ability, motivation and opportunity. Ability concerns practicability, and this and motivation will be discussed at some length. But opportunity will get less explicit attention below. This is because the discussion of ability and motivatability makes it obvious that opportunities for all to be pro-truth would be promoted by pro-truth persons, and implies clearly what these opportunities would be.

PART II, CHAPTER 2, Section 1: It Is Epistemically Justifiable To Have A (Certain Type Of) Society.

It is a pro-truth truth that knowledge is so complex that no isolated individual could sufficiently learn any discipline’s knowledge and avoid major mistakes. Optimal human learning can only be in large part a social process, involving harmoniously helping each other, e.g., by respectful instruction, learning and criticism. This implies that a certain type of democracy[155] would be most pro-truth: the idea that totalitarian rule by some dictatorial person(s) could be epistemically justifiable is unjustifiable. (More on this later.)

(A reminder: U H/I E/T means ‘universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’.) U H/I E/T implies a universally harmonious, and hence peaceful, pro-truth society. Hence, a type of (hypothetical) social contract is needed. Indeed, taking the notion ‘isolated individuals’ to its logical conclusion shows it would be highly anti-truth to advocate a ‘condition (or state) of nature’ where there are only separate, non-co-operating individuals. The logical extreme conclusion is that, as soon as each individual is born, its mother would abandon it, or eat it, or similar. (This shows that human learning is social, not individual.) There would soon be no humans alive to be pro-truth. There certainly could not be any pro-truth social institutions, such as schools, universities, libraries and hospitals. Any condition between that individualistic extreme and a society where all live perfectly harmoniously in an optimally pro-truth way would hence be less than ideally pro-truth.

In a less extreme ‘condition of nature’, where there is only just enough co-operation to enable some to survive till adulthood, but nothing significantly like a society, people would tend to be greatly motivated to compete against each other. Society means people are significantly motivated to co-operate, to be sufficiently harmonious — otherwise the society ceases to exist. If individuals were motivated to live in that condition of nature, these minimally co-operating individuals would not be both motivated and able to have such necessary pro-truth things as farms, factories etc sufficiently efficient (large-scale, mechanised etc) to produce a surplus able to support many others, e.g., so they can study. Similarly, and largely thence, there’d still be no schools, hospitals and so on. Via the lack of co-operation (harmony), there’d be no virtually no opportunity to become optimally pro-truth, or to engage in directly epistemically justifiable enterprises such as science. A society is an indirectly epistemically justified need.

The ideal society would be world-wide, because U H/I E/T implies universal harmony. (This further means that pro-truth theory involves a social contract.) Without a world society, the different societies could conflict, with anti-truth results — e.g., via war leading to the death of highly pro-truth persons and the wasting of resources which could be used in pro-truth education, health-care and so on.

Without at least a fairly large society, it is extremely unlikely that anyone would be motivated to become optimally pro-truth, let alone have the cognitive ability and economic, health etc resources to become significantly pro-truth. The extreme here is a single human raised by other animals, all being co-operative enough to maintain a society. Judging by cases where human individuals were somehow isolated from other humans from infancy, and raised by other mammals, such an individual would probably only be motivated to co-operate somewhat, to survive as such, and feel like sex, and so on, i.e., only be concerned with very basic, animal needs. Beyond such extremes there have been very small human groups isolated from larger, at least somewhat civilised (e.g., literate) societies. These small groups seem to have made far less than minor progress towards developing individuals with the knowledge and the critical, skeptical, non-sexist, non-religious and other attitudes and skills they’d need to be optimally pro-truth. Being optimally and significantly pro-truth involves something like the whole of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, and much more.

In sum, (a certain type of) society is needed for the optimising of persons’ ability, motivation and opportunity to be significantly pro-truth.

More on specific aspects of pro-truth society later, e.g., schools. The present section only needed to make the point that a (certain type of) society is far more pro-truth than a ‘condition of nature’. (Some comments before this section, concerning social contract theories, clearly also apply here. And the discussion supporting that point implies an epistemic justification for a hypothetical social contract. Morally-based social contract theories cannot justify a society’s existence or a social contract, or human existence.) Having made that point, the next section mentions other general issues, and subsequent sections discuss specific implications, all of which presuppose and involve a society. Eg., social institutions such as an education system are needed if we are to be optimally pro-truth, and implementing the educational rights and duties involved is a social process:-

The notion of ‘derived rights’ arises from the truth that, to be pro-truth, persons need the ability, motivation and opportunity. That is, in relation to being pro-truth, or epistemically justifiable, there are epistemically justifiable needs and hence rights. E.g., if persons are to get the education they need to optimally help them to be as pro-truth as possible, it is thereby epistemically justifiable that they have what can be called a ‘right’ to that education; and they have a right to have their a-truth (gender etc) aspects treated as a-truth, e.g., as irrelevant regarding their right to that opportunity.

All pro-truth rights are ‘derived rights’ in that they derive from, i.e., only exist in relation to, the justifiability of the ultimate pro-truth standard. That is, these rights are not ultimate or fundamental. They are not stand-alone justified notions. They are also not the ultimate end or aim of being epistemically justifiable. They are primarily a means to help achieve that end. So their justifiability is derived from the standard and end.

(This fits with Jeremy Bentham’s notion, discussed in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, that the idea of fundamental rights is “nonsense on stilts” — a delusion.)

The prescription ‘Be pro-truth’ however, is a fundamental duty — because ‘Be pro-truth’ is the fundamental prescriptive standard and end. Yet this general duty implies various specific duties, and in that sense the specific duties are derived from that fundamental duty. They are also a means to achieve that general end, and this suggests their justifiability derives from the justifiability of the end. If someone has a right to a specific pro-truth resource, R, this implies a specific, derived duty to supply R. R is a means to the justified end, and the supplying of a means is a preceding means. So here specific duties are a means, and in that sense they are derivative duties. E.g., if children have a derived pro-truth right to a certain type of education, which is a means to the end ‘(Children growing up to optimally) be pro-truth’, then society has a derived duty to provide it.

On the other hand, all specific duties could be seen as fundamental in that they are the specific contents constituting the general duty and end , ‘Be pro-truth’. The issue here is unimportant in practice. It relates to the notion that this end is cumulatively achievable, discussed in the next section. All that matters for a practical theory here is that the duties are known to be justified, and are put into practice. (Some other issues regarding rights and duties and other aspects of the theory are also purely theoretical or merely verbal.)

The notions of rights and duties are often not explicit below, but each of the many pro-truth things discussed below, and all others not mentioned, involve(s) an epistemically justifiable right, or right and associated duty. (And, to fulfil a pro-truth duty is a pro-truth virtue.) E.g., the just-mentioned educational right is implied by the next section, as is the associated duty (and virtue).

(Because the following sections only mention representative implications, there are other, related implications not discussed in this book.)

One general implication is that, if learning and practising pro-truth truths is the epistemically justifiable end, it is most or fully epistemically justifiable to optimally[156] learn and practise pro-truth knowledge. And if something is not fully epistemically justifiable, it is at least somewhat epistemically unjustifiable or anti-truth. This suggests it is really only epistemically justifiable to optimally learn and practise pro-truth knowledge.

However, that can be an impracticable ideal. Here we need to distinguish between an absolutely and a relatively optimal achievement. The absolute is an ideal, involving perfect, unlimited human knowledge and other needed resources. These are not available. The relatively optimal is relative to existing resources. The relatively optimal involves doing the best you can with what is available. It can be most practicable to say that, though from an absolute, ideal viewpoint, P is less epistemically justifiable than Q, P is the optimal available choice. E.g., eating three-quarters of the amount of vitamin C needed for the absolutely best possible pro-truth brain-functioning is less pro-truth than eating the whole amount — but there may only be three-quarters, P, available. Here the eater would be doing the best available though not the absolutely, ideally optimal pro-truth thing. It is not epistemically justifiable to demand the impracticable or unavailable. Here then, the eater would be doing the optimally pro-truth practicable thing. We can have knowledge that the best possible thing is being done. A knowledge-based practicable theory can ask no more.

That point expands on and explains a distinction briefly suggested recently. This concerns the distinction between being optimally pro-truth as far as is practicable, and being significantly pro-truth in an absolute sense. A person can do what is optimal relative to the resources they have, but these resources may be insufficient to achieve anything significant. (However, e.g., over time, the insignificant daily achievements of one person can accumulate, achieving something significant, and moreso when combined with others’ individually daily-insignificant achievements. An ocean is composed of many insignificant drops.)

Similarly, we can only do the absolutely optimal pro-truth significant thing if we know what it is. Perfect, full knowledge may be unavailable in many areas. It is epistemically unjustifiable to demand that we know now what we do not know. Human knowledge is increasing, but there is a great deal we do not yet know. Often, it will be the most epistemically justifiable thing to do what seems optimal and significant — given our limited knowledge. Here, along with doing this (and trying to acquire more pro-truth knowledge), temporarily suspended belief is justified. We can be epistemically justifiable by knowing that we don’t yet know something. Epistemically rational criticism focuses on all the available evidence. This can be evidence that, in some area, there is insufficient evidence. (Or, in another area, e.g., religion or moral theory, we can only have meta-evidence, i.e., evidence about the area, namely evidence that there can never be any evidence in the area.)

With this, it can be optimally and significantly pro-truth to be self-critical and skeptical. Here it is pro-truth to regard ourselves as fallible. This means that pro-truth humility is an epistemically justifiable virtue (contexted in confidence that our knowledge can increase, via the same careful rational self-criticism etc).

However, where we need more knowledge, we need to do more than be skeptical or suspend belief. We also need to provisionally accept possibly true beliefs in that we test them, as hypotheses.

We also need to provisionally accept some suspended beliefs in that it is pro-truth to provisionally act on them. It is pro-truth to implement possible or probable knowledge where it is a pro-truth necessity to act. E.g:- We know we must have some types of food to keep us alive so we can be pro-truth, but we might not know exactly which diet is absolutely optimal here. Here we need to provisionally eat whatever seems to work best as far as we know. ‘Best’ means ‘optimal(ly)’. Doing our best, as far as we can know, is clearly the most epistemically justifiable thing we can do. (Such things are also pro-truth virtues.)

Sometimes, trial-and-error may be all we can do, i.e., when we only have the meta-knowledge that we don’t yet know specifically what to do. Yet any errors help us specifically know, i.e., know what not to do next time. This leaves us less possibly correct alternatives to test. So, increasingly, we can still know something and hence be as epistemically justifiable as is practicable, eventually achieving something significant..

It should be clear that, from this and other general implications, specific practicable implications follow, applicable to life-as-a-whole. E.g., that general point can be applied to specifics of diet, such as ‘What is the optimal pro-truth amount of vitamin C for persons of type P1 in situations of type S1.’ It is practicable to investigate such issues, to resolve ambiguity.

That discussion brings us to another general implication:- Pro-truth theory may not be unambiguously specifically practicable in all areas, due to our lack of knowledge. But the overall view is that this lack will diminish, judging by past experience. Science is increasingly learning such pro-truth truths as the optimal diet regarding the brain optimally being able and motivated to discover knowledge. So, pro-truth theory involves the potential for gradually minimising any ambiguity. (This is not the case with moral theories, as suggested above. As Part I implies, we cannot resolve ambiguity by using an epistemically meaningless vacuum.)

This section so far implies that, from a practicability viewpoint, achieving the pro-truth end can be an ongoing, cumulative achievement for an individual or society. If Juliet is now as optimally pro-truth as is practicable for her, i.e., given her present state of knowledge and so on, then she has now learnt and practised pro-truth truth as far as is presently possible. And, as the pro-truth end is ‘learn and practise pro-truth truth’, Juliet has achieved that end as far as is practicable at the present time. Yet that end-achievement can thenceforth also become a means to achieve that end farther. It can be, e.g., the means to help her learn more pro-truth truths, and then practise them. We need to learn some things before we can learn other, thereon-dependent knowledge. In sum, a general implication here is that, from a practicable viewpoint, the end is cumulatively achievable. And a practical theory must be practicable. (An end which is practicable in that it is reasonably achievable is also more motivating than an end very difficult to achieve. The reasonable achievability will be further exemplified later.)

(Importantly, regarding the following discussions, skepticism about some of my claims may be justified. The claims are in some cases merely what seems to me to be plausible, true or optimal, based on evidence available via my studies in philosophy, psychology, history, sociology, science and so on. But the evidence, or alleged evidence, and/or my interpretation of it, may sometimes need adding to or altering. Apart from the issue of my limited knowledge here, there also needs to be much more empirical research in some areas. All that seems certain to me is that something like the practical theory and the suggested implications in this book are epistemically justifiable.)

There is no epistemically justifiable right to free speech as such, or to have or state a belief, as such. There is a right to freely state pro-knowledge knowledge. Related to this, there are only other rights here such as: (i) Regarding statements, a right to self-critical, evidenced speech, i.e., epistemically rational speech, namely statements based on all the evidence available to the speakers, with the speakers being self-critical, i.e, aware that they are fallible and might have insufficient evidence; and so on, as mentioned above. (ii) A right to ask questions of the more informed, or carefully research the issue, rather than make an uninformed believed statement. Here, e.g., where there is no clear pro-truth necessity to act immediately, the questioner suspends belief instead of believing and acting on a belief the questioner knows lacks sufficient evidence, or for which there is only possibly misleading, apparent evidence[157]. (iii) A right to politely and helpfully positively criticise others who seem to be believing without sufficient evidence. And, (iv) a right to creatively propose hypotheses, while suspending belief concerning them until they are tested. Where there is no knowledge, imagination can provide possible knowledge via such hypothesising.

An alleged right to free speech as such licenses persons freely stating uninformed (unevidenced) or anti-truth things. As this is epistemically unjustifiable, it is wrong: such alleged rights are wrong(s). (Obviously, if you are not a murderer and raper of children, you would justifiably think it wrong for others to have the (alleged) right to be free to say or believe that you are.)

So, claims such as ‘You ought to respect my beliefs or faith’ and ‘I have a right to my opinion’ are epistemically unjustifiable. A belief is epistemically justifiably worthy of respect only to the degree it is plausibly pro-truth knowledge and supported by evidence, i.e., to the degree it is epistemically justifiable. As ‘faith in X’ means there is no evidence for X, and no knowledge, faith is always unjustifiable. Similarly for opinions, if ‘opinion’ means ‘a belief for which the believer has no or insufficient evidence’. Similarly regarding respecting people’s wishes. A wish is a belief that it is justifiable or permitted that X happens. Wishes are only worthy of epistemic respect if they are epistemically justifiable. (E.g., dying pro-truth persons would not wish their bodily organs to be buried/burnt, if the organs could prolong the pro-truth lives of others suffering from organ-failure.)

All those implications, concerning (pro-knowledge) knowledge generally, clearly have wider implications, e.g., concerning society. E.g:-

Persons with racist or sexist beliefs (faith) have an epistemically justifiable right to ask questions about whether there is evidence for their beliefs, or to rationally research them. They do not have a right to state the beliefs[158], i.e., as if they were knowledge.

And, a certain type of education system and society are needed, to promote the ideas in this section. It is a pro-truth duty to provide that education etc. Importantly, a certain type of evidence-based, fallibilist, self-critical democracy is implied. This would ideally be harmonious in that all would be primarily trying to achieve the same ultimate end. There would be no conflicts involving mutually-contradictory ends. There would be no personal attacks. And so on, as implied above. So it would be a peaceful democracy.

Representative other or further implications are the main focus of the rest of the book. The discussion will in part consider emotions in relation to society, e.g., as in the hatred typically associated with racism. Recent discussion has concentrated on the cognitive (and related perceptual) aspect of being pro-truth. The other highly important aspect of our mind is the emotional. One piece of pro-truth knowledge is that being pro-truth also involves the emotions. It is a pro-truth truth that the cognitive and emotional parts of our brains are physically[159] interconnected, i.e., interrelated. E.g., most basically, our cognition and knowledge would not exist unless it was motivated to exist; and we will not do the justifiable if we allow certain emotions to successfully influence us to do the unjustifiable. For those and related reasons, emotions need to be discussed, and we need knowledge concerning them.

To prepare the context for that and other later discussions, the next section discusses emotions directly. It will be argued that emotions are important because motivations are emotions, and a pro-truth society cannot exist unless humans are motivated to know the justifiability of and how to create and maintain such a society:-

The book so far tends to portray the pro-truth standard or end as cognitively-based. This portrait is correct within the context so far developed. But it is time to explicitly develop a fuller, overall, human context:-

An epistemic standard is a cognitive standard. Emotion-based moral or practical theories have been rejected above. However, I’m going to add to that portrait, by arguing that achieving the end implied by that standard is only a primarily cognitive process, not purely cognitive. That is, pro-truth theory is primarily cognitively-based, but, for us, emotions are inextricably involved in achieving its end. The end, ‘Be pro-truth’, involves practising pro-truth truths. One such truth is: ‘To be pro-truth, humans need to experience pro-truth emotions’. So the end is primarily cognitive, but, derivatively thence, for humans it is also partly emotional. Pro-truth theory is fundamentally epistemically-based, but via the application of that fundamental prescriptive standard to humans, it is derivatively also emotionally based.

Therefore, I’ll argue that certain emotions, or certain emotions in certain situations, are no problem for or are advocated by a human epistemic practical theory. However, other emotions, or certain other emotions in those situations, are or could be a major problem.

Normal persons seem to naturally view some emotions as being of intrinsic value[160]. E.g., certain pleasures, due to eating a favourite food, an orgasm, hearing certain music, seeing one’s children happy and fulfilled, and so on, are often felt to be experiences valuable for their own sake, not for any other purpose. An emotional experience which a person prefers to all other experiences, or for which the person feels there is no substitute, is clearly felt to be intrinsically valuable. E.g., many parents consider that the joy they feel on seeing their child happy, along with the child’s happiness, is priceless: such experiences they’d not exchange for any amount of money. Similarly, some would not sell the pet they love, for any amount.

The present major issue here is that an emotion (or some other emotionally-valued thing, e.g., a pet,) felt to be intrinsically valuable could thereby be believed to be of justifiable ultimate or primary value. This could be a problem regarding motivating people to live via a primarily cognitive ultimate standard, if living by it would conflict with those emotions. Here the cognitive and the emotional would conflict.

Can there be such conflict between any such emotion and an epistemic standard, due to both being justifiably viewed as of ultimate value? If both are justifiably of ultimate value, they are of equal value. Here, one of them could not justifiably be given priority over the other if they conflict. Here, how could we know what to do? And does the fact that some emotions are naturally viewed as intrinsically valuable mean that pro-truth theory could be unmotivatable, due to it being primarily cognitive?:-

The pro-truth standard and end have been argued to be of ultimate, primary epistemic justifiability. That is, briefly:- The only overall epistemically justifiable standard is the overall (most general or ultimate) standard regarding epistemically justification, U H/I E/T. This standard implies the pro-truth end. From an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, they are priceless, of ultimate value.

Thence, an epistemically justifiable viewpoint would view the standard and associated end as being of intrinsic[161] epistemic justifiability. In other words, they are of intrinsic epistemic value. From an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, the standard and end are epistemically justifiably intrinsically valuable. They are epistemically justifiably primary, or of primary value.

Any human wishing to primarily only practise the epistemically justifiable, thereby knows that being pro-truth is of primary, intrinsic value. We cannot know this regarding any emotion. So, as far as we can know, the epistemically justifiable has top priority if there is a conflict between it and an emotion. That is, this fundamentally cognitively-based standard is justifiably primary.

(In the following (and elsewhere) it is important to remember the distinction among (i) feelings or feeling-based or emotion-based beliefs and (ii) mere beliefs and (iii) knowledge:-)

However, it is natural for the normal human animal to feel that various emotional states are of intrinsic value. This is natural because this evolved due to its adaptiveness. These emotional states tend to occur relative to certain actually or possibly adaptive achievements. E.g., normal mothers tend to feel deeply, intrinsically rewarding emotions when they have made their children smile, or safe, and so on. Infants tend to smile due to something at least apparently survival-necessary/helpful, e.g., the mother has fed them, or made them feel cared-for or safe. The achievement ‘my child smiled at me’ as such is normally felt by the mother to be intrinsically valuable, i.e., a desired end, not just a means to an end. The same tends to apply regarding the emotion felt by her due to her achieving that end and associated achievements, e.g., feeding the infant, and tends to apply to the associated achievements.

Achievements such as those just mentioned tend to be of obvious value regarding passing on of genes. (If parents find child-care intrinsically rewarding, this makes it more likely, all else equal, that the child will live to pass on the parents’ genes.)

It is fairly common to believe that naturally intrinsically-valued emotions are justifiably intrinsically valuable. (E.g., Utilitarianism is based partly on that deluded belief.) However, the emotions humans feel to be intrinsically valuable cover a vast range. There is a mix of clearly evolutionary advantageous emotions and emotional experiences associated with things for which there seems no evolutionary point. E.g., some seem to feel emotions which are intrinsically valued by them due, e.g, to never having children, to killing children, to heterosexual experiences, homosexual experiences, sex with sheep or shoes, being fit, being lazy/unfit, drinking a certain wine, having their parents proud of them, conquering and enslaving enemies, having a certain collection of bottle-tops, seeing a disliked sibling get hurt, hearing certain music, seeing certain cloud formations, knowing a wilderness they’ll never visit exists, having a pet fish or even a pet rock. And so on, for various other emotions and associated achievements.

This range may be due to the indirectly advantageous fact that diversity makes it more likely that new, even more well-adapted genotypes can be (re)produced. Evolution, via mutation, unintentionally (and hence haphazardly) experiments in innumerable directions. If non-diversity was universally the way things worked here, there’d have been no evolution or change beyond the first, primitive forms of life, as in something like a virus. Yet the random diversity, or blind trial-and-error, in the evolutionary process meant (and means) many dead ends, or failures (early deaths), i.e., many non-adaptive aspects of creatures. So, just because it comes natural for someone to find certain emotional experiences intrinsically valuable, this does not necessarily mean that the experiences are naturally (evolutionarily) valuable, i.e., adaptive.

So that is one problem regarding viewing intrinsically valued emotions as justifiable, or naturally justifiable. Further, Kant’s arguments in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, and other points in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, show there are insoluble problems involved in trying to base a how-should-one-live theory on emotions, and/or on the natural, adaptive or evolved, or on the diverse or blind trial-and-error. That is, there is no epistemic justification for having such emotional experiences, or for their associated practical achievements, as the primary, ultimate end of one’s how-should-one-live theory.

Feeling that an emotional experience is worth having for its own sake is one thing. Believing it is thereby justified is quite a different issue. E.g:- People like Pol Pot, Hitler and Stalin, who ordered the deaths of millions of innocent persons, many of them highly educated, presumably felt something like an elated sense of power here. It is likely they felt this had intrinsic value. Suppose that some such psychopathic killer, Martin, after each murder of a pro-truth person, feels that emotion, and feels that it is intrinsically valuable. Though it is true that Martin feels the experience to be intrinsically valuable, this does not mean it is true that this emotional experience, due to those murderous achievements, is justifiable. They and it are anti-truth, making them epistemically unjustifiable.

The general point here, made in Part I, is that just because someone likes (or dislikes) X, or values X in a certain way, this has nothing to do with whether X is justifiable.

Yet among our mix of emotions, many emotions and associated achievements can be pro-truth, i.e., indirectly or derivatively justifiable. That which is felt to be of emotional intrinsic value can be of epistemic extrinsic value. That which is an emotional or subjectively-desired end can also be a means to a justifiable cognitive or objective end. That sentence is a pro-truth truth. And the pro-truth end, ‘Be pro-truth’, involves practising pro-truth truths. So, experiencing those emotional ends is also an aspect of achieving the pro-truth end. (Points here can be similarly applied to emotions which are not felt to be intrinsically valuable[162].):-

Firstly here, an important qualification. Some previous paragraphs used the word ‘felt’ as opposed to ‘believed’ and ‘known’. It seems possible to feel an emotion is intrinsically valuable or justifiable, but not believe it is, namely not think that you know it is. Here the cognitive reflects on the emotional. This is similar to the cognitive reflecting on our perception, as in our seeing a stick apparently bent by water but not believing that it is bent. Our perception prompts us to believe it is justified that the stick bends. According to the perceptual experience it is justified that the stick is bent. Our cognition can know this is not justifiable, and that the justified conclusion is that we are perceiving refraction, not a stick bending. Similarly, we can perceive or feel that an emotion is intrinsically valuable or justified, but cognitively not believe this. We can instead know that the justified situation is that, in some cases, something felt to be of emotional intrinsic value is unjustified, as with a Nazi feeling joyful after killing many innocent persons. Or, we can know that something felt to be of emotional intrinsic value can be or is of epistemic extrinsic value.

With that qualification in mind, on with the explanation of how something felt to be of emotional intrinsic value can be of epistemic extrinsic value:-

Humans are potentially the most pro-truth species (on Earth). So, humans can best embody (or ‘embrain’) the pro-truth standard and end. So, e.g., any emotion which motivates parents to provide the care needed to help children survive so they can realise that potential, is a pro-truth emotion. It is an emotion which is a means to the end, ‘Being pro-truth’. And, of course, the emotions motivating us to use our cognition to learn and practise pro-truth truths are also of crucial epistemic value.

If any such pro-truth emotion is felt to be intrinsically rewarding, it will be of more pro-truth use than if there is no rewarding emotion experienced as intrinsically valuable. That is, we can have emotional experiences which are of both non-epistemic, felt intrinsic value and of epistemic extrinsic value. (Some analogies:- You can have a car which is both a certain colour and reliable, and you can value both. Or, a car can have a colour which is both of intrinsic emotional (aesthetic) value to Henry, and of extrinsic value to him in that it is the best colour, e.g., most noticeable colour, regarding getting him safely to work.)

We can both experience an intrinsically valued emotion and be optimally pro-truth, with no conflict between them. Indeed, the former can be pro-truth, and support or help motivate the latter. So they can positively harmonise.

Therefore, it is epistemically justifiable to revel in and facilitate all pro-truth emotions. This is an aspect of U H/I E/T: here there can (ideally) be universal harmony among one’s cognitions and emotions. Being optimally pro-truth, for humans, cannot be a merely dull, narrow, cerebral task. Being dull, narrow and cerebral would be anti-truth in that we would not be motivated sufficiently to be pro-truth in even minor ways. We certainly could not be optimally pro-truth.

We can at least somewhat suppress at least many emotions, and avoid situations where we are likely to feel them. But there is often no need for such minimising of emotionality. It is indirectly epistemically justifiable to let any pro-truth emotion flourish to the optimally pro-truth degree. This can mean a great deal of passion. (A passionate respect and search for pro-truth truth, and a passionate desire to ensure all have justifiably fair access to food, health, education etc, are but two such needs here.)

Being pro-truth means a great deal of compassion. Potential pro-truth emotions include unselfish love. The practical harmony among persons implied by U H/I E/T is best achieved if they universally love each other, and find love for each other intrinsically rewarding. With this, it is well known in psychology that children who are not loved will often literally shrivel, become physically ill and often die[163]. This lack of care is often associated with a lack of cognitive or mental stimulation. If unloved infants survive infancy, they greatly lack the physical and emotional health to benefit as much as loved children can from education, food and so on. Similarly for cognitively under-stimulated children. Clearly, these are areas where emotions or motivations are a crucial pro-truth factor. Here, those with the power to ensure children get caring attention and stimulation need to be effectively motivated via compassion to provide it. Providing it will give children the motivation and ability needed to be at least potentially significantly pro-truth.

Here, and in general, a type of universal benevolent compassionate caring is a pro-truth need[164]. (Importantly, a type of meditation can help greatly here, including via turning off any anger, selfish desires, and so on, regarding others, as well as via turning on compassionate benevolence[165].)

In sum, if we are to achieve pro-truth cognitive aims optimally, we need that universal benevolent care[166]. (It would help develop universal (social) harmony regarding achieving the epistemically justifiable, as in and required by U H/I E/T. It would facilitate peace.) That need for pro-truth care, and other points above, support the general point that pro-truth theory interrelates (harmonises) the cognitive, i.e., the directly epistemic, with the emotions. More practicable specifics here:-

Sexual emotions and practices can be pro-truth. They can be associated with pro-truth love. They at least need to be associated with that universal and hence mutual caring. Sex can help bond (harmonise) pro-truth people together. Sex can be pro-truth via producing children, needed to continue humanity’s ability to be pro-truth. And someone may get so frustrated due to a lack of a sex partner, that they cannot optimally learn and practise pro-truth truths. Hence, for them it is pro-truth to have a sexual partner and feel those emotions. (On the other hand, to have sex as one’s primary end and main past-time would be anti-truth in that the person would have insufficient resources (time, motivation etc) to be optimally pro-truth. E.g., their education would suffer. A balance is needed.)

Enjoying such things as exercise, music, food, meditation, pets, sleep and wine can be pro-truth. E.g:- A healthy body is needed for an optimally pro-truth brain, because the brain is part of and affected by (the rest of) the body. So if we are motivated to enjoy certain music, healthy foods, and to meditate, exercise and so on in healthy ways, we are motivated to be pro-truth. And certain amounts and types of wine can be healthy in some situations.

Wine, music, meditation, art, exercise, pets and so on can be aspects of pro-truth recreation. E.g., suppose Mike works hard making safe and hence pro-truth bike helmets. He cannot do this 24 hours, 7 days a week. He needs rest and recreation (and food etc). Recreation means re-creation. Mike needs to recreate his energy and other personal resources, so he can optimally make the helmets. We need to “stop and smell the roses”, or similar. To be optimally pro-truth, one needs a certain quantity and quality of a vast range of things, i.e., in optimally pro-truth on-average balance[167]. (Research is needed to discover this balance, for each individual, or at least, for what works well, on-average, for the main types of individuals.)

I, and everyone I know, have no interest in a practical theory which says we should only aim to fulfil some purely cognitive or rational principle, as in Kant’s ‘Act only on maxims you can will to be universal laws’. A theory concerning how one should live has no practicable interest for me unless it specifically advocates that, along with things I feel obliged to do, I also do various things of great emotional value. I feel obliged to be justifiably universally benevolent (because this tends to not come naturally to humans[168]). In what seems (on present, limited evidence) the most pro-truth balance with such obligations, I also wish to enjoy, e.g., music, swimming, my dog, sex and claret, each of which I intrinsically value.

I also think that, though a pro-truth balance involves pro-truth universal benevolence, there is a place within the balance for my all-else-equal intrinsically-valued preference to be more caring towards my family than strangers. Here, that which is felt to be intrinsically valuable seems capable of being optimally extrinsically valuable regarding the epistemically justifiable. Love of family, and more than a motivationally sufficient quantity/quality of other things felt to be intrinsically valuable, are positively relatable to our learning and practising pro-knowledge knowledge. Again, e.g., if children are not loved, they are unlikely to grow up to be optimally pro-truth. And, (as David Hume suggests), the naturally best (most valued) love involves family and physical closeness. So, all-else-equal, it is more motivationally harmonious with being pro-truth to love one’s family and others in one’s close-circle instead of, e.g., abandoning them and only helping loved-from-a-distance strangers. (The point regarding family applies similarly to friends.)

This does not mean that we should love an ingroup and ignore or even dislike outgroups. It does not mean the groupist conflicts discussed in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1. It only means a close-circle (as opposed to ‘closed-circle’) of love and a ‘distant-circle’ (or increasingly distant circles) of love, or at least compassionate caring. It means that, because it is intrinsically more motivating to most love your family and friends, and practicable to directly[169] love only them[170], it is more motivatably and practicably pro-truth to do so — along with caring indirectly for all humanity. If each person did this, everyone would be directly loved by those most meaningful for them[171], and indirectly loved by all. Thence, world-wide, universally, the most motivatable and practicable optimal result could be achieved. This is, I think, is the most pro-truth balance or prioritising here[172]. This fits with U H/I E/T.

With this, children normally love a parent who loves them, and hence wish to copy and thereby please their parent. Thence, such loving close-circle relationships can be naturally positively motivationally (causally) related to being pro-truth, in the optimal human overall way. (Similarly regarding teachers caring for their students.) Thence, parents (and teachers) can better motivate children’s pro-truth cognitive achievements. Pro-truth theory’s aim or end involves an interrelated cognitive-emotional flourishing, and for humans this would crucially involve a caring close-circle for each person. (This would facilitate peace within and among persons: those who feel unloved by all are more likely to hate/attack others.)

A flourishing of and via a balance[173] between such close-circle love and pro-truth universal benevolence is crucial regarding pro-truth theory’s general, primary social aim — namely universal harmony (regarding achieving the epistemically justifiable[174]). Such love, peace etc is involved in the only justifiable, universal, harmonious flourishing. (Harmony means peace.)

Some other crucial emotions involved in that flourishing are liking a challenge, and enjoying solving problems. More specifically, people can be motivated to be pro-truth via helping them feel it’s a worthwhile challenge to solve a problem regarding the practice or learning of pro-truth truth. E.g., it could be a challenge to learn to drive more safely, thereby preserving potentially pro-truth children and so on. It could and should be a motivating challenge to solve the problem of ensuring all humanity has access to an optimally pro-truth diet and other pro-truth resources.

Further:- Many persons feel that truth or knowledge is of intrinsic cognitive or epistemic value. Such persons can also feel it is emotionally intrinsically valuable to be at least somewhat pro-truth, and to learn new knowledge. Building on this, it can be a greatly motivating challenge to learn, and live by, an epistemically justifiable practical theory — as opposed to a delusion, i.e., something not as close to truth as possible. (Such issues are discussed further in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1.)

A conclusion from recent points:- ‘Directly pro-epistemic emotions’ directly motivate one’s epistemic (cognitive) capacities. E.g., a desire to learn pro-knowledge knowledge is a directly pro-epistemic pro-truth emotion. Other pro-truth emotions are indirectly pro-epistemic. E.g., compassion for those suffering can be an indirectly pro-epistemic pro-truth emotion. Both types are indirectly epistemically justifiable. This is a pro-truth truth. Experiencing and using emotions in pro-truth ways is a pro-truth practice[175]. The pro-truth end has been argued to be ‘learn and practise pro-truth truths’. So the pro-truth end can be called a ‘cognitive-emotional’ end. The cognitive is primary, but, for us, the epistemically cognitive cannot exist without pro-epistemic or pro-cognitive emotions. Being pro-truth, and achieving the pro-truth end, is not a purely cognitive or cerebral matter. Certain emotional experiences (practices) are aspects of that end, while also being aspects of the means to further achieve that end. Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3 discussed the general issue here, namely that, from a practicable viewpoint, the pro-truth end is cumulatively achievable. Applying that general point to emotions: one example is the practice of enjoying learning new pro-truth knowledge being also a means to motivate the learning of further pro-truth knowledge. Such universal harmonising cumulatively across time is an aspect of U H/I E/T.

Another conclusion:- The emotions discussed in this section so far tend to involve happiness (or at least an avoidance of unhappiness). So happiness is involved in being optimally pro-truth, in the recently-mentioned flourishing. We need the freedom (ability and opportunity) to achieve what makes us happy here. There is a pro-truth duty regarding happiness. It is part of pro-knowledge knowledge that, all else equal, humans are more likely to persist at something if they are happy to do it. Happiness is what Hume[176] and various Utilitarians argue to be the ultimate natural end (aim) of all normal intended practice, and this seems partly true. A more than sufficiently motivating amount of happiness or rewards felt to be intrinsically valuable can be associated with achieving the pro-truth end. Yet history, sociology and the like show that at least many persons can achieve various very difficult ends, which don’t seem to involve happiness, via apparently being motivated by emotions other than happiness. The often painful responsibility of caring for terminally-ill, fatally-starving or fatally-wounded persons in great pain is one probable example — common through history, due to disease, plagues, war, famine and so on.. Similarly, most parents and teachers sometimes find their child-upbringing responsibilities painful. However, fortunately, much happiness needs to be involved in being optimally pro-truth. (And an increasingly more pro-truth world would increasingly lessen the just-mentioned pain and similar.)

Happiness is positively required via the pro-truth standard, except where happiness conflicts with pro-truth achievements. Here the prescription is similar to J.S. Mill’s cognitively-qualified Utilitarianism (which renders it rather non-utilitarian):- Better a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied or happy pig (or bottle-top collector, Hitler, and so on). Pro-truth psychological peace, or mental health, does not involve total, passive contentment when it is pro-truth to be discontented and hence active so as to increase peace generally in the long-term. (This point is expanded on soon.) This is another aspect of the pro-truth duty regarding happiness

Recent points discussed emotions felt to be intrinsically valuable which are of epistemic extrinsic value. However, there is a problem regarding the fact that, among persons, there is a vast, conflicting range of emotions and associated achievements felt to be intrinsically valuable. Points above need a quick review here, and building on in relation to happiness, duties and beliefs:-

Some such emotions and achievements are anti-truth. Arguments in Part I show that, if an emotion or achievement is felt to be intrinsically valuable, or involves happiness, this has nothing to do with whether it is epistemically justifiably valuable. It is pro-truth to discriminate among emotions felt to be intrinsically valuable, and minimise or de-condition any which are anti-truth. E.g., extreme racist beliefs tend to involve hatred for the race discriminated against, and love for the racist’s race; and one or both of those emotions can be felt to be intrinsically valuable. And various military or political or religious leaders seem to feel it is of intrinsic value to cruelly conquer other nations or unbelievers, enslave foreigners, persecute, terrorise, exterminate and so on. They seem to get intrinsically-valued happiness from having the power to achieve such things.

They can feel that such emotional states and achievements are intrinsically valuable and hence believe they are justifiable. But this is only having an emotion-based belief that such things are justifiably intrinsically valuable. As Part I argued, beliefs as such are not knowledge. A belief only becomes knowledge if it is epistemically justifiable, i.e., if it is a true belief, justified via sufficient evidence. And emotions, or feelings, cannot be evidence that, e.g., it is epistemically justifiable to invade your country and enslave or kill all there. The epistemically justifiable standard, U H/I E/T, advocates universal harmony in relation to the epistemically justifiable: such invasions involve unjustifiable conflict, not universal harmony (in relation to the epistemically justifiable).

Similarly, we can love our children in a way greatly emotionally fulfilling to all concerned, making all very happy, along with, e.g., implementing the belief that they will be happiest if we teach them some comforting moral or religious beliefs, namely false or untestable beliefs. Yet we can achieve similar happiness as such and not implement such a belief. We can instead implement pro-truth knowledge. Fulfilling this duty involves knowledge that universal harmony (regarding achieving the epistemically justifiable) is justified, and that this harmony would mean more happiness overall than is achievable via the hate-driven conflicts likely when people have differing moral or religious beliefs. Such beliefs tend to comfort ingroups only, or only help make ingroups happy. Yet such beliefs often mean an ingroup is unhappy with or hates its outgroups, and often mean unhappiness for the outgroup, e.g., via it being attacked due to that hate. And vice versa. U H/I E/T avoids such hate-related unhappiness. This is an aspect of pro-truth peace.

Similarly, consider pro-truth parents with an uninformed child who enjoys telling sexist and racist jokes, the child believing this is fine. The pro-truth duty here involves the parents explaining, positively, perhaps as follows: ‘We love you, and want you to be happy, but you need to be happy in a justified way. It is justified to be non-racist and non-sexist’. As far as possible, such parents should also explain why racism and sexism are epistemically unjustifiable beliefs, and so on — and that the children can be happier by being benevolent towards people of all races and genders.

Such pro-truth parental duties and caring involve retraining the child’s emotions. Again, normally, at least many of our emotions are (re)trainable. E.g., consider James, trying to be more pro-truth, but he had an extremely racist upbringing[177]. Thence, James hates Umgumbrians. He now regrets this. He feels an obligation to meet Umgumbrians and be friendly. He finds that hard, having been trained by his parents to feel contempt for Umgumbrians, and to believe they are inferior and evil. But he persists, and overrules his anti-truth emotionally-negative training[178]. Gradually, he sees, e.g., that they care for their and his children, and, contrary to what he was led to believe, they don’t torture or eat children. And so on. His beliefs change. They become epistemically justifiable. He gradually comes to not mind Umgumbrians existing, and being with them. Later he makes friends among them, and enjoys being with them. His emotions have been retrained, by his choice. He and the Umgumbrians are now harmonious (in relation to the epistemically justifiable).

Similarly, if Shane is in the habit of impulsive angry acts whenever someone justifiably criticises him, he can, via conditioning or habituation, and meditation, gradually lose that habit. Then, Shane can calmly say to himself, “Yes, that criticism is correct”, and welcome the opportunity to improve. Where there was a negative, anti-truth emotion, there can be a pro-truth positive emotion.

There can be anti-truth positive emotions, and these also need retraining. E.g., suppose Linda is emotionally positive in that she is always blissfully happy. She maintains this by only doing and thinking about things that make her happy. (Bliss can mean ignorance, and ignorance can be bliss.) She hence never feels worried or dissatisfied about anti-truth things. She ignores impoverished others’ anti-truth poor health, poor education, and ignores her friends’ hate-filled racism, their and her selfishness, and so on — all of which she could alter. So her positive, enjoyed emotions are anti-truth. They need to be retrained, so that she enjoys doing pro-truth things. With this, it is epistemically justifiable for her to feel enough of a negative emotion, such as dislike of the unfair way impoverished people do not get the same health-care as the rich, to motivate her to act in a pro-truth way here. Then she can enjoy improving others’ health, education and so on. (This example relates to the recent comment about a dissatisfied Socrates and the happy pig.) In sum, Linda has no right to be permanently blissfully happy with a significantly and avoidably somewhat unjustifiable world. Here she has a duty to be somewhat unhappy with the world.

Pro-truth psychological peace in an absolutely optimal pro-truth world would mean total mental harmony and related contentment (though not passivity). Optimally pro-truth psychological peace in a less than absolutely optimal pro-truth world is contexted or of a relative degree. The overall context is a balance involving being content that one feels optimally discontent with the unjust(ified). Here, this is the only degree of peace which is both justifiable and practicable or achievable. Pro-truth practicable psychological peace involves studying war, racist hatred and so on, to learn how anti-truth they can be, and to learn how to avoid them. (For this and other reasons, history is a crucial subject. E.g., all should study 20th century Germany.) Then, via acting on such education, one can feel at peace via knowing one is doing what seems optimal regarding achieving peace (harmony) universally. Similarly, the context/balance for pro-truth happiness in a less than ideal pro-truth world involves being optimally unhappy about the anti-truth (and includes being happy that oneself is not like happily ignorant Linda).

Something like the Yerkes-Dodson curve[179] applies here. That is, we can be so little dissatisfied or worried, or so greatly upset or worried, that we do not bother or cannot effectively do anything to change an anti-truth situation into a pro-truth one. Similarly, hatred, as opposed to dislike or dissatisfaction, would seem to normally be too strong a negative emotion to be optimally pro-truth. A high degree of a negative emotion, such as hate, worry, deep depression or a panicky concern to be pro-truth, could lead to counterproductive (anti-truth) acts. An on-average moderate degree of concern seems most pro-truth here. Minor depression can be an aspect of justifiable - mental health.

Such a need for moderate concern does not mean we have to always be in a state of on-average moderate concern, or simultaneously always feel somewhat happy and somewhat discontent. Far from it. E.g., such things as totally peaceful and blissful recreation, rest, sex, love and meditation are pro-truth in many situations. A balance is needed. (Such balances give us the ‘harmony’ in ‘universal harmony ... in relation to the epistemically justifiable’, as opposed to harmony as such or for its own sake.) This balance would probably involve only a very small proportion of time spent consciously negatively concerned with unjustifiable things one can change. (It is impracticable and hence epistemically unjustifiable to be concerned about anti-truth things one cannot change.) Positive motivation, complementarily related to or arising from and largely replacing explicit negative concern, is needed most, in that being positive seems on-average more effective in motivating achievement. (Action motivated by that positive-negative balance is of course what is ultimately needed.)

1) Such optimal pro-truth balances or interrelatedness among our emotions, and a harmonising of emotions with the cognitive, are aspects of a pro-truth overall integration (harmonising) of a person, i.e., of pro-truth integrity.

2) Our brain naturally projects colour onto objects, so we have the illusion that colour is objectively ‘out there’. Similarly, as Hume pointed out, normal persons (inter)subjectively naturally project certain emotionally-experienced evaluations onto certain things ‘out there’. Thence, we naturally tend to believe, e.g., that torturing children is objectively bad, and that it is intrinsically valuable that one’s child looks safe and happy. The previous three sentences are (potentially) pro-truth truths. (Reflecting on them in a certain way makes them actually pro-truth truths.) We can epistemically autonomously reflect on such (now actual) pro-truth truths, and hence autonomously and justifiably choose whether to act on our emotional projections. We can also thereby know it is justifiable to encourage some emotions felt to be intrinsically valuable, and diminish or avoid others; and so on. Some emotions felt to be intrinsically valuable can conflict with the pro-truth. Here it is epistemically justifiable to prioritise, and overrule the emotion — and, ideally, retrain one’s emotions. We need knowledge of which intrinsically valued (and other) emotions are pro-truth, which are anti-truth, and which are a-truth, in this or that situation, regarding associated achievements. So, everyone needs to be an optimally pro-truth judge, to reflect on and discriminate epistemically justifiably among emotions — and among all other things, achieving an optimal balance (harmony) overall (universally). One’s judgement-level also needs to oversee the (re)training of any anti-truth emotions. This judgement involves the cognitive having priority (autonomy) over the emotional[180], via the cognitive being the decision-maker — though the decisions include promoting certain emotions. So, the cognitive needs further attention.

That crucial need for cognitive judgement will be discussed further soon. In order to prepare a suitable, sufficiently overall context for that discussion, more needs to be said about a-truth things:-

The main focus of this section is an indirectly pro-truth aspect of society, namely that a pro-truth society would permit total a-truth freedom:-

(This section only begins this book’s main discussion of a-truth freedom. After sections below develop a suitable context for more points here, partly via discussing the idea of pro-truth judgement-level discrimination among the pro-truth, anti-truth and a-truth, those points are discussed.)

The pro-truth standard, U H/I E/T, implies that things which are irrelevant to achieving pro-truth things are neither justifiable nor unjustifiable. So standards used in a-truth choices are neither justifiable nor unjustifiable. That is, it is epistemically justifiable that the choices are irrelevant regarding the epistemically justifiable. So there is no justification for not allowing total freedom here. Here, each alternative is epistemically justifiably equal in that each is epistemically justifiably neither justifiable nor unjustifiable. That is, they are equal because it is true that each has an equal, neutral causal relationship regarding humanity’s ability, motivation or opportunity to be pro-truth. Here we can know that we cannot know what is epistemically justifiably right or wrong. So here we can know there is no justifiable reason to not be free to do whatever you like. So we have an indirect pro-truth duty to protect that freedom, and everyone has an indirect right to that freedom. To do otherwise is to treat the a-truth as if it is not the a-truth — which is epistemically unjustifiable.

The following needs to be prefaced by mentioning that, in at least some cases, research is needed to discover precisely which aspects of a given situation are a-truth (and, with this, which are pro-truth or anti-truth), and in which situations certain things, which might not be a-truth in all situations, are a-truth. (Informed judgement is needed.) Again, there can be situational relativity and some (minimisable or removable) ambiguity.

When scientists place objectivity above all else, the associated values include treating impartially all those aspects of fellow scientists which are irrelevant to their objectivity. For example, inherently pro-objective (pro-truth) scientists do not reject or accept a theory because it is proposed by someone of this or that race, gender, sexuality and so on. (Karl Popper makes a similar point[181].) (Here, at least implicitly, scientists use an epistemically justifiable judgement-level to make pro-truth decisions, and, perhaps, to cognitively overrule any emotion tempting them to decide otherwise.)

So, to do the obviously directly epistemically justifiable, we need to be non-racist, non-sexist, non-ageist and so on. This has implications regarding being indirectly epistemically justifiable, i.e., for society generally:-

Primarily, people living by those non-racist etc values would be unified. (As Karl Popper suggests[182], science’s internal values are unifying.) That is, primarily, those people would live harmoniously (in relation to the epistemically justifiable). What would it mean to be in harmony with the non-racist, non-sexist and so on values inherent in objective, scientific justification? It would mean that in all situations, all should act via the rule that it is rational and pro-truth to treat the a-objective (a-truth) as the a-objective, i.e., as irrelevant to objectivity.

There are innumerable things which can be a-truth. These could include preferences regarding music, art, sport, clothing, sex, food and various other lifestyle choices. The following simplified trivial example makes generalisable important points regarding such areas:-

Consider equally pro-truth fruits F1 and F2. Suppose it is only their flavour which differs, and that this difference is a-truth. From a pro-truth viewpoint, here all is equal. The standards via which pro-truth persons choose between F1 and F2 are a-truth standards. They concern differences associated with equally pro-truth alternatives: here both fruits have the same nutritional, economic etc pro-truth potential as such. Whichever of F1 and F2 is eaten, the same pro-truth effect is achieved. Pro-truth persons have one ultimate or primary end. But, not inconsistent with this, pro-truth persons can have innumerable secondary, a-truth ends. Here there is no conflict regarding achieving the primary end. The pro-truth person can either always eat only F1, switch between F1 and F2, or mix them together, and so on. Therefore, whichever a-truth flavour-standard is applied, or temporarily applied, primarily it is only the ultimate pro-truth standard which is always applied. That is, as in U H/I E/T, harmony with the epistemically justifiable end is maintained via advocating freedom regarding choices irrelevant to that end.

This means a type of pluralism along with a singularism. Only a single pro-truth standard is ultimate, so here singularism is justified. But this is irrelevant regarding anyone having a vast plurality of secondary ends, among which any choice is permissible. (Part II, Chapter 2, Section 7 gives a brief diagrammatic summary of the interrelation between the single pro-truth standard and the plural a-truth standards. If the present point and recent points are unclear, a preview of that summary should be helpful.)

Every possible a-truth standard is permissible for every pro-truth person, as opposed to ‘known to be justified’. Permissibility means those persons would allow anyone to practise via any of those standards.

So, pro-truth persons would not conflict over each others’ a-truth aspects or choices, because these aspects and choices would be viewed as neither right nor wrong, just different. This means social harmony involving diversity, and social diversity involving harmony. Here then, is an epistemically justifiable place for divergible values. (As discussed in Part I, they can be an insoluble epistemic problem for moral theory. They are no such problem for pro-truth theory.)

Clearly, this type of harmony plus diversity or pluralism would mean peace — peace within and among every pro-truth person here. It would also mean fulfilment and a type of flourishing, via everyone having the practicable maximum freedom to achieve their a-truth ends, regarding music, sex or whatever. This would mean various types of happiness.

That temporarily concludes the discussion of the a-truth and emotions. The next section begins the promised return to more directly cognitive issues.

The next section partly concerns the recently-mentioned crucial need for epistemically justifiable cognitive judgement among things. This relates to the present and previous parts of Part II, because it is only via that judgement that we can know which emotions and other things are a-truth, which are pro-truth, and which are anti-truth, in this or that or all situations. Only thence can we know specifically where the freedom to do a-truth things should apply. The next section also leads up to an argument concluding that being free to peacefully achieve whatever a-truth things persons like might indirectly motivate persons to practise pro-truth theory — the theory which justifies and promotes that freedom etc.

Again, after sections below develop a suitable context, there are more points concerning the a-truth.

PART II, CHAPTER 2, Section 6: Pro-truth Society — Its Individuals, Their Judgement And Associated Psychology, And Some Pro-truth Freedoms.

The unity involved in a pro-truth society would not be a totalitarian unity. The above shows that pro-truth society would not be totalitarian, except in that it would be totally dedicated to total individual a-truth freedom and pro-truth freedom. It would totally promote opportunities to be pro-truth. So, direct pro-truth freedoms and opportunities need discussing. (Something like many of the individual liberties advocated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty are involved.):-

Direct pro-truth freedoms include an individual being free to helpfully and respectfully inform, disagree with or criticise others. E.g., suppose only one individual has sufficient evidence regarding some claim concerning whether something is pro-truth. Pro-truth society would encourage (motivate) such individuals to be and feel free to inform others helpfully and respectfully. Similarly, an individual would be free to doubt a view held by all others, due to this individual knowing that others hold the view only because they have what understandably seems to be sufficient evidence for the view.

Pro-truth education and upbringing would encourage such pro-truth freedoms, via trying to help develop a certain type of mind and judgement in each individual. This means an epistemically autonomous individual. Pro-truth society would maximise democracy in that, if all pro-truth individuals were epistemically autonomous, they would be pro-truth more willingly, by their free, knowledge-based choice, than if they were ignorant (epistemically vacuous) here and had to be persuaded, pressured or tricked into being pro-truth. Universal epistemic autonomy would mean universal social and democratic-political harmony (U H) in relation to the epistemically justifiable. Epistemic autonomy enables all to know what is justified, which enables universal harmony (among all individuals) in relation to knowledge, as in U H/I E/T. So the ideal society is a directly[183] democratic society, universally constituted by such persons.

Epistemically autonomous pro-truth persons would crucially embody a justifiable, overall view or judgement:-

John Stuart Mill’s point concerning the need for an ultimate judge to decide among alternatives has some relevance here. The ultimate judge can only be in the individual’s mind. Because the judge is ultimate, the judge has the ultimate or overall or most general power, i.e., freedom[184], to seek the pro-truth. For the freedom and judgements to be epistemically justifiable, the judge’s ultimate standard needs to be the pro-truth ultimate standard. The judge needs to try to be optimally pro-truth. A judge who is as epistemically justifiable as possible would have the overall view of ‘Be pro-truth’, as discussed in Part II, Chapter 1, Sections 2 and 3. With this, the judge, due to being ultimate, would be the individual’s highest level of thought. That is, the judge would reflect on all the individual’s other thoughts. To judge something is to reflect on it, and in that sense be at a higher level of thought than it. That is, the highest level involves meta-thoughts, i.e., thoughts about other thoughts. The latter then are lower-level. They include the thoughts or intentions directly underlying actual or possible intended actions. This highest level is the judge with the ultimate, justifiable freedom to decide whether oneself ought to act only in one way, or whether oneself ought to permit oneself to do either this or that act. This is the self-governing freedom involved in justifiable autonomy. (This is partly similar to Kant’s notion of autonomy, except, e.g., he has different ideas concerning specifically what ‘freedom’ and ‘justifiable’ mean.)

The judgement level needs to consider the issues concerning fallibility, provisionality, self-criticism and so on, mentioned in this chapter’s Section 1. The individual’s highest level needs to reflect critically on the individual’s own suspended judgements, firmly held and provisional views, and on others’ views. That highest level’s viewpoint involves assessing other, lower-level viewpoints according to what seems their degree of epistemic justifiability: how pro-truth are they, on presently available evidence, and is this evidence sufficient?

This highest level is the most epistemically justifiable and least fallible level in that, as one aspect of its overall view, it alone is general:- It has the general aim of being fully epistemically justifiable. This aim, as such, cannot be to any degree epistemically unjustifiable. Similarly regarding this level’s general task of rationally assessing all specific views for their epistemic justifiability. E.g., it would assess different views about which types of exercise are best regarding specific effects on a certain individual’s ability/motivation to be optimally pro-truth. The specific views are held at lower levels of thought, and here is where errors tend to be most likely. Provided the judgemental level uses the most epistemically justifiable general scientific and/or, as appropriate, other epistemic (e.g., reasoning) methods available, it would probably have less chance of being wrong than the views it assesses. And, being self-critical, and open to others’ rational criticisms, the judge can increasingly correct its mistakes — improving its assessment methods.

An important role for one’s judgement level is to assess one’s emotions. E.g., an emotion sometimes simply presents itself, as an impulse, motivating an individual to strongly feel like doing X now. This can be an anti-truth impulse. E.g., someone could have an impulse to kill certain pro-truth persons. Such impulses occur at what many philosophers call the ‘first-order’ level of thought. This lowest level only directly suggests some specific act, X. Above this level, one could be said to have a second-order level, where one asks oneself something like, “Should I do X?”. This might be the pro-truth judgemental level. If it only asks that question via considering whether doing X would fulfil some moral aim, e.g., make oneself and/or others happy, it is not the pro-truth highest, judgemental level. Here there would need to be another, highest, pro-truth level. A third level here could supply this. This would justifiably reflect on both those first and second-order levels.

This pro-truth judge would say, e.g., “Doing X will make me happy by giving me short-term happiness, but it will have anti-truth effects overall, and is hence unjustifiable”. The prescription, sent by one’s judgemental level to one’s lowest, potentially impulsive, directly action-prompting level[185], is: ‘Don’t do X’.

The pro-truth highest level’s autonomy includes freedom from (or power over) emotions which might influence one to act in an unjustifiable way. (Here is another similarity with Kant’s notion of autonomy.) This highest level is the cognitive level which Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 suggests is needed to control emotions.

In sum, it is pro-truth to assess one’s lower-level thoughts, impulses and emotions for justifiability, and for one’s judgemental level to be in control of them. This autonomy means being free (self-empowered) to choose justifiably among them. (This is also similar to, but also significantly different from, Kant’s notion of ‘autonomy’.) Pro-truth autonomy involves encouraging and revelling in certain emotions.

It is also pro-truth to assess others’ thoughts and emotions, e.g., regarding how these affect one’s own and others’ lower-level thoughts and hence actions. This has direct implications for society. E.g., because that judgemental level checks for the anti-truth, via focusing on evidence, seeking faulty reasoning and so on, the pro-truth individual will not accept a lower-level, specific view only because, e.g., a parent, peer-group, teacher, government or newspaper tries to influence the individual to believe the view. It is a pro-truth test of character to ignore all such influence, and autonomously rationally assess such views.

The views may be emotionally-comforting, but this also has nothing to do with whether they are justifiable. Via a pro-truth education, individuals would be encouraged (motivated) to think independently. Pro-truth character or psychology involves having the strength of character to epistemically justifiably asses all views, regardless of their social source, comforting nature and so on. (This is necessary if we are to have pro-truth social and world peace, via getting rid of morality, religion and so on, hence avoiding the wars and other conflicts they can lead to.)

Clearly, such individuals have a high level of emotional maturity, involving autonomously controlling their emotions rather than being controlled by them. (This can help with the courage needed, e.g., if one needs to resist anti-truth parental, peer-group and other social pressures, or if interacting with other, hostile anti-truth individuals. (The need for such virtues is another practical implication of pro-truth theory.))

In sum, such individuals have the epistemic autonomy discussed in Part I, Chapter I, Section 2.

Such emotionally mature individuals’ psychology would mean a rather unique type of person or self. (If, via education, these became a majority, this would mean a society, a democracy and normal psychology unlike any before it.):-

Persons have a self-concept. At least one thing has to be considered primary or of highest importance in one’s self-concept. Pro-truth autonomous individuals would locate their person-ness primarily at that highest, judgemental level of thought — not at the potentially more epistemically vulnerable, lower levels. Regarding one’s judgemental level being in control of one’s lower-level impulses etc, a pro-truth self-concept involves the knowledge that oneself has epistemic autonomy. That is, one knows oneself to be justifiably in control of oneself, and free to make decisions. (This probably would have some pro-truth self-motivating result. Here one’s self-concept would involve the confidence that one is effective in at least trying to do what is epistemically justifiably right and can thereby increasingly learn how to actually do so. (‘Right’ here involves one being self-critical and/or skeptical in some areas, and so on, i.e., not an authoritarian or undemocratic egoistic-righteousness.))

One’s self-concept here would not be threatened by oneself finding that a view one held was wrong, i.e., epistemically unjustifiable. Because pro-truth provisionalist (or fallibilist) individuals seek evidence to criticise their own, lower-level provisional views, they would hence welcome the chance to improve by eliminating a wrong view. Improvement is no threat to them.

This pro-truth self-concept would also not be harmable by criticism by others. This individual would not conflict with others here, or feel insulted. This highly pro-truth individual would regard unjustified or anti-truth criticism, e.g., hostile irrational criticism, as evidence that the critic needs to be helped to be more pro-truth, not as harm done to the highly pro-truth individual’s self-concept. There is no harm here. A highly pro-truth individual would not interpret others’ rational (i.e., evidence-based) criticism as a personal attack, an attack on one’s primary self. This is because this individual’s primary self is rational (i.e., evidence-based) and critical, ready to attack the individual’s own errors, skeptical of the individual’s own provisional views, and so on. Each such individual would welcome other’s rational criticisms. (Such personal interactions would be fairly unique in history. E.g., they are hardly the norm in the parliamentary and similar discussions I’ve heard. Such interactions would help constitute a new type of democracy, a justifiable democracy.)

Such personal characteristics are aspects of pro-truth unselfishness: here one does not regard one’s self as something that nobody should criticise. One regards one’s self as one regards all other pro-truth selves here, via oneself sharing the same primary or ultimate, justifiable aim as the others. In that sense, all pro-truth selves would harmonise — one would not see oneself as someone deserving special (e.g., non-critical) treatment only for the (selfish) reason that oneself is oneself. This is yet another practicable, egalitarian or democratic and social-psychological implication of U H/I E/T. It means a type of peace within and among persons. It means types of freedom, e.g., being free from personally harmful criticism, from epistemically harmful criticism concerning one’s primary self, and freedom from being influenced by perceived threats to one’s ego. It means freedom from jealousy, hate and so on. (Such freedoms involve pro-truth duties, or virtues.)

Recent points suggest a re-interpretation of part of Kant’s notion of persons as ends-in-themselves:-

I’ve argued that the only overall epistemically justifiable standard is the most general or fundamental standard regarding epistemic justification, and that this standard is U H/I E/T. Thence, it makes some sense to say that the end associated with that standard is the only justifiably[186] intrinsically valuable end, i.e., it is of intrinsic epistemic justifiability. Now this standard and the achievement of that end are the primary aspects of the judgemental, highest-level which is primary regarding a pro-truth self-concept. So, that standard and end are embodied in this person’s primary self. This would make the primary self epistemically justifiably intrinsically valuable. This is in part something like Kant’s notion of persons as ends-in-themselves. Persons would have that epistemically justifiable end in themselves, in their self.

However, this is different from saying each person as such is an end-in-themselves, an absolute. As argued above, that is a moral, vague and hence too-problematic notion. And, regarding real, i.e., fallible, pro-truth persons, it is probably most accurate to say that, instead of them being absolute embodiments of that standard and end, they at least embody the aim ‘Try to live by that standard, and to achieve that end’ and can thereby often be as optimally pro-truth as is practicable. This would mean that persons are of epistemically justifiable intrinsic value only to the degree they intentionally are optimally pro-truth as far as they are able[187]. (This would mean that extremely anti-truth persons, such as Pol Pot and Stalin were, are of insignificant justifiable value, unless they reform and make amends.)

Along with having a type and degree of intrinsic epistemic justifiability, a pro-truth person would also be of extrinsic epistemic justifiability in that they are part of the means to the pro-truth end. This gives us a re-interpretation of Kant’s ‘Always treat each person as end, never just as a means’[188]. (His universal approach includes oneself in ‘each person’, with which I agree.) We can be a means to that justified end, but we are not just limited to that. Our brains can also embody (‘embrain’) that end to a significant or optimal possible degree, and in that sense part of a person’s mind could to some degree also be an end — one of justifiable intrinsic value.

The recent discussion’s distinction between a highest-level primary self and other things a self does or temporarily is makes sense of a claim made by some psychologists. The claim is: if Eve wishes to constructively criticise Colin for something he did, Eve needs to criticise his act, not him as a whole person. This, like many notions not intended by their originators or users to fit with pro-truth theory, can be re-interpreted in a pro-truth way:-

Assume Colin has normal capacities. Justifiable criticism, which is constructive criticism, would recognise that Colin has the potential to have his highest level of thought reflect justifiably on his lower level of thought which unjustifiably ordered the act to be implemented. Pro-truth Eve would, if needed, help Colin to develop that judgemental level. Then she would criticise the act in a general way, giving a general reason, e.g., ‘X is unjustifiable because ...’, and ask questions facilitating Colin to reflect critically on anyone doing X. (Colin would not be labelled specifically as someone with an unalterable unjustifiable character because he did X.) Thence, Colin’s primary (new?) self can perhaps most easily and autonomously alter/control his lowest-level, action-prompting self. A person, when being a pro-truth judge, is of justifiable intrinsic value in that the judge at least tries, as far as the person is able, to achieve the pro-truth end. Hence it is unrealistic, and epistemically unjustifiable, to negatively criticise that primary aspect of the person. It is justifiable for Eve, and Colin, to constructively criticise anything anti-truth done by Colin’s other, non-primary, lower levels. Pro-truth constructive criticism can help re-construct the lower levels in a pro-truth autonomous way.

When discussing Kant’s ‘persons as ends-in-themselves’ notion, I mentioned that a person’s characteristic practices most plausibly show us the person’s present nature. What a person characteristically does tells us what sort of person they were/are, but not necessarily what they will always be. If a person characteristically does anti-truth things, it is still fairly likely they have a significant potential to develop pro-truth highest-level reflection, thereby changing their character. Others’ help here can be crucial. Justifiable autonomy needs to be learnt, or taught.

So, it can make a lot of sense to criticise the general types of acts, or characteristic acts, and lower-level thoughts, of a person — not the person-as-a-whole. The person-as-a-whole should not be told they are worthless, i.e., unjustifiable. This is another practicable pro-truth implication and duty. And fulfilling that duty would seem more likely to motivate pro-truth acts than if the whole person was criticised, making them feel humiliated, frustrated, uncared-for, stubborn, rebellious, and hence likely to live up to that unjustifiably negative label, ‘worthless’ or similar.

This fits with the above-mentioned point: ‘If one has a pro-truth self-concept, this would not be threatened by oneself finding that a view one held was epistemically unjustifiable. Because pro-truth provisionalist (or fallibilist) individuals seek evidence to criticise their own, lower-level provisional views, they would hence welcome the chance to improve by eliminating a wrong view’. With this, they would welcome pro-truth, inherently constructive, criticism from others. This can give them new insights, new possibilities, and hence alternatives. Freedom cannot exist without alternatives, i.e, choices. So, such critical insights can give them the freedom, the autonomy, to change themselves into something better. Equivalently, the more resources/opportunities one has, the more power one has to do things. Giving someone more alternatives gives them more resources/opportunities, hence more power. Positive criticism helps empower the person. Empowerment is necessary for autonomy.

Finally here:- Facilitating something like the individuals and the society they’d flourish in, as described above (and below), is the only justifiable aim of psychotherapy, psychiatric drug and other physical treatment of the mentally-ill, social science, corrective institutions for criminals, political and legal institutions, the economy, child-raising, education, films, literature, art and so on. Clearly, e.g., a type of what is called ‘cognitive psychotherapy’ or ‘rational psychotherapy’ fits here. With this, pro-truth theory offers an epistemically justifiable definition of ‘sanity’, ‘maturity’, ‘autonomy’, ‘wisdom’, ‘integrity’ and so on — significantly different from presently widely-accepted definitions.

Part II so far has discussed the main general aspects and some typical specific implications of pro-truth theory. Hence, and because the discussion is rather long, involving many different things, it seems appropriate to try to summarise the overall picture. That is, the next section shows the “forest”, as opposed to just looking at, and perhaps getting lost among[189], many separate “trees”:-

The diagram is a simplified representation of the overall situation regarding the epistemically justifiable in life-as-a-whole. It might be most useful to first look at the diagram, then read these explanatory notes:-

(1) It is of positive value, i.e., justifiable, to be pro-truth. (E.g., from an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, ‘1+2=3’ and an epistemically justifiable education are of positive value, but ‘1+2=7’ and depriving children of that education are of negative value.) Pro-truth things are hence the primary or top priority. They are justifiably superior, and anti-truth things are inferior. So pro-truth things are on the top or highest level of the diagram and vertical dimension. From here, a highest-level epistemically justifiable viewpoint can reflect on all else, placing all other things where they epistemically justifiably belong on the diagram. (This gives one’s life-as-a-whole a pro-truth structure and integrity (integration).)

The ‘+’ on top of the vertical dimension means ‘epistemically justifiable’, i.e., ‘of positive value regarding epistemic justifiability’. Evaluations on this dimension are cognitive, not emotional. That is, evaluations are via one’s epistemically justifiable thoughts. Here evaluations are objective, or as overall close to truth as possible.

(2) It is of negative value, i.e., unjustifiable, to be anti-truth. Anti-truth things are on the lower, negative end of the vertical dimension. E.g., ‘1+2=7’, brain disease and racism belong there.

(3) It is of neutral value, i.e., neither justified nor unjustified, to do the a-truth. Things here, belonging on the horizontal dimension, are irrelevant regarding achieving anything on the vertical dimension. The geometric way to represent dimensions irrelevant to each other is via an ‘orthogonal’ diagram, i.e., using right angles. Whatever happens on the horizontal dimension cannot affect or cause anything on the vertical.

3a) The evaluations (preferences) here are via one’s emotions, i.e., not cognitive. They are subjective, not objective. Evaluations along the a-truth, horizontal dimension are either positive (+), negative (-) or neutral from an emotional viewpoint, i.e., things are, respectively, liked/loved, disliked, or there is emotional indifference. (But all evaluations here are of neutral cognitive value, i.e., from the pro-truth or epistemically justified cognitive viewpoint they are known to be neither right (justifiable) nor wrong (unjustifiable).)

This dimension’s evaluations vary according to variable individual subjective preferences. Any a-truth things of neutral (zero) emotional value to the person(s) in question belong in the middle (zero area) of the dimension for the person(s). If someone needs to choose among things here, choice via chance is appropriate, e.g., coin-tossing. E.g:- Suppose Evelyn needs to wear socks, but it is a-truth whether she wears red, blue, green or brown socks one day, and she prefers red, dislikes blue and is neutral (indifferent) regarding green and brown. For Evelyn, red belongs on the right hand, positive(ly evaluated) end of the dimension; blue belongs on the negative end, and green and brown belong in the middle. Suppose her dog wrecks the red socks. Evelyn tosses a coin to choose between green and brown.

Whether her preferences place a sock colour on the ‘+’ or the ‘–’end of the dimension, or in its middle, or whether her sock preferences change from day to day, is irrelevant to the vertical dimension.

PRO-TRUTH.

(Epistemically justifiable things.)

(Epistemically unjustifiable things.)

ANTI-TRUTH.

—

The structure shows that, from an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, all a-truth things are of neutral value. Hence they are justifiably of equal value. So, all persons’ a-truth aspects and preferred things are epistemically justifiably equal. So pro-truth theory advocates treating all persons as equal here — another aspect of a pro-truth society’s democracy.

Persons can also be epistemically justifiably equal in that they can equally intend to be optimally pro-truth or as pro-truth as possible. They can be epistemically justifiably unequal in some pro-truth ways. E.g., a mature, expert pro-truth driving instructor has knowledge concerning driving which is superior to that of a teenager about to learn to drive. (Such issues, in relation to equality, and democratic inclusivity among persons, are discussed further, later.)

The pro-truth orthogonal structure interrelates both unity and diversity, or both converging and diverging[190]. This relates, respectively, to the notions ‘harmony’ and ‘irrelevance’ in U H/I E/T. That interrelation gives epistemically justifiable content to the general distinction, suggested in Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, between needed common core rules and divergible choices. Pro-truth theory advocates all persons converging, namely on a common core, where this is epistemically justifiable, and permits and encourages diverging where this is neither justifiable nor unjustifiable. That is, primarily, we ought to be pro-truth; secondarily, orthogonal to this, we are free to do whatever we like in a-truth areas. Regarding the pro-truth, vertical dimension, namely the primary dimension, the only directly justifiable thing to take notice of is our cognitive aspect. This alone can tell us what is right as far as we can know — regardless of any emotions opposing (or supporting) this. Regarding the a-truth dimension, where knowledge about what is right is impossible, the cognitive encourages us to take notice of any emotional preferences. Here we can do whatever feels good[191]. Unity is justified regarding the one ultimate, pro-truth end. But diversity is acceptable regarding all that is irrelevant to achieving that end. Here, the divergible is fine: be free to diverge from what others do. Do whatever you like.

Here then, such things as playfulness, uninhibitedness, bizarre art and eccentricity are acceptable. This has implications for psychology and social life. Some psychological theories have a rather one-dimensional view of humans here. That is, e.g., these theories, at worst, see playfulness as always and only a sign of immaturity, appropriate for children but not adults. Such theories see individual expression, e.g., hair dyed green, as only a sign of a psychological disorder, e.g., as childish showing off by a socially-unskilled or immature person craving recognition inappropriately, perhaps due to low self-esteem. Some see eccentricity, uninhibitedness and so on similarly — or as sign of psychosis, i.e., being out of touch with the allegedly single-dimension structure of reality, to which the theories morally assume all should conform.

Such theories lack the pro-truth overall view of reality: they are ignorant of the epistemically justifiable orthogonal structure of human life. From an epistemically justifiable viewpoint, it is the psychologists, moralists, religious fundamentalists and so on who believe such theories who have the psychological problem. They are objectively deluded — insane. Such limited theories are only justifiably applicable in certain areas within the vertical dimension. E.g., it is epistemically justifiable to not play around, but to pay quiet attention, during lessons on pro-truth driving, health-care, philosophy, psychology and so on. But the last three such courses would advocate playing around and other diversity often, outside of lesson-times. This is because there are two, orthogonal dimensions involved in a justifiable, i.e., knowable, reality or life. Here lies the full or overall view of what human life can and should be. Anything less is justifiably literally incredible.

Within the a-truth dimension, it is fine to be playful, even silly. Playfulness can be a sign of epistemically justifiable maturity, not immaturity. Feeling too inhibited, feeling unfree to be justifiably free, is the problem here. It involves immaturity in that one lacks the strength of character to be an individual, to be what is justifiably fully human. It involve immaturity in that one lacks the inherently mature epistemic autonomy to not weakly conform to any statistically-normal epistemically-questionable uniform social rules. Or one lacks mature autonomy via only doing what present others, a charismatic leader or one’s peer group does/says, only for the reasons that this is what they do/say and one is so weak-charactered that one feels one ought to conform to whatever they do/say. (Such persons are more likely to obey a Hitler’s or Nazi-type society’s commands to enter into war, genocide etc than are persons who are strong, autonomous individuals seeking objective evidence for what they do.)

Similarly, it can be a sign of the self-confident, epistemically justifiable, strong self-esteem involved in an optimally pro-truth self-concept, rather than of low or weak self-esteem, to feel uninhibited by (unjustifiable) social pressure, and hence feel free to have some fun or be different. And so on.

Further, playfulness, eccentricity, uninhibitedness and the like can also be aspects of pro-truth recreation, pro-truth fun, pro-truth scientific and artistic creativity, and so on, and hence they are things a justifiably responsible and hence mature person would revel in. This point raises related issues:-

Comments above could seem to suggest that the unity justifiable regarding the pro-truth, top end of the vertical dimension, means that freedom is unjustifiable there. However, other comments above show that much freedom or autonomy is needed in order to achieve the justifiable here. The unity here only involves the ultimate, general aim, and the justifiability of sharing that aim. Freedom and diversity will often be needed regarding the specifics of achieving that shared aim:-

E.g:- People need to be free to diverge from any conventional, limited, problematic viewpoints. They need to be free to rationally criticise each other, to seek pro-truth truth unhindered by social pressure to conform to what may be only apparently true beliefs. To discover pro-truth truth, a type of uninhibited, divergent thinking can be very helpful, and even necessary[192]. Importantly, advances in knowledge often require free, imaginative or uninhibited thinking: to think of possible new knowledge, we must be free to think of new possibilities — of alternatives to our present errors or ignorance. Freedom means alternatives, i.e., divergence; and vice versa. If humans had never diverged from the errors, ignorance and limited knowledge of a million years ago, we’d still be living in caves, hunting and gathering, or similar, dying when young, and believing nonsense such as ‘Angry thunder-gods cause thunder’, and so on. (Similarly, we need to diverge from all moralities and religions.) It is pro-knowledge to encourage the freedom to diverge here, to be imaginative. Einstein said something like the following: ‘To advance in knowledge, we need to use existing knowledge and our imagination. Of the two, imagination is the more important’. The idea that unity regarding the pro-truth involves being unfree or too inhibited to change is ridiculous.

The necessary freedom to diverge intellectually is more likely to flourish if freedom is encouraged universally, wherever this is pro-truth or a-truth. E.g., if free expression in art, dance, fiction and play are encouraged, then, all else equal, this seems likely to facilitate the free thought needed to discover new pro-knowledge knowledge. (Einstein said something like this.)

Pro-truth unity regarding the general aim can also involve diversity in that there can be different equally pro-truth specific means to that single ultimate end. Different family structures, different foods, different types of exercise, and so on, could be equally pro-truth. Here too, you are justifiably free to do whatever you like. The choice among equally pro-truth alternatives is a-truth. The differences among them are a-truth. So here too there needs to be freedom of choice.

Similarly, pro-truth society would require a great diversity of skills, educational and employment opportunities, and it would often be pro-truth for an individual to freely move among different occupations, disciplines etc. Interrelating different knowledge and skills has often led to new knowledge and skills. And a significantly optimal pro-truth society is only possible via there being the freedom to fulfil the diverse dietary, educational and other needs among every, different individual. Similarly, all need a very broad (diverse) education (along with depth in some areas).

The overall view here sees (1) that the unity only concerns the primary general end, in that the number of ends here is only one, i.e., unity, — but (2) that plurality or diversity or freedom is often involved in specifically achieving that single end.

The unity would mean peace. E.g., in optimally pro-truth politics, the judgemental, highest-level thinking of all involved would ensure peace via all having the same ultimate aim, and via all respectfully considering what any person thinks is evidence regarding achieving that aim. All would be united via being self-critical here too, thereby removing a potential source of conflict among persons. If others criticise a pro-truth individual in the same constructive and respectful way the individual would criticise himself/herself, due to all sharing the same ultimate aim, then this individual would welcome this criticism, this help in achieving the unifying aim.

The a-truth diversity would also involve peace. Pro-truth persons would consider each others’ a-truth preferences as neither right nor wrong, and hence not a source of conflict. All persons’ preferences here would be seen as ‘equi-acceptable’ (equally acceptable) by optimally pro-truth persons, as opposed to there being merely tolerance of preferences different from one’s own, and of persons different from oneself. (This is another aspect of pro-truth unselfishness or non-self-centredness.) Here too, pro-truth, highest-level judgement is crucial.

In sum, both pro-truth unity and a-truth diversity involve peace, or lack of conflict within and among persons.

Or do they? A possible problem: the diversity involved in the structure could seem to suggest that a-truth freedom and diverging a-truth choices involve contradictions or conflict within a theory based on harmony, i.e., on avoiding contradictions. If there are diverse things to choose among, one choice would contradict another. Hence, a critic of pro-truth theory could say the theory involves contradictions and is hence epistemically unjustifiable:-

It would be possible for a powerful dictatorship to more or less impose uniformity (unity) concerning food choices, clothing styles and much else in public, and avoid what might be seen as problematic diversity (and freedom). E.g:- Suppose the choice between fruits F1 and F2 is a-truth. (This example’s general point could apply to two races, sexualities and so on.) Pro-truth fruit F1 could be the only fruit allowed to be grown, though it would be equally justifiable to also grow F2, here the forbidden fruit. A more than superficial view of pro-truth theory shows that imposed uniformity regarding a-truth choices would contradict the epistemically justifiable standard, ‘Be pro-truth’ or U H/I E/T. It is not true that F1 is the best choice, the most pro-truth fruit. It is the imposed uniformity, not the justifiably permissible diversity, which would conflict with the epistemically justifiable: it is epistemically justifiable to not think it justifiable to treat only one choice among the neither justifiable nor unjustifiable as justifiable, and all others as unjustified in that they are forbidden. Or, it is incoherent to act as if it is true that, among things which are objectively neither right nor wrong, it is right to have only one of them, and wrong to have the others in that they are banned. This situation involves treating the a-truth as not the a-truth. Arguments above show this is epistemically unjustifiable and self-contradictory. It would also contradict epistemically autonomous persons’ autonomy: such autonomy involves knowing it is justified to be permitted (free) to choose between conflicting a-truth alternatives.

Any moral or practical theory must choose between conflicting alternatives, via its standard(s).It is impracticable to avoid innumerable mutually-conflicting alternatives. E.g., we must all at least implicitly choose between such things as suicide and non-suicide, selfishness and unselfishness, covering one’s genitals or not, sitting or not. The justifiably only important issue here is ‘Via which standard should one choose among unavoidably conflicting alternatives?’.

With this, in relation to the pro-truth single standard/end, if something is irrelevant to the standard/end, it cannot conflict with the standard/end. The ultimate standard is not just U H E/T. It is U H/I E/T: both the irrelevant and the harmonious are involved, i.e., orthogonally interrelated.

And it seems probable that enforcing uniformity (unity) within the a-truth would lead to anti-truth frustration and so on, hence decreasing persons’ motivation and ability to be pro-truth. (Some people may prefer F2, and feel, and know, it is unjustified to forbid it.) Instead, it is pro-truth to uniformly practise via the rule that it is justifiable to treat a-truth diversity as neither justifiable nor unjustifiable — as something we ought to be permitted to revel in. That which is neither justifiable nor unjustifiable cannot contradict the justifiable.

Here we meet another, motivationally important implication of the orthogonal structure. In at least some cases, the things among which we are free to choose, or the contents of one’s choices, are a-truth — but the method of choice, or the freedom to choose, can be pro-truth. Or, the choice-in-itself can be a-truth, but the effect of being free to make that choice can be pro-truth. (Here the contents and choice-preferences belong on the horizontal dimension, and the freedom and the related decision that this freedom or method of choice is justified, are instituted by the vertical; and the effects of the freedom are on the vertical.):-

The freedom to choose among a-truth things is freedom to do whatever makes one happy here. Because this freedom is advocated by their ultimate judgement level, pro-truth persons thereby made happier are more likely to be happy with their pro-truth judgement-level and its ultimate standard than they would be with a standard or judge forbidding freedom. If so, such freedom has a pro-truth effect and is thereby further epistemically justified.

E.g:- From an epistemically justifiable cognitive viewpoint, suppose that, for Felicity, apples and pears are equally pro-truth, via their nutritional effects. That is, each fruit as such, all else equal, would have the same effect on Felicity’s learning and practising pro-truth truths. But all else is sometimes not equal. There can be a subjective, emotional difference. Suppose Felicity usually likes pears more than apples, and so, when free to choose, she eats less apples than pears. If forced to always eat only apples, she will be less happy than if she is free to eat either pears or apples. (However, if she is primarily aiming to be pro-truth, she will eat whatever in-itself-pro-truth food is available, regardless of her likes and dislikes.) Suppose there is no anti-truth effect on the world if both apples and pears are made freely available. She will be more pleased living in a society which grows both than if both were not freely available. (She occasionally likes an apple instead of a pear.) So, being free to choose among alternatives where the differences are a-truth would have an indirect pro-truth motivating effect. It certainly would not contradict the epistemically justifiable.

Now, apart from Felicity, there are other persons, with preferences different from hers regarding apples and pears. Encouraged diversity and freedom here would co-exist with and indirectly promote unity among persons — regarding all accepting the judgement which encourages the diversity which makes them happier.

In such ways, persons’ lower-level emotional or subjective standards can co-exist with their highest-level cognitive standard or objective judgement-level — and this can make the latter more socially and psychologically acceptable, and make a more democratic society. This would make pro-truth theory even more motivatable.

Summing up here:- The freedom of choice here is a-truth regarding the contents of the choices, and pro-truth in that the freedom has its source in the top end of the diagram’s vertical dimension. That is, the method of choosing, namely individual freedom rather than via a uniform choice for all, imposed dictatorially, is instituted by epistemically justifiable judgement, which resides at the top end. This judgement knows it is epistemically justifiable that individuals ought to be free to choose among a-truth things. (Again, there is an orthogonal interrelationship, involving both the harmony and the irrelevance in U H/I E/T. A reminder: U H/I E/T means ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’.)

E.g., it is pro-truth judgement alone which can know that a-truth things, i.e., things on the other dimension, truly are a-truth. That is, the things known to belong on the horizontal dimension are put there cognitively, via the vertical dimension. And the free choice among horizontal-dimension things, instituted by the vertical dimension’s top end, can indirectly help motivate people to accept that which resides on the (their) top end of the (their) vertical dimension.

Preferences on the a-truth dimension can be those of an individual or group. The possible problem concerns groups. In the recently-discussed case concerning Evelyn’s a-truth sock-colour preferences, (Part II, Chapter 2, Section 7, note (3a),) no-one else is involved. E.g., she could be home alone. So whatever a-truth colour she wears affects no-one else. But often others are involved, and here the judgement of pro-truth persons would be that a type of democratic vote is appropriate. E.g., suppose it is a-truth whether a community hall is built in architectural style P or style Q. Here, because the choice is a-truth, there is no knowledge regarding whether P or Q as such is better. Via this cognitive, ‘We know there is no knowledge here’ criterion, everyone’s preference is of equal, neutral value from a pro-truth judge’s highest-level viewpoint. (So democracy concerning a-truth issues would be different from democracy concerning pro-truth issues.)

This criterion might, on first view, suggest that one-person, one-vote is appropriate. Yet a pro-truth judge’s overall viewpoint considers more than just that criterion. Apart from that cognitive criterion, emotions need to be considered. If, apart from that cognitive issue, all else is equal from an epistemically justifiable highest-level viewpoint, each person involved should get an equal vote, one vote. But, from that overall viewpoint, all else might not be equal. There could be very different degrees of emotional preference:-

This possibility involves a point made previously in this section:- “In at least some cases, the things among which we are free to choose, or the contents of one’s choices, are a-truth — but the method of choice, or the freedom to choose, can be pro-truth. Or, the choice-in-itself can be a-truth, but the effect of being free to make that choice can be pro-truth.” Now this freedom to choose among a-truth things would perhaps be most precisely represented by one being free to choose according to one’s degree of preference. To be and feel most free to express one’s preferences would seem to involve being free to express them precisely. It is plausible that there could be anti-truth effects due to individuals with differing degrees of preference only being free to express preferences in an extremely approximate, limited way — in a uniform, one-person one-vote way. (As suggested above, the effects of having a free choice here could belong on the vertical, pro-truth dimension. A choice is not fully free if it is unnecessarily limited.) Instead of arbitrarily imposing this type of democracy on all situations requiring a group choice among a-truth things, a ‘preference-degree’ voting system would fit better with the truth:-

Suppose a one-person one-vote vote would mean 51 votes for style P, and 49 for style Q. Suppose those preferring style Q do so ten times more strongly. Suppose each person rates their strength of preference from 1 to 10. This results in there being 51x1=51 preference-units for style P, and 49x10=490 for style Q. Clearly, some persons could feel frustrated with a society/judgement instituting such a democracy. ‘Preference-degree’ voting to decide among a-truth choices would probably be most pro-truth, considering the (suggested) indirect effects of the method of choice used. With this, regarding the H in U H/I E/T, considering degrees of preference harmonises more with the precise truth regarding preferences than would ignoring the degrees. Here, all pro-truth persons involved would honestly rate their degree of preference, with differential voting on that subjective, emotional basis.

Something like the following might work well:- Anyone with zero preference gets zero votes: they abstain. Anyone with preference-level 1 gets one vote; anyone with preference-level 2 gets two votes; and so on. Thence, the previous paragraph’s result would be 490 votes for style Q, and 51 for style P. The loser here, because they only slightly prefer their choice, would hardly notice they’d lost. So, regarding pro-truth theory’s motivatability, this result would be as close as possible to a win-win situation regarding the voters, the pro-truth society which instituted the voting system, and regarding the associated theory.

Often, such issues would be difficult to solve precisely. But it is probably impracticable for any system to “please all the people all the time”. And pro-truth theory only concerns the practicable. The pro-truth ideal here is a world society where all are entirely unselfish, and all know and thereby feel that an a-truth choice other than theirs is as acceptable as theirs. Here no person would be displeased by group decisions disagreeing with the person’s a-truth preference. However, such an ideal state is unlikely to be even approximately reached till the distant future, if ever.

A conclusion concerning recent points:- I provisionally think it is most pro-truth to have voting on a-truth issues via degrees of preference. The overall view seems to be that, overall, that’s the most pro-truth system here.

It is at least practicable for a pro-truth society to show citizens that it is trying as hard as possible to do what seems most justifiable, given present knowledge. It can be motivating to know that the most justifiable and justifiably fair possible political system exists, as far as can be known at the time — and that one’s society is willing to change any system if there is new evidence, confirming that a change is justified. (After all, a pro-truth society would be its citizens.) Here again, a type of pro-truth society-overall democracy is needed, an evidence-based democracy. This would decide, among other things, what type of democracy is appropriate regarding group choices among a-truth things.

PART II, CHAPTER 2, Section 9: Unselfish, Pro-Truth Individuals, Their Society, Its Economy, Its Inclusivity And Egalitarianism.

The first part especially of this section interrelates various issues in previous sections with the notion, unselfishness:-

The first issue here concerns criticism and self-concepts. When an optimally pro-truth person criticises someone, the pro-truth person is unselfishly primarily trying to help make the world a justifiably better place, for all humanity. Pro-truth persons would not criticise others in order to belittle others and make themselves feel superior. That would be selfish. Similarly, pro-truth persons would not criticise others on the basis of the others’ a-truth aspects. A person would not be viewed as primarily, say, as a person with a certain skin-colour, and hence of this or that justifiable value[193]. Such aspects would inherently not be part of a pro-truth individual’s primary concept of other selves— or of the individual’s own self-concept. Again, the (primary aspect of the) pro-truth primary self is epistemic. Truth and rationality have no colour and so on.

(So, regardless of or ignoring a-truth aspects such as race, each individual would be free to criticise on epistemic grounds, and, partly thence, all could learn and practise in a way consistent with and promotive of all other persons’ freedom to do the same, consistent with society overall being optimally pro-truth[194]. This is another social implication of individual pro-truth unselfishness.)

The second, related issue here concerns discrimination. Discrimination can be justifiable or unjustifiable (or neither). This is clear is some areas, e.g., it is justified to discriminate against ‘1+2=7’, or against a person’s answering ‘1+2=?’ with ‘7’ in a maths test. Yet these days (2004) it is often believed that any discrimination against persons is unjustifiable, and self-centred. It is selfish and indeed unjustifiable for Fred to discriminate against an unalterable a-truth aspect of a person, e.g., the race the person is born with, due to Fred’s self-related preference for a contrary a-truth aspect, i.e., here, Fred’s race. A radical distinction needs to be made between a-truth things which are unalterable aspects of a human, and a-truth things separable from humans, e.g., architectural building-styles. (The issue of choosable things, for which the chooser is responsible, as opposed to unchosen things, arises here too.) Humans are conscious, and many might be affected emotionally by others’ criticism so as to feel like making anti-truth choices. Buildings and so on lack those capacities. It is not anti-truth, e.g., to vote and act via emotional preferences regarding an a-truth architectural style. It is anti-truth selfishness to act on any emotional preferences regarding any unalterable a-truth aspect of a person, when such action will have an overall anti-truth effect on the person and/or others.

However, discrimination against (an aspect of) a person can be unselfish and justifiable:-

The overall issue regarding a discrimination can involve situational relativity. Situational relativity applies justifiably only in relation to the epistemically justifiable. The last sentence of the previous paragraph applies in relation to, e.g., an ‘X is the truth’ or ‘What is the truth?’ situation. Examples here are the above cases of pro-truth persons, e.g., the scientist Lee, not discriminating towards or against others’ knowledge or plausible hypotheses due to the others’ race, gender and so on. Unselfishness is involved here when a non-discriminator prefers, say, one gender sexually, and feels like generalising from this self-related preference to preferring hypotheses suggested by attractive persons of that gender — but ignores that self-related preference. Here, the justifiable preference relates to the epistemic, to knowledge or the plausibility of the hypotheses alone. Here, discrimination towards or against a gender is completely epistemically unjustifiable, and selfish. In such situations certain things, e.g., gender, are a-truth aspects of a person. However, in another situation, gender might not be an a-truth aspect. It could be a pro-truth or anti-truth aspect. E.g:- Suppose, regarding family matters, it is most pro-truth for Lucinda to have a baby via a life-long monogamous heterosexual partnership. Lucinda emotionally prefers a male sex partner. Here it would be anti-truth for Lucinda and anyone involved to regard gender as a-truth, as neutral, and for Lucinda to toss a coin to decide the gender of her life-long monogamous sex partner. She might choose the female gender. Here gender is not a-truth. Here, Lucinda’s emotional preference for a male sex partner is pro-truth. Here, to discriminate against a male would overall be unjustifiable. Here, as will be explained shortly, Lucinda is not being selfish.

Here there would be discrimination against a female. Suppose Maggie feels discriminated against here, because she wants to be Lucinda’s sex partner. If Maggie tries to be more pro-truth here, she’ll be unselfish and overcome that initial feeling. First here, she’ll unselfishly not let that feeling affect her actions. She’ll unselfishly accept that, overall, e.g., over all persons involved, the most pro-truth thing is for Lucinda to have a male, and for herself to seek another, willing woman. Then Maggie will gradually lose that negative, selfish, potentially very anti-truth feeling. With this, true love or caring is entirely unselfish, only considering what is best (most justifiable) for the loved or cared-for person. An optimally pro-truth and hence caring Maggie would want Lucinda to be justifiably happy.

Another, individual-related implication concerning unselfishness, explaining why Lucinda is not selfish:- Being entirely unselfish need not conflict with doing certain things for oneself. Doing things for oneself can be unselfish. Here, the things you do would create or maintain the resources you need in order for you to optimally serve others. Here humanity is your central focus. You are not self-centred. This is pro-truth self-care, involving a balance between (1) duties to oneself, as a means to perform (2) duties to others. E.g., you cannot optimally help others if you are unhealthy, highly sexually-frustrated or disablingly miserable. So all persons have a pro-truth duty to eat well, to rest, to not overwork on-average, to have some person(s) to directly and deeply love and be loved by, to have friends, fun, desired sex, a wanted and needed child, recreation, health-care and so on. Being optimally pro-truth normally involves keeping oneself at least moderately happy on average. (This would help motivate people to be pro-truth.) It would be pro-truth self-care for Lucinda to act on her preference for a male sex partner. This would better enable her to unselfishly care for all humanity.

The pro-truth self’s judgemental level would judge that oneself needs such things, and that any apparent selfishness here is ultimately unselfish. One’s judgemental level would impartially understand that any pro-truth person has such general needs, and that anyone in your specific situation, (e.g., you may have an allergy or a certain sexual preference,) has certain specific needs, in order for the ‘anyone’ to be optimally pro-truth. So, in judging that oneself needs to do things for oneself, one’s judgemental level is being objective, and only doing what one would unselfishly do for anyone, for every other person as far as is practicable and pro-truth.

Pro-truth self-care can mean such things as using the only available economy as a means to the unselfish, pro-truth end. This economy might aim to promote selfishness, hence being somewhat anti-truth. E.g., one needs a certain amount of material resources to give oneself the optimal ability, motivation and opportunity to be pro-truth, and if the only source of most such resources is a capitalist economy, then to some degree one needs to use the capitalist system. Someone apparently accepting capitalism can do so only in order to ultimately undermine capitalism. This superficial acceptance is merely a temporary means to that end. There is no conflict here with the epistemically justifiable end, because the use of capitalism is here the best or only available means to that end. This can be the only practicable pro-truth thing to do here, temporarily. The apparent selfishness involved here in acquiring resources capitalistically is really pro-truth self-care needed to achieve longer-term unselfish ends.

The ultimate, justifiable aim here is a pro-truth economy. Because U H/I E/T implies total unselfishness, there are certain implications for a pro-truth society’s economy. These relate, e.g., to certain educational implications:-

Impartial pro-truth persons would try to ensure that they and all others only get a pro-truth fair share of resources. This balance is whatever quantity and quality of resources is consistent with society overall being as optimally pro-truth as possible. U H/I E/T implies that it is anti-truth and hence unjustifiable for any individual to have more or less than that. Each only justifiably needs whatever proportion of resources is needed, e.g., to develop epistemic rationality optimally for and by all — and in each individual to the degree that this does not conflict with society overall being as pro-truth as possible. (All future generations need considering. ‘Overall’ implies ‘longest-term’. So, e.g., a pro-truth economy would try to ensure a sustainable pro-truth environment, for all future generations.)

Thence, selfish economics, e.g., capitalism and Stalin’s communism (e.g., Stalin had a Rolls-Royce and palaces), is unjustifiable. Capitalism allows some to profit at the expense of others: its primary aim is hardly to promote, fairly for all[195], everyone’s ability, motivation and opportunity to be optimally pro-truth. If only some individuals have a selfish proportion of resources, this would mean that other persons would be denied an otherwise available degree of, e.g., pro-truth education and health care, or food.

Those selfish individuals get an anti-truth unfair proportion presumably partly because they are at least moderately intelligent (but use their rationality primarily in a merely instrumental, selfish way). However, an unfair distribution could also be via severely intellectually disabled humans, who, given present medical knowledge, can improve only marginally or not at all, being given immense educational etc resources. This resource distribution could be unbalanced/unfair to the degree that there are insufficient resources to train enough able persons to develop medicine so as to increasingly avoid intellectual disability in future generations, or to quickly develop new biochemical, gene or stem-cell technology which might help those now-alive disabled persons’ brains change so as to greatly remove their disability.

I included that issue because it is pro-truth to admit the truth that there will sometimes be such hard choices, and to show that, to the degree that we lack knowledge of what is optimally pro-truth, to that degree there will be ambiguity. However, again, hard choices and ambiguity will decrease as our knowledge and hence (economic and, hence, educational, medical etc) resources grow. Besides, there would be hard choices whatever practical or moral theory is applied. (E.g., consider Kant’s and Rawls’s absolute respect for each individual’s (alleged) right to life, i.e., regardless of the consequences for other individuals. This can mean a hard, indeed impossible choice. This is the case when either one individual or some other(s) must die.[196]) So, if it is impracticable to avoid some hard choices, it is incoherent or epistemically unjustifiable to reject pro-truth theory because it can involve hard choices (and some reducible ambiguity).

An above-mentioned example is relevant here:- Sally is 20 years old and Jim is 60. Both have a fatal but curable disease which will kill within a month unless treated. But due to limited medical resources, only one can be cured. Suppose, as far as we can tell, that both will be equally pro-truth, each future year. Sally probably has about 60 future years, and Jim only 15. It would be most pro-truth to discriminate in favour of Sally[197], and give her the cure. If Jim was truly pro-truth, and hence objective, he would impartially accept this. Here Jim would be unselfish, making the ultimate sacrifice. This is the epistemically justifiably fairest decision[198]. This hard choice is the “lesser of two evils”. It would be the least hard because all concerned would know it is the most unselfish and most justifiable. (Also, if Jim was objective, he’d know that all the available evidence suggests that, after one’s death, there is nothing — all experience ceases[199]. So, as an ancient Greek said, death is nothing to fear. An objective, pro-truth Jim would not fear his death[200]. He’d not miss not being alive.)

The just-mentioned severely intellectually disabled person presumably lacks Jim’s pro-truth judgemental ability. This person cannot make an unselfish, pro-truth choice in that recently-mentioned situation concerning educational resource distribution, or if this person also had the fatal disease and only two could be cured. Still, someone has to make the choice. To allegedly do nothing would in fact still be a choice. It would be the choice to only allegedly do nothing, but, hence, effectively, it would be the choice, e.g., to let all three die. So those with the opportunity and ability to decide need to decide impartially (in relation to the justifiable), e.g., via hypothetically asking what would be most pro-truth to have done to them if they became severely intellectually disabled, or via hypothetically asking what the real disabled person would do if he or she somehow had pro-truth judgement. This is all that is practicable, regarding making the most epistemically justifiable choice concerning those individuals as such. Pro-truth judges here and elsewhere can only decide on the basis of ‘what is justified here as far as we can know’, and that is inherently the most epistemically justifiable basis. Regarding Jim and Sally, where only one can be cured, then if all that is known here is as stated, Jim should die instead of Sally. This is the least sad choice. And so on.

However, the ‘as far as we can know’ may involve further issues. With this, that discussion of Jim and Sally only considered them as individuals as such:-

Situational relativity[201] could apply to Jim and Sally, meaning the above hypothetical judgement needs changing. The above situation involved Jim and Sally, as individuals, being equally helpful per year of remaining life regarding developing a more pro-truth world, if cured. But individuals do not exist in isolation, with isolated effects. Suppose Sally has only one person, Brian, who loves her directly and who, hence, would miss and grieve over Sally more than insignificantly if she died. Suppose there are twenty persons who will miss and grieve over Jim to the same degree, a major degree. This degree, as far as can be known, will probably reduce each person’s pro-truth effectiveness by 40 percent on average, for 3 years. This would mean, say, 40x3 anti-truth units per bereaved person. So, for Sally to die, there’d probably be 120 anti-truth units, i.e., for one other person, Brian. If Jim dies, there’d be 2,400, i.e., among twenty persons. Suppose we have a fairly accurate likely score for Jim’s potential post-cure individual pro-truth achievements, and add this to that 2,400. We do the equivalent for Sally. Suppose the overall possible scores mean that Jim’s death is likely to have much more anti-truth effect overall than Sally’s.

Above, the possibility of controlling emotions was discussed. Emotions such as anger and hate tend to be controllable, especially via meditation and highest-level mature reflection. However, from my training as a psychologist, and personal experience, it seems to me that, for a considerable time at least, to a major degree, normal humans tend to have little control over grief felt due to the actual or highly-likely death of or desertion by a much-loved person[202]; and such grief greatly affects one’s cognitive ability. If so, discussions concerning what the most epistemically justifiable decision is need to consider any grief likely to occur as a result of (or in anticipation of) this or that decision.

So, if some such grief is unavoidable, Sally and Brian, if trying to do the most pro-truth thing, would unselfishly decide that Sally should be sacrificed.

There are clearly other possible similar situations here — and elsewhere. E.g., regarding severely intellectually disabled persons, intelligent pro-truth persons with normal emotions may feel upset and guilty if the disabled are given meagre resources. The effect may be similar to that concerning grief. Even if extra resources only make the disabled more comfortable, as opposed to becoming more pro-truth individuals as such, giving such extra resources may have more pro-truth effects on the population overall than if more resources were not given to intellectually disabled persons. (The situation with animals’ comfort is similar[203].) With such issues, persons able to make informed, pro-truth decisions need to reach a democratic consensus on what the most pro-truth balance seems to be, based on present knowledge (and/or provisional plausible judgement?).

Different situations can mean different judgements are required — yet all in relation to the one ultimate standard: ‘Do what is overall most pro-truth (as far as you know)’. And, of course, we cannot fully know how to precisely calculate such things as degrees of missing a person, anti-truth units, and so on. We can only act on the best knowledge we have, which may be limited or fallible. It is often only practicable to have probable knowledge, e.g., of the future. Yet we do know, for instance, that normal persons can for years lose much of their motivation and abilities if they lose a much-loved person, through death, desertion, betrayal or whatever. We can also know that some persons would be missed and grieved over much more than others, and that the length and/or type of lives certain people will probably have are very different. We can ask those who could be bereaved to honestly estimate the degree to which they would be upset in an anti-truth way, contexted via knowledge of previous similar bereavements, and make some estimate regarding the likely future of persons. So, at least often, we can have some probable approximate evidence in such cases. And, again, we can only act on what we can most probably know, or on the only available, limited knowledge and/or fallible estimates. To ask for full knowledge in such cases is impracticable, and hence epistemically unjustifiable. (It is epistemically justifiable that here we fully know we don’t have full knowledge.) If we choose to ignore the little we do know, and allegedly do nothing, we are thereby doing something, as argued above. We are thereby doing something even more epistemically unjustifiable and irresponsible. It is true that in cases like Sally’s and Jim’s, someone must do what many call ‘playing god’. So the decision-maker(s) must choose between doing this on the basis of either (a) considering all the (perhaps very limited) evidence or probable evidence there is, (b) on the basis of ignoring it[204], or (c) allegedly doing nothing due to thinking there needs to be more evidence, which is unavailable until it is too late, e.g., until both Sally and Jim die of the disease; or (d) refusing to make a decision due to being too afraid (weak) and irresponsible, thereby allowing those even-worse tragic consequences; and so on. Only (a) is epistemically justifiable. Importantly, to the degree that (a) involves trial-and-error, trial-and-error can mean we get closer to the truth by learning what not to do next time.

Those examples, of difficult educational, medical and economic issues, have implications for the type of democracy which would make the most pro-truth decisions. Again, e.g., it needs to be evidence-based, and unselfish. Next, another such economic example, with the same general types of implications:-

As argued before, U H/I E/T implies sharing resources universally, unselfishly. To achieve this, one pro-truth truth is that we have to go from where we are. We are (in 2004) in a fairly anti-truth situation here in that capitalism is dominant, there are separate countries, and a small number of them have enormous wealth, at least somewhat at the expense of the vast number of poorer countries. Some are so poor that, e.g., they have no hope of supplying an even somewhat pro-truth education universally to their citizens. Some cannot even feed all their citizens. So, many potentially highly pro-truth persons have died.

(The following economic discussion involves some speculation, or some somewhat-educated guesses. I’m not an economist. However, much of what various economists see as objective economic theory involves subjective alterable moral choices by the persons largely constituting the subject matter of that allegedly objective economics — and such choices and related matters are my field.)

Given the widely-accepted selfish moral values in the rich countries, it would seem difficult to motivate the rich to fairly share out what is needed to make all about equally wealthy. (This would require a pro-truth re-education of values, which would take some time.) Also, to share out that much wealth quickly may make it less practicable to develop the world to a certain highly pro-truth stage than if only some is shared out. To initially distribute wealth equally could plunge the world into a state so economically depressed and unproductive that, to reach that highly pro-truth stage would take many decades. That equal distribution could reduce all in the world to below the level of the lowest economic class in the USA. It may be quicker, and hence more pro-truth, if all in the highly economically-productive countries had, say, the wealth of the lower-middle class in USA, i.e., temporarily more than in the poorer countries. Any surplus in the richer countries after that redistribution would be used to help the poorer countries. All in the richer countries would then still have enough wealth, e.g., to buy things produced by factory workers, who would thereby get paid, and could pay enough taxes for the infrastructure (e.g., electricity and roads) needed by poorer countries to maintain efficient factories, farms, schools, etc. (Sometimes, extra temporary help from the richer countries may also be needed, e.g., to prevent a famine.)

This, if it happened world-wide, could increasingly mean that, while all in the previously richer countries stayed at, say, their previous USA lower-middle class economic level, or only got wealthier[205] marginally, the poorer countries could catch up, achieving world-wide personal[206] economic equality quicker than via any other redistribution. This seems to me the outcome which is the pro-truth fairest[207], and perhaps the most achievable. Then the whole world could advance economically, harmoniously, at about the same rate.

It is important to note that the increased productivity is not for its own sake. It is also not increased productivity aiming at producing an increase in goods (desired things) as such. It would not aim to give more people more selfishly-desired things. It would not aim to give persons more cars, more electronic games, more unneeded, polluting, plastic toys/gadgets, and so on, as such. Those are aims of various capitalist economies and types of utilitarianism. The increased productivity would also not be aimed at giving nation-states more power, e.g., through more destructive weapons. (There would, ideally, be no nations.)

Instead, the increased productivity would have justifiable aims, involving justifiable progress. It would, e.g., aim at increased pro-truth efficiency, including maximally durable and recyclable, environmentally-friendly products. This efficiency would, e.g., (i) give workers more time and energy etc, i.e., more freedom, to do other pro-truth (and a-truth) things, such as have better education, better health, better family life and better recreation. This progress would involve replacing some workers with robots, freeing these workers to do more human work, namely work only humans can do and find meaningful, e.g., giving pro-truth, affectionate care to lonely persons, or very young or old persons. (ii) Produce the pro-truth resources needed to achieve things as in (i). (iii) Involve maintaining a longest-term sustainable pro-truth physical environment. This includes maintaining a great deal of nature as it is. (TV environmental programs such as David Suzuki’s make some points which suggest various pro-truth justifications[208] for this.)

Various points above imply that occupational health and safety would be a far higher priority than efficiency or productivity. Death, injury and psychological suffering of workers, and the negative effects these have on friends, family etc, would be disharmonious with the benevolence, unselfish sharing and social harmony needed for all to be optimally pro-truth. Humans are the greatest and only direct pro-truth resource: only humans can embody and achieve the pro-truth standard/end. Selfishly putting profit or productivity before humans is hence unjustifiable. Productivity is only justifiable relative to or as a means to help human pro-truth achievements. All other pro-truth resources, and the degree of efficiency of production of them, are means to that human end.

Many resources are limited, and always will be. So, pro-truth resources-as-a-whole will always be somewhat limited, regardless of how much more efficient our productivity becomes. This means such things as hard economically-related choices will never be entirely avoidable. It means that some things, which could be a-truth if there were sufficient overall resources, are anti-truth due to limited resources. E.g., suppose that, if the world’s overall resources were unlimited, it would be a-truth to hold a certain type of lavish concert each day in every city, or for everyone to have whatever trivial/unneeded cosmetic plastic surgery they liked, anytime. Yet because we don’t have unlimited resources, the resources needed to provide the concerts and cosmetic surgery are needed for pro-truth purposes, e.g., education and life-saving surgery. Here it is anti-truth to use the resources for the concerts and cosmetic surgery.

Of course, if productive efficiency and conservation of resources increase, we can increasingly have more freedom (resources) to do more a-truth things we like, and more pro-truth things we need to do. But there will be limits to that increase.

U H/I E/T implies that, as far as is practicable, as an aspect of unselfishness, the economic and other benefits and the burdens of living in a pro-truth society should be shared universally[209]. That is, there would be universal harmony (reciprocity) here, regarding achieving the epistemically justifiable. Here, it is unjustified to make an exception of oneself[210], e.g., by withdrawing from society, or by taking more or contributing less than is optimally pro-truth over all persons. So, e.g., if it is optimally pro-truth for a group to share some work equally, it is not justifiable for one of the group to selfishly secretly not bother to put in an equal effort, saying, “My little bit of laziness won’t matter”. (Similarly for theft, littering and so on.) Such acts are unjustifiable because they conflict with universal harmony among persons regarding achieving the epistemically justifiable. (This is something like Kant’s argument here.)

Pro-truth rights (benefits) harmonise overall[211] with pro-truth responsibilities (burdens, or obligations). Benefits and burdens would be shared universally, where practicable. The economy would be a ‘pro-truth fair-share’ economy. This would be similar in some ways to a type of socialism, but with many major differences. (It would certainly be radically different from economies such as Stalinist-communism’s economy.)

Karl Marx (who I think would also have opposed Stalinist communism,) said something like: ‘To each according to their needs, from each according to their abilities’. This can be re-interpreted in a pro-truth way here. One implication of U H/I E/T here is that in a pro-truth society all able persons would be employed. They would all have a right and associated duty to work as hard as each other on average. (Such things would be hard to measure, but we can only do what is practicable.) They would work towards an optimally pro-truth society, e.g., by optimally efficient production of pro-truth food, transport and so on. This includes the (re)production, and hence optimal care, of children. So, e.g., factory workers and those who work at home caring for their children would all be doing epistemically justifiable work. The latter is a crucial, human-focused and hence often direct pro-truth responsibility. Hence it is epistemically justifiable that they all get pay and recognition.

A fully pro-truth society would consider everyone worthwhile, due to everyone fairly sharing both the benefits and burdens as far as they are able. E.g., infants would be considered worthwhile in that they are potentially persons with a capacity for such fairness[212]. One’s character is of pro-truth worth to the degree that one tries to the best of one’s ability to achieve the epistemically justifiable. As this is all that is practicable for an individual, this is all that is epistemically justifiable to say concerning an individual’s character. Thence, it is possible for all persons to have a pro-truth virtuous character.

Many pro-truth achievements can be achieved by persons other than intellectually brilliant persons. This means each able person could be an individually-optimal pro-truth achiever[213]. The end, ‘learning and practising pro-truth truths’, means a network (harmony) of achievements, or of causal chains — each individual link of which is needed. Apart from individual end-achievements here, and interrelated with them, U H/I E/T implies there is also a general, social end. This involves many individuals’ differing practices harmonising. That general, social end does not need all to be brilliant discoverers of complex pro-truth truth. That end requires only some such persons. It requires different practices. It also requires all able persons to be practisers of whichever pro-truth truths they are able to practise. An individual is achieving that end if the individual, e.g., cares for others and the environment in pro-truth ways, e.g., by keeping city streets clean, thereby helping citizens live in an attractive, healthy environment. Pro-truth society would need every able person’s contributions. U H/I E/T implies there would be a valued contribution by all able persons.

Pro-truth theory’s focus on practicability and universal harmony, along with the cumulatively achievable nature of its end, discussed in Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3, implies that its end is an end practicable for all who try to achieve it. Each person who individually-optimally contributes, thereby participates in that general, social end as far as is practicable for an individual. This individual has achieved an individually-practicable justified end. Hence all can deserve respect as end-achievers. (If all feel they can achieve a justifiable theory’s end, this would help make the theory universally motivatable. Anything less conflicts with the justified and justificatory notion, ‘universal harmony ...’.)

So, in a fully pro-truth society, all individuals would be equal via equally contributing to the best of their ability, i.e., as far as is practicable. Each person’s intentions, efforts/dedication and achievements would be as pro-truth as individually possible. So here, regarding what is practicable, all would be epistemically justifiably equal. Again, pro-truth society involves all practicable types of justifiable (as well as a-truth) egalitarianism.

There would be some areas where it is most pro-truth to have inequality, namely a hierarchy. Above, the example of an expert driving instructor and a non-driving pupil applies. Clearly, it would be anti-truth to have a dangerous non-driver in charge of a car instead of an expert safe driver. Another common example:- If you need life-saving brain surgery, would it be justifiable to trust an expert brain surgeon or your medically-ignorant friend to operate? Or would you allow all in the hospital (cleaners, clerks too) to have an equal (mostly uninformed) vote on what specifically to do at each step of the operation? Or would you allow all to equally participate in the operation?

However, that expert surgeon may belong at the bottom of a hierarchy concerning social skills, teaching or repairing cars or computers. The fully pro-truth expert in some situation would, in other situations, state “Here your knowledge is superior, so you should decide or tell me what to do”. Or, most generally, regarding specific abilities: ‘Whoever has the best pro-truth knowledge or skills in an area should decide in that area’. The ‘whoever’ can be someone else, or oneself. Regarding being pro-truth in general, all persons can be equal via all agreeing that the most epistemically justifiable thing ought to be done, or that oneself should try to be optimally pro-truth. Here, concerning this most important, overall issue, there would be epistemically justifiable equality. If all agree on this most general guideline, whatever is specifically needed is more likely to be achieved than if they don’t all agree. So this area is the most crucial, overall. It is primary in that it is that agreement, that justified general decision, which leads to all specific intended pro-truth achievements: it comes first. And here, where all in a fully pro-truth society would agree, there would be no hierarchy.

(Such points, and those in the next few paragraphs, have implications for the types of education and democracy[214] appropriate for a pro-truth society.)

The required specific hierarchies would also involve egalitarianism in that they’d involve mutual helpfulness and respect in relation to that same, shared, overall aim. Equally highly knowledgeable experts in the same or in different area(s) are equal regarding pro-knowledge knowledge as such. But their justified end aim is ‘Be pro-knowledge’, which involves practising in a pro-knowledge way – the end is not pro-knowledge knowledge as such. Pro-truth persons less able to achieve high-knowledgeability are equal to all other pro-truth persons if they all intend to, and hence do, achieve to the best of their ability. This is justifiable equality, along with being the only practicable equality here among humans. A universally practicable theory or egalitarianism does not expect impracticable equality. A pro-truth theory inherently has a firm grasp on reality. If each individual puts in their individually-practicable optimal effort, then the differences among individuals’ achievements are due to factors outside the individual’s control and responsibility, e.g., the genes one is born with, the time one has (been alive and has hence) had to learn skills, and unintended effects of one’s efforts. So the differences in achievements are due to arbitrary factors — luck. It would be unrealistic and a mistake (epistemically unjustifiable) to believe oneself to be justifiably superior to another person, and hence not respect the other person, due to arbitrary factors, or luck. Where each person makes an individually-optimal effort, all persons in any hierarchy here need to recognise that each person’s position in the hierarchy is only because of arbitrary, unintended factors. Again, there is practicable equality here. (Something similar, concerning arbitrariness and equality, applies regarding unalterable, unchosen a-truth aspects of persons.)

In any hierarchy, whether pro-truth overall or not, there needs be at least some social harmony in relation to the practicable truths involved. E.g., an expert engineer working for an anti-truth, racist dictatorship cannot supervise making weapons to kill the hated race unless, e.g., farmers have grown food to keep the engineer alive, unless someone has dug a mine to reach the metals needed for weapons, unless someone removes garbage which would otherwise lead to the engineer dying of cholera, unless someone teaches the engineer to read when young, unless someone cared for the engineer when young, and so on. Any so-called ‘individual achievements’ are socially-contexted: they are social achievements to a major degree, from an overall viewpoint. Any individual, to exist beyond birth, must at least have been cared for as a child. And the mother must have been cared for, not killed by others. And so on. In sum, any individual’s place in a hierarchy is not the individual’s achievement as such. We are all interdependent to a major, crucial degree. To practice via this truth in an epistemically justifiable way is to practise via U H/I E/T. This involves a type of democracy involving recognition of that interdependence and, hence, respect for each individual who is involved to the best of their ability. This means the universal inclusivity and fairness implied by U H/I E/T.

Pro-truth egalitarian fairness and unselfish helpfulness require flexible hierarchies. Every person above others in some hierarchy, due to this person having more knowledge or other ability, would unselfishly try to help all the others acquire and improve on those abilities. So, e.g., a pro-knowledge teacher would give students the opportunity to become even more knowledgeable than the teacher could be. If a student proved to have more knowledge in some area, the pro-knowledge teacher would ask this student to temporarily be the teacher here. This is egalitarian in that it involves equality of opportunity, with all persons in authority being willing to share power with or relinquish it to others who justifiably deserve it. Justifiable power is relative, relative to the epistemically justifiable. (As Acton said, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”) Situational relativity means flexibility is needed.

Another general point regarding inclusivity concerns treatment of beings who lack the motivation and knowledge-ability to intentionally be pro-truth, though they may have other, potentially pro-truth abilities. We could often find a pro-truth purpose for them, and appreciate them. E.g., a horse will not choose to help make the world more epistemically justifiable; but horses can have the ability to plough fields for growing pro-truth food, provide pro-truth transport, give blood for human pro-truth vaccinations, and be a part of our pro-truth recreation. Similarly, trees give the oxygen needed by pro-truth persons, trees can give pro-truth fruit and aesthetic pleasure. Trees give us shade, which helps us avoid skin cancer, which is anti-truth. And so on.

A similar point can apply to non-living things. E.g., a sunrise can give pro-truth aesthetic pleasure and warmth. Similarly for food, clothes, art and much else. In such ways, pro-truth inclusivity can apply to all forms of life, and to everything in the universe, except for things which negatively affect pro-truth things, abilities, motivation or opportunities, e.g., cancer, the hole in the ozone layer, crop diseases, mental illness, nationalism, religion, morality, capitalism and the typical politician (though politicians can change).

Any representative discussion of inclusivity needs to consider multi-culturalism. In some societies with a multi-cultural policy, some anti-truth cultural views are permitted or even encouraged. Here (expedient) inclusivity is given priority over the epistemically justifiable. E.g., some very sexist minority cultures[215] in Australia are seen by the allegedly non-sexist government as deserving to be maintained largely intact, i.e., without altering the sexism much. Or, some politicians think it is politically astute to flatter a minority sexist culture if it has significant voting power. Similarly, to a major degree some minority (and dominant) cultures at least implicitly inhibit the search for pro-truth truth, e.g., via inhibiting the divergent thinking, rationality, skepticism and self-criticism needed for a pro-truth society. Such aspects of a culture need altering. (Education is the best long-term solution here.)

Yet, apart from such things as religion and moral beliefs, many aspects of perhaps all minority cultures could justifiably remain in a pro-truth society. A-truth cultural differences could flourish. There are probably a-truth aspects in every culture. It would only be unjustifiable to maintain anti-truth cultural differences. Clearly, pro-truth cultural aspects would be encouraged. Some cultural differences can give us pro-truth knowledge. E.g., epidemiological research may show that the normal diet in a culture other than one’s own can have more pro-truth health effects than one’s own culture’s normal diet. (E.g., comparisons between the main Southern-European diet, low in saturated fats, and the traditional English diet, high in saturated fats, seem to show that the former has more pro-truth potential.)

In conclusion here:- Inclusivity for the sake of inclusivity, or for some questionable political advantage, or diversity for the sake of diversity, is not epistemically justifiable. Inclusivity or diversity that is for the sake of the epistemically justifiable is clearly epistemically justifiable. Inclusivity or diversity irrelevant to the epistemically justifiable is fine.

In Part II, Chapter 1, Section 5, it was pointed out that we are necessarily at least minimally pro-truth, e.g., because all our serious statements are at least implicitly prefaced by ‘It is true that’. Associated with this is presumably an at least minimal necessary motivation to be pro-truth[216]. We would not have beliefs, and believe them to be true, unless we were at least subconsciously minimally motivated to do so.

However, regarding what persons believe are justified ends, this motivation might only be associated with persons believing that their anti-truth moral or religious delusions are the truth. So here the minimal motivation might only involve false beliefs. Here one would only be “theoretically” or ‘prefacingly’ pro-truth. That is, that universal prefacing means one would be universally motivated to be pro-truth concerning beliefs, but, in effect, not actually achieve knowledge (of the truth) here[217]. One’s belief here would not be the truth. However, the minimal motivation to be pro-truth must involve truth in other areas, in practice. E.g., humans intentionally achieve various things, and they must know how to achieve them. To achieve them, we must achieve (i.e., know) the relevant knowledge. Persons with false beliefs concerning the justifiability of ends, if they are to intentionally achieve those ends, namely via means they choose, must still know how to achieve them. Such persons could be motivated to be pro-truth only in that, in effect, they want knowledge of how best to achieve their anti-truth moral or religious aims. This is being in-effect merely instrumentally pro-truth. (So one’s being motivated to be at least minimally pro-truth can be contexted in one being primarily anti-truth.)

An area where all humans who survive at least partly via their intentions must be instrumentally pro-truth is the survival area. We tend to be naturally motivated to be more than theoretically pro-truth. We have also evolved a motivation to be actually pro-truth in survival-necessary, practical areas[218].

To survive it is more helpful if an animal’s choices regarding such things as food are directed by knowledge rather than by ignorance or false beliefs. E.g., if an animal believes poisonous things are healthy food, the animal will die. If an animal believes that jumping off cliffs is a way to quench thirst or satisfy sexual desire, the animal will die. If an animal is only capable of ignorance here, and has no instinctual skills here, it will die (unless amazingly lucky). If genes help cause such beliefs or ignorance, the genes are not likely to be passed on. All else equal, a gene will be selected out if it produces a brain which predisposes an animal to such ignorance or to value practices unlikely to lead to knowledge concerning survival of the animal and any offspring. So, natural selection has resulted in our genes normally giving us the ability to acquire knowledge, i.e., pro-knowledge ability, and in genes motivating us to use that capacity to learn and value practices which lead to survival-necessary knowledge[219]. These practices include observing and remembering observed evidence concerning how to survive. Crucial here is the practice of valuing such other pro-truth practices.

In sum, we are naturally motivated to be more than minimally theoretically pro-truth.

The term ‘minimally pro-truth’ includes that theoretical, universal prefacing, plus one’s practical instrumental degree, which is at least one’s survival-necessary degree. Yet, further, normal humans seem to have evolved to at least sometimes feel it is intrinsically motivating to discover truth fairly generally, i.e., to be more than minimally pro-truth. With this, many tend to regard truth or knowledge as being of justifiable intrinsic value and hence worth pursuing. And we can find it challenging, worthwhile, to solve a problem, i.e., to acquire knowledge. Normal persons have a powerfully motivating curiosity instinct (though some types of society stifle this somewhat). That is, humans tend to be naturally motivated to seek truth, or at least to seek truth in many areas apart from where they (often falsely) believe they know the truth. It is an evolutionary advantage to have a somewhat open desire and capacity for knowledge, because our survival depends on adapting to our environments — and what the environment one is born into might be, or might change into, or where one might move to, is to some major degree unpredictable. So, a somewhat open motivation to acquire knowledge can be, on-average, adaptive. The flexibility associated with this openness makes it more likely we can know how to survive in hot deserts, jungles, snow, on the sea, under the sea, in cities and so on, and at times of war, peace, disease, crop-failure and so on. Yet because it is a somewhat open motivation, we are motivated to seek knowledge in areas beyond the obvious survival areas. E.g., humans seek knowledge concerning piano-construction, ancient now-unspoken languages, chess and hobbies such as bottle-top collecting. Many are interested in philosophy. ‘Philosophy’ means ‘the love of knowledge’. This general, open love (motivation) leaves the way open for seeking knowledge about how one should live.

That motivation to seek truth involves natural rewards, which are further motivating here. As Kant suggests, we naturally tend to respect ourselves for being rational. Self-respect is motivating. Rationality is the method we use to achieve our curiosity instinct’s aim, by learning something new, or solve a problem, i.e., acquire knowledge. With this, we are naturally motivated to avoid cognitive dissonance, i.e., the frustrating realisation that there is a lack of harmony among our beliefs, or that we seem to be thinking something that is untrue. We feel rewarded if we remove the dissonance or frustration, the conflict. This reward, along with the associated type of peace, is clearly most securely achieved in the long-term by achieving harmony with the truth[220].

That open motivation can be directed and built on by our choosing to do so. It can be aimed more directly and fully at the pro-truth. This is more likely if persons know that their aim, this end, is justified, and that no other end is justifiable. Here pro-truth education is vital. Persons can thereby come to know that the only coherent notion of ‘justified’ is ‘epistemically justified’. They can learn that the only epistemically justifiable end is to achieve the epistemically justifiable, which implies U H/I E/T or being pro-truth. They can learn that all alternative theories concerning how one should live are delusions, i.e., unjustifiable beliefs. As Part II, Chapter 1, Sections 3 and 4 imply, they can learn there is empirical evidence that alternative theories are unjustifiable, and that U H/I E/T is justified via empirical evidence.

Such knowledge is re-assuring, i.e., motivating. That is, if one can know that (as far as one can know) one is doing what is justified or justifiably permitted, and that there is rationally undeniable evidence for at least the general guidelines here, this gives one emotional security.

Moral and religious beliefs can give emotional security, but because these lack evidence, this security is highly vulnerable to epistemically justifiable skeptical attacks — showing it was based on an epistemic vacuum. An epistemically justifiable practical theory lacks such vulnerability.

However, pro-truth emotional security is not the total security offered by unquestioning, ignorantly arrogant totalitarian moral or religious-moral theories, which claim falsely to possess all truth, or all important truths (or The Truth, as opposed to epistemically justifiable scientific etc truth). Part of pro-truth knowledge is the knowledge that our knowledge is limited, and that we can be fallible. So, an optimal, at least minor degree of self-questioning is pro-truth, within associated epistemically unproblematic, invulnerable general guidelines.

Still, if we have a practical theory as close to truth as is presently possible, and know that we are still far from knowing all the specific truths here, this would mean more reliable security and be more motivating than the vacuum or despair that can come from merely knowing that all morality is unknowable, and delusional. (Similarly regarding religion.)

And, again, we can improve on our presently limited knowledge, via the just-mentioned curiosity and a justified desire to know more of the epistemically justifiable. This improvement, and knowledge of further improvability, would give us even more motivating re-assurance. And so on.

Above, pro-truth theory was said to be somewhat interpretable in terms of virtues and flourishing[221] (or similar). More on this claim concerning virtues:-

Virtues must relate to something specific. The notion, ‘virtue’, is in itself too abstract to be unambiguously practicable, and similarly for any specific thing someone calls a ‘virtue’. E.g., bravery is often said to be a virtue; but one cannot simply be brave — one must be brave in some specific way. One can only be brave, e.g., in climbing mountains, in war, in cutting three of one’s fingers off to qualify to join a Tough Persons Club, in taking risks to steal bottle-tops to increase one’s collection, in questioning one’s cherished, comforting moral or religious beliefs; and so on. (As an analogy, we cannot just have ‘yellow’, we must have, e.g., yellow shoes, yellow paint, and so on. It is impracticable to send someone to go shopping for ‘a yellow’. It is only practicable to shop for, e.g., yellow shoes.)

If something called a ‘virtue’ can be specifically related to being pro-truth, the virtue is indirectly epistemically justifiable. Virtues have traditionally been moral notions, with all the problems that these involve[222]. Yet at least some traits often regarded as virtues can relate to the epistemically justifiable, via them being a means to achieve the epistemically justifiable, or by defining them in relation to the epistemically justifiable so that they are synonyms for a pro-truth duty. The just-mentioned bravery in questioning one’s cherished, comforting moral or religious beliefs can be a means or step towards becoming optimally pro-truth. Similarly for being brave in war against a enemy who, like Pol Pot, aims to destroy libraries, kill well-educated people, and so on. This can be epistemically justifiable, a justifiable virtue.

The pro-truth aim concerning war and peace involves a virtue, a qualified pacifism. The best or only way to achieve a justified peace could be via aggressively fighting anti-truth, anti-peace enemies, i.e., enemies who cannot or will not be persuaded to become peaceful, pro-truth persons. Such pacifism, along with fighting such enemies bravely, aiming to achieve a just(ified) peace, is the overall pro-truth virtue here.

The most general pro-truth virtue and duty is ‘Be pro-truth’. This includes protecting and promoting the pro-truth freedoms and rights of all to criticise, to be educated, fed, cared for and so on, in pro-truth ways — and bravery may be needed for this. If terms such as ‘honourable’ have any epistemically justifiable meaning, they would involve fulfilling such duties.

That most general virtue involves the specific virtue of universal benevolence to all at least potentially pro-truth beings, mentioned above. Various other specific virtues are implied by that most general duty, and are suggested representatively in previous sections, except that more needs to be said regarding our treatment of other animals:-

Above, when discussing Jim and Sally’s fatal disease, and the treatment given to severely intellectually disabled persons, it was pointed out that if other persons are upset by what happens to someone they love or indirectly care for, this can have anti-truth effects. Something similar can apply regarding non-human animals. Many persons are upset if they know animals are being treated cruelly. (As suggested at least indirectly above, such persons tend to be those with the most pro-truth potential overall.) Getting upset can lessen persons’ ability and motivation to be pro-truth. (So kindness to animals is needed, to develop that potential or maintain/increase that ability and motivation.)

Further, as Kant and many psychologists point out, if children grow up knowing that animals are treated cruelly, the children can come to accept it as normal and hence as acceptable. Then, this can be generalised. That is, the acceptance of cruelty to animals can spread, so that the children come to accept cruelty to persons. Cruelty to persons seems definitely anti-truth[223]. Certainly it is anti-truth to feel that cruelty is generally acceptable or that it is acceptable except to oneself and one’s ingroup.

So, indirectly and derivatively, this gives animals the pro-truth right to not be treated cruelly. This means that kindness to animals is a pro-truth virtue. Here then, there would be harmony among human and non-human animals, in relation to the epistemically justifiable.

Kindness (benevolence) is one of various virtues that need to be learnt at as early an age as possible. Because kindness can also generalise, it is justifiable for children to be encouraged to be kind to animals, as training for later treating their own children in the optimally pro-truth way. (Parents who encourage such learning possess one of many parental or educative virtues.) (A virtuous, justifiable mass media here would not, e.g., have films which can promote an acceptance of generalisable cruelty or violence.)

Another reason why kindness to animals is a pro-truth virtue is that animals, treated kindly, can help provide pro-truth therapy for many persons. Animals need to be included in pro-truth universal harmony.

Various of those points regarding treatment of non-human animals can be adapted to apply to those humans who, at least temporarily and/or at least partly, also lack the capacities of normal human adults. Many humans lack, e.g., the power, competence, health, intelligence, rationality, awareness and hence accountability of normal human adults. Such lacks mostly occur in children. They also occur in the very sick, some of the very old, all the significantly intellectually disabled, the mentally ill and so on. If there are any persons significantly poorer than other citizens, some of such lacks occur in those persons too. (However, in an inherently kind, fair pro-truth society there would be no rich and poor.)

Another virtue issue concerning kindness:- Kindness is related to the unselfishness involved in being pro-truth, and they both imply being considerate and appreciative, as does the notion ‘harmony (among persons, and concerning the relationship between the burdens and benefits of pro-truth society)’. Those notions imply types of social manners, e.g., saying ‘Please’ and ‘Thankyou’ in relation to sharing pro-truth resources. Such manners are a pro-truth virtue. They can help motivate people to be more pro-truth.

As I’m trying to avoid a lengthy book, I’ll discuss only one more general virtue, and one possibly apparent specific pro-truth virtue which is not pro-truth and implies that being untruthful can be a pro-truth virtue. Then I’ll finish this section with a few comments on Rawls’s theory in relation to virtue:-

This general virtue, integrity, goes with or is a way of structurally describing the most general virtue – overall pro-truth dutifulness. In order to be optimally dutiful, one needs pro-truth integrity. That is, as suggested previously, one needs the optimal pro-truth integration and hence systematic balance among all the specific virtues. E.g., one should not concentrate only or mainly on the narrow, cerebral aspects of being epistemically justifiable. This concentration would involve the too-narrow, anti-truth view of what ‘epistemic justifiability’ means, discussed above. An overall integrating would include the orthogonal interrelating of the pro- and a-truth in one’s life overall, and involve an interrelated cognitive-emotional flourishing (discussed further soon), and all the virtues therein involved. That is, only here do we have a justifiable, orthogonal, fully human notion of ‘overall integrity’.

Aristotle’s virtue theory’s notion of a highest-level, integrating ‘nous’ can be somewhat re-interpreted to fit with pro-truth theory’s notion of the epistemically justifiable highest-possible holistically-integrating level of thought — the only level capable of achieving that integration/integrity. This level involves the overall cognitive virtue — epistemically justifiable wisdom, the structural aspect of which is that integration, i.e., the associated virtue, integrity. As shown above, and below (e.g., Part II, Chapter 4), an epistemically justifiable version of what ‘integrity’ means is the only version not involving self-contradiction, or contradiction of one’s primary self.

This virtue involves a main theme of the book – peace, and hence the virtue ‘pro-truth peacefulness’, in that a fully integrated system means a lack of conflict. Pro-truth integrity means this peace within a person, and peace among persons who possess pro-truth integrity. That orthogonal integrity involves all those persons sharing the same primary aim, and, thence, the pro-truth truth that persons’ a-truth preferences and unavoidable a-truth differences need to be treated as a-truth, as irrelevant regarding that shared aim. This integration avoids conflict among persons, helping to achieve that peace. Universal individual pro-truth integrity would mean universal justifiable integration (harmony) among persons. This gives us U H/I E/T.

The claim that honesty is inherently, necessarily, a pro-truth virtue could seem plausible. After all, being honest means telling the truth. However, life and the pro-truth are not that simple. There are different types of truth. As Part II, Chapter 1, Sections 1-3 argued, an overall view shows that some truths can be anti-truth. This means that total honesty, or honesty as such, is not necessarily a pro-truth virtue:-

If we aim at the end ‘Be pro-truth’, it may sometimes help to be untruthful. Here we promote a pro-truth false belief in someone else. This sounds paradoxical or inconsistent, but there is no conflict with the epistemically justifiable end or standard. Here, something like ‘Sometimes you need to be cruel to be kind’ applies. For example:- Pro-truth parents might lie to a child-murderer concerning their children’s whereabouts, with the expected result that their children live longer and so develop their potential to be pro-truth. This un-truth would be a means to the pro-truth. Here the murderer would be anti-truth, and it would be a pro-truth virtue to lie to the murderer.

This virtue involves the pro-truth truth that applying the rule, ‘Be untruthful’ here, is in fact applying the ultimate pro-truth standard. This involves the truth that an untruth here is more pro-truth than being truthful to the murderer. That is, there is an ultimate truth or meta-truth here, an overall truth, which is epistemically justified[224].

(Doing such things as saving these children would also result in more pro-truth happiness overall, making the theory more motivatable. In such cases, it is unlikely that parents and most people could be motivated to obey rules such as ‘Always be truthful’.)

Rawls’s theory is a virtue theory in that he says: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” [225]. Yet like the justice-as-fairness basis of the social institutions he advocates, his justice-as-fairness system of thought, i.e., his theory, does not in-effect primarily and explicitly aim at truth, let alone the pro-truth. His theory does not have the epistemically justifiable as its ultimate standard and end.

Rawls’s and any moral theory is a system of thought. So, according to Rawls, and to the epistemically justifiable, the first virtue of a theory concerning how one should live is that it is true, or as close to truth as possible. So, Rawls implies that his theory should be epistemically justifiable. With this, the epistemically justifiable would be the first virtue of a theory of justice. And, in that the just is the justified, the only coherent notion of ‘just’ means ‘epistemically justified’. This suggests that an epistemically justifiable how-should-one-live-justly theory would have the epistemically justifiable as its ultimate standard. Hence, the theory’s end would be ‘Be pro-truth’. Otherwise the theory would be self-contradictory.

With this, as shown above, a type of justice or fairness is a virtue instrumental in optimally achieving the epistemically justifiable. But justice as fairness as such is not epistemically justifiable, because such notions are abstract, and have no unambiguous or single specific meaning. That is, justice or fairness as such is not an epistemically unquestionable ultimate end, or a justifiable first or fundamental virtue or standard. A specific type of justice or fairness is a means to the pro-truth end, but is not that end. (‘Justice’ could be specifically defined as that end, via defining the just as the (epistemically) justified, but that is a separable issue here.)

Rawls’s and other moral theories at least implicitly aim to be true, and unavoidably theoretically or prefacingly aim at truth and are hence minimally pro-truth. In practice, or in-effect, they do not achieve that aim or end, because the only practical theory as close to truth as possible is a pro-truth theory. And, as discussed in Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1, if a theory or theorist aims at truth, and is in that narrow way pro-truth, this in itself does not mean that truth or being pro-truth is the end, the primary or ultimate end, of the theory. E.g., a horticultural theory could aim at the truth concerning how to cross-pollinate a type of fruit tree. The primary end here is, say, to have fruit to sell. The end here is not truth as such, or pro-truth truth, but truth about fruit. Rawls’s theory’s advocated general end-state of society is a society where all are free to equally achieve their specific ends. These specific ends are selfish[226] ends. An epistemically justifiable end is not explicitly mentioned. Rawls suggests that the role of justice or fairness is as part of the most effective means to achieve those selfish ends for all, e.g., via the type of (morally) fair distribution of resources (money etc) which will achieve the ends. The ends are such things as improving one’s golf, cooking a perfect soufflé and having a vast bottle-top collection. Rawls’s theory suggests that persons in the society he advocates would see such achievements as their primary ends, as the ends they believe they should justifiably achieve – not justice or fairness. They too would see a type of justice or fairness as merely a part of the means to help ensure such ends are achievable by each person, consistent with every other person having similar freedom to achieve their specific selfish ends.

Those desired specific ends are not ranked in any order of importance. Being epistemically just(ified) is not given any priority here. Those ends do not involve any epistemically justifiable virtues, except, occasionally, incidentally. (E.g., golf can help pro-truth fitness. But such co-incidental potentially pro-truth achievements are not intended aims for persons living by Rawls’s theory, and can be nullified by and hence conflict with their other aims under that theory. E.g., a golfer here could drive round the course, due to also aiming at a fairly lazy, pleasurable, overfed life.)

Yet Rawls’s and any other moral theory stating that achieving truth or the epistemically justifiable is a or the primary virtue of theorising about how one should live, leaves the way open for a much wider, overall epistemically justifiable application of that virtue — and hence for a non-self-contradictory theory. This will involve that general, epistemically justifiable virtue, pro-truth integrity. A virtue, end or standard applicable in one area within the how-one-should-live sphere, namely the how-one-should-theorise area, could be applied to the whole sphere. Suppose the virtue involves an epistemically justifiable standard which can be applied holistically to the sphere. Many arguments above show that this is possible, and that it is the only just(ifiable) thing to do.

In sum, as with Kant’s theory, Rawls’s somewhat-Kantian theory can only be an epistemically justifiable virtue theory, and a theory embodying the justifiable first virtue of theories, if it is radically altered. This would make it unrecognisably Rawlsian.

A notion such as ‘flourishing’, meaning something like ‘well-being, fulfilment, involving optimally developing one’s capacities, and involving associated happiness/pleasure’, can also be related to the epistemically justifiable. (The ancient Greek notion of ‘eudaimonia’ is sometimes translated as ‘flourishing’. Aristotle’s ideas here are in part similar to a pro-truth view here.[227]) As with the term ‘virtue’, ‘well-being’ etc are normally moral concepts, and so need to be re-interpreted.

There are different views concerning what ‘flourishing’ (or ‘eudaimonia’)specifically means, or different emphases on different aspects. E.g., Aristotle emphasises virtues. Others include but do not emphasise virtues, or omit virtues. Similarly regarding happiness/pleasure and other notions. A pro-truth interpretation of eudaimonia or flourishing seems to be as follows. (Again, there is only space for representative comments. And many points above can be interpreted to concern pro-truth flourishing.):-

In Part II, Chapter 2, Section 9, I discussed how increased productivity as such, or as under capitalism, is not pro-truth. That discussion relates to pro-truth flourishing or well-being, and, thence, to pro-truth motivation:-

Recently there was a major conference on “The Science Of Well-Being”[228]. This involved research into persons’ sense of long-term well-being or satisfaction with life. It reported that pleasure, as in food, sex, wine and the like, is not in itself a factor in such satisfaction or long-term, overall happiness. Rather, meaningfulness and engagement with persons are the crucial factors here. Pleasure without those factors present is not regarded as important, or meaningful: such pleasure is not a factor here. Pleasure, when it exists along with those crucial factors, becomes a factor. The combination of them all leads to the most satisfaction with life, via a multiplier effect.

Clearly, this can fit with various above-mentioned points in pro-truth theory, and conflicts with none — if the meaningfulness and engagement relate to the epistemically justifiable, and happiness is associated therewith, and with being free to do whatever a-truth thing you like, and so on.

The conference reported that increasing material prosperity, and associated pleasures, as in the capitalist West, does not seem to have lead to increased happiness. There is some evidence there’s been a decrease. Before material prosperity (and hence urbanisation) increased greatly, persons seem to have been more satisfied or happier due to living in small village-type communities, working for purposes mutually deemed worthwhile. Here, engagement and a type of meaningfulness are naturally quite easy. This in part fits with the ‘U H’ in U H/I E/T. A complete fit with U H/I E/T would obviously involve whatever ideas and implications of this book are epistemically justifiable. E.g:- The meaningful engagement easy in small communities can easily be via comforting, groupist religious and moral delusions, which an epistemically justifiable meaningful and engaging life would exclude. A complete fit would involve implementing something like the discussions, e.g., in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, implying it probably being most harmonious with being pro-truth if each person has a village-size close-circle of love and caring, along with indirectly caring for all other persons. There’d be no groupism in a pro-truth world, and hence no outgroups. There would be universal flourishing, via all being engaged in doing what is justifiably meaningful.

Rawls’s theory is in a way aimed at a type of flourishing, in that the maximum possible freedom to achieve desired ends among all persons is their general ultimate aim. Here, in that each person gets as much of the associated fulfilment as is consistent with every other person doing likewise, the aim is for a type of maximum personal fulfilment. This is perhaps plausibly a type of flourishing or well-being, involving happiness. (Yet it could be, especially for selfish persons, merely pleasure). The implications of the conference on “The Science Of Well-Being” could easily apply here, especially for the egoists (selfish persons) Rawls designs his theory for[229]. That is, that type of flourishing would involve all being meaningfully engaged in that they would all be maximally free to get what they want. But the main point here, regarding epistemic justifiability, is that Rawlsian flourishing does not aim at flourishing in an epistemically justifiable direction. Instead, again, the specific personal ends aimed at are not ranked in any order of importance, and could be such things as improving one’s golf, cooking a perfect soufflé and having a vast bottle-top collection. Being optimally pro-truth is not given any priority or even mentioned here. This focus of Rawls’s theory is in part similar to a-truth freedom, but does not derive from, and so it conflicts with, the pro-truth, vertical dimension’s primary focus — overall epistemic justifiability.

Rawls’s theory could be altered to advocate pro-truth flourishing. But, here too, it would become unrecognisably Rawlsian.

The U and H in U H/I E/T suggest that, in order for the world to best achieve universal harmony regarding being epistemically justifiable, the world needs a universal language. Then all can communicate more harmoniously, all else equal. All can thereby better work towards humanity’s epistemically justifiable end. All can more meaningfully engage with each other.

This language, all else equal, needs to be as easily learnable as possible, in order to free mental and educational etc resources needed elsewhere. To achieve this, and to be epistemically justifiable, the language needs to have no contradictions or ambiguities, such as ‘ough’ making contradictory sounds in ‘tough’, ‘cough, ‘although’, through’ etc. A rational version of English seems to me the best present (2004) option.

It could be pro-truth to study other languages, e.g., because comparisons can be helpful, e.g., via seeing that some languages involve less contradictions than English. Here lies a potential pro-truth aspect of multi-cultural diversity. And, if there are sufficient resources, it could be a-truth to speak one or more other culture’s languages besides the universal language.

Within this language, various changes apart from spelling and grammar are epistemically justifiable. E.g:-

Words such as ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ have been argued to refer to delusions, to the epistemically unjustifiable. Such terms are fine to use when moral delusions are being criticised. Otherwise, it would be pro-truth to not use such terms, e.g., as in ‘Fran has very firm, good morals’, which justifiably means ‘Fran has very entrenched delusions concerning how she should live’ (i.e., ‘Fran is insane’).

Instead of such terms, something like ‘epistemically justifiable’ is appropriate. However, this is a long term, so ‘justifiable’ or ‘right’ could be used, with the clear understanding that they mean ‘epistemically justifiable’. Or terms such as ‘pro-truth’ could be used, or a new word. (Uhietic?, as in U H/I E/Tic.)

Terms such as ‘Christmas’, if Christmas and the like are believed in, are anti-truth. They also refer to delusions, to unevidenced, unverifiable beliefs. Still, it can help pro-truth motivation if we have enjoyable holidays, festivals and so on to look forward to and meaningfully engage in. So, instead of Christmas, it could be pro-truth to have a celebration called, say, ‘Givmas’. The ‘mas’ here would be interpreted secularly, non-delusionally, as meaning simply ‘a celebration’. ‘Giv’ would mean ‘give’. The time would involve a celebration of giving, i.e., of the total unselfishness involved with being optimally pro-truth. Some of the symbols of Christmas could be kept, if they can be re-interpreted epistemically justifiably. E.g., a flourishing tree could symbolise pro-truth flourishing; lights could symbolise epistemically justifiable enlightenment. The time could be June 25th, the opposite time of the year, to symbolise epistemically justifiable opposition to the delusions (unenlightenment), the selfishness and so on involved in Christmas. (New Year could remain at January 1st, leaving a similar length of holiday round December 25th, as New Year tends to be a secular celebration. But, e.g., New Year resolutions would need to be resolutions to be more epistemically justifiable.) (The word ‘holiday’ is problematic too, in that its origin is ‘holy day’.)

And so on, for many other terms and related social practices. The only other terms I’ll mention are certain types of swear words, because they are a unique, difficult issue here. Swear words are often used to add a negative connotation to something. Giving X a negative connotation as such seems to me to be fine when X is unjustifiable. ‘X is unjustifiable’ means ‘X is justifiably of negative value’. However, that issue is different from the issue of using sexual words to give the negative connotation[230]. Swear words tend to be sexual or toilet-related or religious[231], and the reasons for this seem to probably involve the powerful influence religion had on morality centuries ago, which still lingers. E.g., the Jewish and Christian religions tend(ed) to view sex and excretion as morally evil or suspect, something to be hidden away and not talked about; and they viewed using religious words negatively as evil. So of course many people used such words, via swearing.

Various arguments above suggest that a religious or moral reason for doing something is unjustifiable, a delusion. So there is no epistemically justifiable reason here for using sexual words to give a negative connotation. With this, points above suggest that sex is hardly necessarily anti-truth or unjustifiable. Indeed, unless sex involves something anti-truth, such as selfishness, insufficiently-informed consent, violence or disease, then sexual behaviour is pro-truth or a-truth. Here it is unjustified to use such words negatively. Justified sex is something very positive, involving unselfishness, mutual care, respect and pleasure. So here, e.g., the content of statements such as ‘Get fucked’, really means wishing that the person spoken to has an enjoyable, justifiable experience. It is like saying “I hope you have a good day”.

PART II, CHAPTER 3, Section 5: Regarding Sexuality, Marriage And Related Matters.

Firstly, importantly, there needs to be justified, free consent. For pro-truth theory, this means those making decisions here need to have sufficient of the epistemic autonomy discussed above[232]. They need the judgement involved therein. The decision cannot be justified unless there are justified, true beliefs involved, i.e., relevant knowledge. E.g., an adult having sex with an allegedly consenting child would involve the adult selfishly using hence-unjustified power, and the child being insufficiently informable and lacking epistemic autonomy. A pro-knowledge theory requires relevant knowledge in all in such situations, and for no-one to be susceptible to grief and so on. For such reasons, rape, a selfish act, is unjustifiable[233].

Next, heterosexuality and/or homosexuality? A footnote, in Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2 , stated something like the following:- ‘Suppose that, somehow, all of one sex turned homosexual (or celibate) and would not help with reproduction. As humanity would die out, the potentially most pro-truth species would be extinct. Here, this sexual preference would be anti-truth, not a-truth. Or, suppose all of one sex died, and so could not help reproduce. It would be anti-truth to have just one sex.. In that sense, a person’s sex is not a-truth.’

A most basic need for an optimally pro-truth world is for humans to exist. So, the most basic pro-truth need regarding sexuality is to reproduce potentially pro-truth persons. Pro-truth reproduction has top priority here. So, in that a type of heterosexuality is necessary for this, that type of heterosexuality has priority over homosexuality and celibacy — though homosexuality is not ruled out.

Arguments elsewhere in this book (and, e.g., the history of the Catholic church,) suggest that celibacy would be anti-truth, and so would need to be ruled out[234]. Apart from that, the issue is more complex. E.g., that type of heterosexuality can merely involve sperm and egg meeting in a laboratory, namely without a male and female having sexual intercourse. As long as at least that sperm-egg meeting occurs, it can be irrelevant whether persons are heterosexual or homosexual. It is irrelevant if all else is equal, e.g., especially, if pro-truth child-care is not disaffected.

But, often, all else is not equal. E.g., normally many more resources are needed to produce so-called ‘test-tube’ babies than via sexual intercourse, and these resources could be needed for other, more pro-truth purposes. E.g., the medical and financial resources could cure diseases, fund education, pay for food for starving people, and so help many more persons, making the world more pro-truth overall. It depends on what is the optimal pro-truth cost-benefit balance among such needs and the needs/wants of would-be homosexual mothers, and so on. And there are other complications. However, there seems nothing epistemically unjustifiable about either homosexuality or heterosexuality as such, and in some situations the choice between them could be a-truth.

Whether a person is homosexual or heterosexual can perhaps be a predisposition due to brain events the person has no control over, e.g., via their genes, or at least an interaction between genes and other physiological and/or social events the person (e.g., when a child) could not control. If someone’s sexual predisposition is hence (probably) unchangeable, it would be anti-truth to try to pressure them to change, e.g., due to the frustration (disharmony) felt. If there is that unchangeable predisposition[235], and the preference is a-truth or as equally pro-truth as the alternative(s), then there is no justification for frustrating a person’s sexual desire.

If sex with another person (i.e., not individual masturbation) is most pro-truth for a heterosexual in a situation where the only available and willing person is not of the opposite sex, then an at least temporary change to homosexuality might be the most pro-truth thing to do. And vice versa. (Being bi-sexual would be useful in such cases.)

If the only way to reduce anti-truth sexual frustration is by masturbation or some other non-anti-truth sex act not involving some other person(s), then, all else equal, the masturbation or whatever is the most pro-truth thing to do.

Regarding censorship, there seems to me no justification for much of the censorship of sex (and nudity) in many present (2004) societies. A great deal of violence is not censored in the media, but sex is heavily censored, often at least indirectly due to religious-based moral views, i.e., delusions, i.e., mistakes[236]. I think that research suggests the reverse would be the most pro-truth thing to do. E.g., for some persons at least, some media violence seems to generalise to how they treat various real persons. An increase in media sex would need to promote only pro-truth or a-truth sex. Points elsewhere in this book suggest that sex on the media (and anywhere) would only be pro-truth if it was contexted, e.g., in mutual care and respect, and was not the primary aim or interest of the persons and media-enterprise involved.

Regarding family or marriage structure, or number of sexual partners, it is likely that the choice among some alternatives could be a-truth. (Religious traditions here need to be censored, ignored.) Provided that the likely long-term outcomes for all, including children, are equally pro-truth, e.g., via there being for those involved no on-average differences regarding physical or mental health problems, and provided there is justifiable free consent (which involves having sufficient knowledge concerning the alternatives, including their likely long-term outcomes), then the choice between, say, communal and monogamous living, might be a-truth.

In much of the world, various arguments in favour of monogamy are widely accepted, and some can be re-interpreted to fit with pro-truth theory. So I won’t say much about them. An argument for the other side:- Communal living might be more pro-truth, all else equal. It means a larger closest-circle of love. E.g., if one parent of a monogamous couple dies, this is likely to leave the surviving parent and their children in a less pro-truth (e.g., grief-stricken and lonely) state than if there were other parents in the family, especially if all in the commune loved each other about equally. However, there are complex issues here. Often all else might not be equal. E.g., it could be easier to achieve optimally pro-truth marital harmony between just two partners, compared to among ten or so. (Such issues need researching, contexted by facts such as: (i) many people can change greatly, perhaps making themselves more motivated and able to live harmoniously in a commune; and (ii) there could be great differences among individuals here, some perhaps unchangeable.)

Whichever of such marriage or family structures is optimally pro-truth for the persons involved, the marriage or family needs to be harmonious(ly pro-truth), in the overall context of the need to harmonise society as-a-whole in the most pro-truth way. This means, e.g., that a family’s potential interpersonal conflicts need to be prevented, that communication needs to be open, and people need to be willing to change in a more pro-truth direction. Informedly freely contracting to indulge in free love or have an open marriage might be no problem in some cases. But selfishness, as in sexual affairs which will hurt others, is unjustifiable. Selfish deception here and everywhere is ruled out. Such things conflict with the general type of harmony involved in being pro-truth.

The need for a type of harmony does not mean, e.g., that an abusive person and their abused partner should stay together, period. This is not pro-truth harmony. Rather, it means the abuse needs to stop. Ideally, perhaps via cognitive therapy, the abuser needs to primarily become a self-critical, pro-truth judge and thereby change their behaviour so as to achieve a pro-truth, harmonious, close circle of love — not selfish, immature (and often cowardly) dominance. If this does not happen after a reasonable time, then, after fair warning, giving the abuser one, last chance to reform, it is probably most pro-truth overall for the abused person to leave and enter or form another close, safe, non-abusive circle.

PART II, CHAPTER 4: ONLY ONE OVERALL, CONSISTENT SYSTEM IS POSSIBLE. MORE JUSTIFICATORY POINTS.

(This chapter is mostly theoretical, sometimes heavily so. It need not be read if the justificatory points in Part II, Chapter 1 seem convincing. It is only a minor supplement to them, along with relating a few points discussed since them, to them, e.g., concerning integrity.)

This chapter concerns overall possible or practicable consistency. The ‘overall’ relates to the U and ‘as-a-whole’ in U H/I E/T. The concept ‘consistency’ covers both harmony and irrelevance, i.e., both the H and I in U H/I E/T. ‘Consistency’ means ‘non-contradictory’, or ‘non-conflicting’. If something is harmonious with X, it does not conflict with X. If something is irrelevant regarding X, it cannot conflict with X.

This chapter concerns achieving overall consistency for and by persons, in relation to the epistemic justifiability of their beliefs. Various issues are discussed here. The first concerns the argument that, to achieve overall consistency either absolutely regarding beliefs as such, or relative to or regarding epistemically justifiable beliefs, means the same thing. It means: consistency (1) among one’s beliefs-as-a-whole, achievable only via them all being epistemically justifiable; and consistency (2) concerning one’s intended, practised life-as-a-whole, achievable only via all practices here being epistemically justifiable. The discussion will also concern (3) consistency between (1) and (2).

This section suggests further that only pro-truth theory, including the practices it advocates, can give us that overall consistency, i.e., U H/I E/T:-

E.g., concerning (1):- Suppose Jasmin has the false belief that goblins cause illness, crop failures, disliked weather and so on, and that they can be appeased by sacrificing chickens. (This argument can be applied to religion, e.g., to prayer.) Jasmin’s beliefs here, namely in this very limited ‘goblin area’, can be consistent or harmonise with each other. But they are not consistent with the truth. So, any truths Jasmin knows will not be consistent with her beliefs-as-a-whole, because that whole includes her false, goblin-beliefs. The false as such is inherently inconsistent with the true as such. (In such discussions, the term ‘belief(s)-status’ (i.e., the beliefs are either true or false) could sometimes be substituted for ‘belief(s)’.) Now, for Jasmin to intentionally survive, she must know some truths. E.g., she must know how to get and eat food, and know that poison is not (healthy) food. These are some of her survival-necessary true beliefs. So if she has any false beliefs, (and is in that way anti-truth,) she has not achieved overall consistency within her beliefs-as-a-whole. This is because she has not achieved overall harmony with the truth.

If she runs controlled scientific experiments on, say, crop failures, she can discover the truth that sacrificing chickens to alleged goblins does not stop the disasters, and that, say, there is a bacteria causing the crop failures, curable by an anti-biotic. Thereby getting rid of her false beliefs, she would increase overall consistency, or U H/I E/T, for herself. Only if all her beliefs are true justified beliefs, i.e., knowledge, can she have overall consistency, i.e., a non-self-contradictory overall system of beliefs. To have as much consistency as possible, she needs to believe in a practical theory as justifiably as close to truth as possible, not a moral (or religious) theory.

Similarly, Jasmin, like all of us, unavoidably at least implicitly prefaces her beliefs with the belief that ‘It is true that’, as pointed out in Part II, Chapter 1, Section 5. So, to achieve consistency with that unavoidable preface-belief, her beliefs need to be true. The preface also involves a minimal, implicit belief that it is justified to be pro-truth. So, to achieve non-self-contradiction among her beliefs-as-a-whole, she needs to fully and explicitly believe a pro-truth theory.

That discussion primarily concerned (1) above, i.e., beliefs as such, and the overall consistency among beliefs-as-a-whole only achievable via the beliefs all being true (or as close to truth as possible). There is a wider, truly holistic, overall consistency achievable. This involves truths and (2) above, i.e., how one lives:-

(2) above concerns intended practices, and one’s intentions are based on one’s beliefs. (If Ken intends to eat apples, it is because at the time[237] he believes it is justified or permitted to eat apples[238].) So, if one’s beliefs are overall consistent or epistemically justifiable, this includes the beliefs underlying one’s intended acts. Hence there will be overall consistency between (1) and (2) above. Apart from that:-

The maximum possible consistency at any one time for a person or group, given their present knowledge, involves them (a) suspending belief (i.e., having no beliefs) in areas where they cannot know or do not yet know the truth, and (b) as far as possible using that present knowledge to avoid the anti-knowledge and to learn more pro-knowledge knowledge, and (c) practising all their pro-knowledge knowledge everywhere else too. (a), (b) and (c) mean being as pro-truth as possible in life as-a-whole:-

The only use or content of objectivity consistent with the most general standard involved in the methods of objectivity, namely U H/I E/T, involves us investigating as many things as possible, in life as-a-whole, to see in which situations a thing has a positive, neutral or negative relation to objectivity — and then developing the positive, permitting the neutral and avoiding the negative. That is, we need to do only that which is consistent with (harmonious with or irrelevant regarding) the pro-truth. This will maximise whatever consistency is achievable at the time. Over time, this degree of consistency can increase:-

That investigation and development involves an ongoing self-causing or self-developing interrelationship. (The notion, ‘The pro-truth end is cumulatively-achievable’, applies here.) That interrelationship inherently involves as much consistency (harmony) as is possible at any time. With this, being pro-knowledge involves the only self-improvable (self-harmonising) justifiable system of beliefs or thought.

All how-should-one-live theories other than pro-truth theory must in practice use knowledge or truth as the means of thought used to achieve their practical ends — ends which are not the pro-truth end. (False beliefs would of course fail overall[239].) If a theory’s ultimate or primary end(s) is (or are) not the pro-truth end, the theory’s end(s) is (or are) anti-truth. So, a pro-truth theory is the only practical theory which can achieve consistency (harmony) between means and end. We must be pro-truth via using truth as the means of thought to effectively achieve ends, and the only end harmonious with that means is the pro-truth end. (This is another aspect of U H/I E/T.) Otherwise, we have inconsistent values (beliefs) in that we value truth (via using it) as a means, and value something anti-truth as the end (achieved via that means). If we desire to be as thoroughly or overall consistent as possible, and have an as consistent as possible and hence epistemically justifiable system of values, then means-end consistency is part of this.

Otherwise we are self-contradictory within our beliefs-as-a-whole, because our beliefs-as-a-whole include believing in being pro-truth via believing the truth about which means to use to achieve the anti-truth end(s) we believe justifiable. With this, if we use means we know are effective in achieving the end(s), we’d have true beliefs concerning the means but false beliefs concerning the justifiability of the end(s). This is again inconsistency within our beliefs-as-a-whole. (As argued previously, an inconsistent or self-contradictory system is not epistemically justifiable. We cannot know it is justifiable, or right. We can know it is not.)

(Various points above show that achieving a-truth ends via being pro-truth concerning the means to those ends cannot conflict with those ends or with the pro-truth end. Anything irrelevant or orthogonal to X cannot contradict X. The ‘neither justifiable nor unjustifiable’ cannot conflict with the justifiable.)

An overall, consistent (H or I) system or theory has no conflicts because it has only one ultimate or fundamental standard. Apart from the recently-mentioned sources of conflict, various how-should-one-live theories other than pro-truth theory can involve conflict because, as with Kant, their standard licenses contradictory practices, which means in-practice conflicting standards, each such practice and standard being believed justified, or because a theory has more than one standard the theory considers ultimate. (E.g., some democratic theories consider two general abstract notions, ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’, as justified and ultimate. These can conflict. E.g., if persons are free to get more wealth than other persons, this conflicts with persons being equal in wealth; and vice versa.)

Again, in such cases an ultimate judge is needed, to resolve the conflict via some (alleged) truly ultimate standard. Now ‘resolve the conflict’ at least implicitly means ‘discover the truth about what’s (most) justifiable here’. Similarly for ‘discovering or applying the (allegedly) truly ultimate standard’. Clearly, therefore, the standard which can best[240] resolve conflicts is a standard as close to the truth as possible. This standard, to do the best job overall, i.e., regarding life and truth or beliefs overall, would need to be the standard involved in the only overall consistent system, if there is such a system. This is because ‘resolved conflicts’ means ‘consistency’, i.e., no more conflicts. Many arguments above, including Kant’s, show that there could only be one such (for us, practicable, understandable) system and hence standard.

That standard is pro-truth theory’s standard, U H/I E/T. This is inherently the standard of overall consistency — because ‘overall consistency’ is what ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’ means. Inherently, U H/I E/T is the only standard which can avoid conflicts totally, i.e., overall, as far as is possible.

This chapter’s points so far imply that pro-truth theory is the only how-should-one-live theory which does not at least implicitly have part of it stating that another part is wrong, and vice versa — because that is what a theory involving conflicting beliefs (self-contradiction) inherently states. Even if a practical theory does not involve conflicts via being like Kant’s, or via having two or more standards considered equally ultimate, all practical theories other than pro-truth theory involve the following: they all have (at least) one end considered justified and ultimate, and this is an end other than the pro-truth end. Hence they conflict with the pro-truth end and hence with the epistemically justifiable, the overall, consistent system of truths. So such theories cannot be truths or as close to truth as possible. As with Jasmin’s goblin-beliefs above, only delusions or false beliefs or the unjustifiable can conflict with truth. Therefore, if a theory has an ultimate end other than the pro-truth end, the theory at least implicitly states that the theory is wrong.

So, here too, it seems rationally undeniable that all practical theories other than pro-truth theory are unjustifiable.

However, in two other ways, pro-truth theory can seem to involve conflicts — suggesting that it is not consistent overall, and hence not epistemically justifiable:-

Firstly: A pro-truth person can be inconsistent via changing preferences in a-truth areas. This is not a case of conflicting beliefs, because pro-truth persons have no beliefs here. A-truth preferences are emotional, and emotions are not beliefs. They are like an itch, neither true nor false, just there. Also, a pro-truth person does not believe ‘It is true that this a-truth preference, rather than that, is justified or the right one’. Here they only have the meta-belief, ‘It is true that there can be no true beliefs regarding which a-truth alternatives I should like, dislike or be indifferent about, or change among; so I should have no beliefs here’. This meta-belief remains true during any a-truth preference changes. This belief is pro-truth knowledge. So the only belief here consistently remains true, and is hence consistent with all the pro-truth person’s other true or justified beliefs.

Secondly:- Because pro-truth theory has only one ultimate or primary end, there should be no inconsistency in relation to the end. But there can be two or more means to that end, means which could be equally pro-truth, and which cannot both be implemented at the same time. So, at that time it could seem there’s a conflict, regarding achieving the aim, ‘Be pro-truth’.

E.g., suppose Janice knows it is equally pro-truth for her, at 2 pm tomorrow, to do some pro-truth swimming, and to renew a certain pro-truth friendship. (If X and Y are equally pro-truth at time T, then, whichever of X and Y is done at time T, the pro-truth effect is the same, but X and Y apparently still conflict.)

If the friend comes swimming too, this conflict would obviously only be apparent. But the friend may not be able to come at 2 pm, or Janice may not ask the friend to swim because the friend is allergic to the chemicals used in the only available pool. Or, there may be a different, incompatible Y. E.g., Janice may not know how to decide between pro-truth swimming and an equally pro-truth car-driving lesson, it being impossible to do both of these at 2pm. However, in any such situation there is only apparent conflict regarding the pro-truth and overall practicable consistency:-

If X and Y are equally pro-truth means to help achieve the pro-truth end, and Janice cannot simultaneously do both, of course she cannot know which to do. But that implies the solution: she cannot know what to do because the choice between equally pro-truth means is a-truth. We cannot know that this rather than that a-truth choice is justified. It is impracticable to know specifically which of X and Y to do. Yet, in relation to the pro-truth end, she can know it does not matter which she does. This is sufficient knowledge here. She does know she needs to eventually do both X and Y, but it is irrelevant which of X and Y she does first. Because she knows it does not matter which of two equally pro-truth things are done at some time, she knows it is justified to toss a coin to decide or act via an a-truth preference.

Therefore, she has suspended beliefs concerning X versus Y. So she has no beliefs here. She does not believe, e.g., ‘It is true that it is justified to do X rather than Y’. She does believe (know) ‘It is justified to not believe I should do X rather than Y’. If she has no beliefs there, there can be no conflict among beliefs there. The discussion a few paragraphs ago, concerning changing among a-truth preferences, has implications here. (That discussion and this have implications for other issues too.)

Also, there is no conflict in relation to the end. The just-mentioned lack(s) and this lack of conflict are all that U H/I E/T asks, or all that being pro-truth requires. It is only harmony regarding the epistemically justifiable that matters, not regarding the neither-justified-nor-unjustified (and, besides, it is epistemically justifiable to have no beliefs claiming that something is justifiable within the neither-justifiable-nor-unjustifiable area). Whichever of X and Y is done first, here the justified end is achieved by the same degree overall, or over-time. This achievement and consistency is all that is practicable, or possible. Pro-truth theory only claims to concern practicable, understandable truth. And this chapter is primarily concerned with consistency which is practicable, or possible, in relation to the epistemically justifiable. It is impossible or impracticable for us to understand how both such an X and Y could be done simultaneously. But we can know that, whichever is done, the overall effect is the same — and the same in relation to the epistemically justifiable.

And we can often know that we can do X now, and Y later, or vice versa. If X could be done either now or later, but Y can only be done now, then the choice between them would not be a-truth. It would be most pro-truth to do Y now, then X. So here too there would be no conflict between equally pro-truth means. (And here it is justified to believe ‘I should do Y first’.) Here, in relation to the end, there is a justifiable prioritising of means. Similarly for situations where X would only be as equally pro-truth as Y, but less so otherwise, if X was done at 2pm. (The degree to which something is pro-truth (or anti-truth,) (or whether it is a-truth,) can be situationally relative.)

If X can only be done now and Y can only be done now, it is most consistent (harmonious) with the epistemically justifiable to do either (rather than neither). Here the choice between them is a-truth, and the practicable, justifiable effect would be the same.

In relation to the (practicable achieving of the) end, there is no conflict if the choice between different means to the end is a-truth. The most justifiable possible outcome is still achieved. So, because the choice is a-truth, i.e., irrelevant regarding the epistemically justifiable end, the overall practicable consistency regarding the epistemically justifiable is unaffected. With this, the beliefs involved are as consistent as possible, and consistent with the truth.

Part II, Chapter 1, Section 6 discussed how Kant’s concentration on form is inadequate for an overall epistemically justifiable practical theory, and how epistemically justifiable content needs to be involved, not just form. Recent points suggest that pro-truth theory alone involves an overall harmony between form and content:-

The theory’s form is U H/I E/T. Its (end-)content, implied by that form, is the pro-truth, which indirectly involves the a-truth. Arguments above show that this form alone harmonises with pro-truth theory’s content. That is, the form U H/I E/T is a way of stating, ‘Primarily, always be pro-truth, which includes treating the a-truth as a-truth; secondarily, i.e., irrelevant to that, and along with that, do any a-truth thing you like.’, i.e., ‘Be either harmonious with or irrelevant regarding the epistemically justifiable’. So this theory alone, based on the U H/I E/T form, has the only content which does not conflict with that form, the form of epistemic justifiability. This is because this form and content are equivalent or identical, and because all other theories concerning how one should live have an end other than the pro-truth end as their primary content, and they do not have U H/I E/T as their ultimate standard or form. So no other theory can involve overall consistency and hence non-self-contradiction.

In Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4.1, conclusion (1), I pointed out that any sound argument, i.e., one with valid form and true content, i.e., an epistemically justifiable argument, is circular — but not problematically circular, and that that chapter shows there is a sound argument justifying applying the single ultimate epistemically justifiable standard to life-as-a-whole.. In relation to the previous paragraph, this conclusion means that that sound argument has an epistemically justifiable form and the epistemically justifiable most general statement possible as its content. This argument alone then, involves as much consistency as is possible — between form and content, and among all things (beliefs, practices, forms, contents, feelings and so on) in life-as-a-whole.

Finally here, this chapter, and various previous points, further suggest that, as far as possible, pro-truth theory alone can solve the ‘fact-value’ or ‘is-ought’ problem explained in Part I. The problem involves the notion that, regardless of what facts there are, the issue of values is quite separate: no fact implies a value. Similarly, whatever ‘is’ the case, this has nothing to do with what morally ‘ought’ to be the case: there is an apparently unbridgeable gap between what is and what morally ought to be (or what some person(s) believe morally ought to be the case). If the gap can be epistemically justifiably filled or shown to not exist for a certain viewpoint, then this produces harmony or consistency where there appeared to be a split or no hope of consistency:-

Above there are plenty of examples showing how such issues cannot be epistemically justifiably solved by moral theories. However, a practical theory or viewpoint which is epistemically justifiable can solve such problems. One reason for this is that, if a practice is epistemically justifiable, this means it is epistemically justifiable that we ought to do it. There is no justifiable gap between that ‘is’ and that ‘ought’. To do what one ought to do is to do what is justifiable, i.e., epistemically justifiable. That’s what ‘ought’ means. Part II, Chapter 1, Section 5 said: “ ‘That which one ought to do’ is equivalent to ‘That which is epistemically justifiable to do’. Equivalence means there is no gap, no epistemically problematic gap, between this ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Only here is there that equivalence.” It is incoherent or epistemically unjustifiable, i.e., a mistake, to at least implicitly ask ‘Why is it epistemically justifiable to do what is epistemically justifiable?’, i.e., ‘Why is there no connection or no equivalence between what is epistemically justifiable and what is epistemically justifiable?’.

And, because ‘It is true that’ prefaces the statements implicit in such (“double-barrelled”) questions, when a person claims that pro-truth theory has an is-ought problem, the person is at least implicitly asking such self-contradictory or incoherent questions.

Another reason why pro-truth theory solves the is-ought problem relates to an explanation proposed by naturalistic epistemology. This was discussed in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1, somewhat as follows:- ‘To survive, it is more helpful if an animal’s choices regarding such things as food are directed by knowledge rather than by false beliefs. E.g., if an animal believes poisonous things are healthy food, the animal will die; if an animal believes that jumping off cliffs is a way to quench thirst or satisfy sexual desire, the animal will die. The animal’s genes are not likely to be passed on. A gene will be selected out if it produces a mind which predisposes an animal to value practices which are unlikely to lead to knowledge concerning survival of the animal and its genes or offspring. So, natural selection has resulted in us naturally using and valuing practices which lead to survival-necessary knowledge. These practices include necessities such as observing and remembering observed evidence concerning how to survive. A crucial practice here is the practice of valuing such pro-truth practices.’

A necessity is an ‘is’, or fact, and those necessities include a value, or ought. The epistemic connection here between the is and ought also involves a natural connection:-

Those practices are things we naturally feel we ought to do, to discover what is. Yet even if we did not naturally feel this, they are still things we necessarily do (and justifiably ought to do), to discover what reliably is, in that they are aspects of the general standard involved in practicable knowledge-as-a-whole, U H/I E/T. What we observe and remember is, structurally or formally, that there is either harmony or irrelevance, as discussed above.

Our evolved interrelated practices and values here only need to work sufficiently well to ensure that, on-average, enough humans learn enough to pass on genes sufficiently for species-survival. That is, here only some humans only need to know enough to find enough food, avoid cliffs and so on, for some to have and care for children, and so on. We are not naturally fully or optimally pro-truth.

Still, that survival-necessary limited pro-truth need helps to explain why there are certain values or oughts naturally involved in our discovering facts. Further, as discussed in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1, we have evolved a much less-limited, far more open desire and associated capacity to discover what ‘is’. To do this, regardless of that natural degree of bridging the is-ought gap, it is the case that there are certain things we necessarily ought to do. That evolved open desire means we naturally feel we ought to do them, but we also need to choose to effectively value using that open capacity to be fully pro-truth. To do this we necessarily do (and justifiably ought to) practise via and value U H/I E/T. The necessary practice is an ‘is’, the necessarily associated value is an ought. This fills the gap, epistemically justifiably.

Practising via and valuing U H/I E/T involves many specific pro-truth things. There are many examples of them above. E.g., consider again Lee, a scientist objectively (rationally) supervising others attempting to discover certain facts (truths) concerning bacteria. Lee soundly argues that he needs (ought) to assess the others’ claims via the evidence they observe, not via whether they are of this or that gender. So non-sexism and valuing evidence (observation and sound arguments) are necessary values involved in being epistemically justifiable, which involves discovering facts.

At the most general level, the discovery of facts (truth) involves operating via the epistemically justifiable general standard regarding facts-as-a-whole. This is U H/I E/T. That which is epistemically justifiable is of epistemic value, or of epistemically justifiable value. Just as ‘1+2=3’ is of epistemic value, and ‘1+2=7’ is not, so too the non-sexism and other practical values involved in (the practice of) being rational are of epistemic value: without them we cannot achieve the knowledge objectivity or rationality alone can give us.

In sum, the specific values involved in discovering facts are thereby epistemically justifiable. That which is epistemically justifiable is a fact. So it is a fact that those values are inextricably interrelated with facts. This ‘is’ solves the fact-value or is-ought problem as far as possible: the apparent gap between facts and values, or between is and ought, is thereby bridged. The gap is real for morality, but only apparent for a theory based on the overall standard and hence values involved in discovering facts or in facts-as-a-whole.

To be able to minimally discover facts, we need to be minimally pro-truth. To optimally discover facts, we need to optimally practise epistemically justifiable values. We need to be optimally pro-truth. We need values which harmonise with or in relation to facts-as-a-whole. U H/I E/T gives us both those values and the structure of facts-as-a-whole. Again, U H/I E/T bridges that otherwise apparent gap.

Because being minimally pro-facts or pro-truth is not being optimally pro-truth, being minimally so will involve some anti-truth or anti-fact values or aims. Hence being minimally so means that one’s values-as-a-whole are not consistent with the epistemically justifiable, and hence not with the practices and associated values involved in discovering facts. So here there is only a tenuous or epistemically problematic, partial link between facts and values. (With this, one’s beliefs as-a-whole are inconsistent, because values are beliefs.) In sum, only via being as pro-truth as possible is the link or bridge as firm as possible. Indeed, being fully epistemically justified means that one’s values and truths (facts) are inextricably linked, or two sides of the same coin. Here alone they are consistent with each other.

In conclusion here:- To be optimally pro-truth involves the maximum achievable overall consistency among truths (facts) and practices required for discovering them, e.g., inherently impartial (non-sexist, etc) objectivity. These practices involve values. Only thus can we have an overall consistent system — a system involving both facts-as-a-whole and the values involved necessarily and optimally in acquiring knowledge of them. This system or structure is U H/I E/T, or, equivalently, the pro-truth orthogonal structure as in something like the diagram in Part II, Chapter 2, Section 7. So only here can we have a non-self-contradictory notion of ‘integrity (integration)’: integration surely requires consistency.

There are plenty of concluding remarks above, so there seems no need to say much here, except for:-

This book discusses whether we can have an epistemically justifiable practical theory. If a theory is not epistemically justifiable, what is it? (‘1+2=7’ is not epistemically justifiable. What do we think of such statements? We think they are false, or wrong, i.e., unjustifiable. What would we be doing if we practised via them? We would be doing something unjustifiable.)

As far as I can see, pro-truth theory is as epistemically justifiable as is possible, as unambiguously practicable as possible, and could be sufficiently motivating for at least a majority. Something like this theory, or an improved version of it, is, I think, the best we can do regarding getting a theory as close to truth as possible. A pro-truth theory is inherently as close to truth as possible. If there is anything better, i.e., more justifiable, i.e., more epistemically justifiable, I’d welcome it.

Philosophy is so complex that I expect to have made some at least minor errors. However, it is possible there is a major error. But, if so, we can learn from our mistakes and get closer to the epistemically justifiable. The critical, rational approach I have tried to use in this book needs to be applied to the book, so as to improve the theory.

A way of stating the central negative aim of the book is to say it tries to show that moral theories involve insoluble problems of either (i) moral belief, i.e., believing in delusions, in the epistemically unjustifiable; or (ii) a moral vacuum, and hence despair, cynicism or similar, due to realising that all moral theories are epistemically unjustifiable, their concepts involving an epistemic vacuum.

The main, positive aim of this book was to solve those and associated problems. Another way of stating this aim is as follows: to help make life justifiably better for humanity, and give us a way of life we can know is justifiably better. That is the main, cognitive aim. There were also emotional aims, separable from the cognitive aim:- I hoped that, along with trying to develop the epistemically justifiable theory required by that cognitive aim, it would also be possible to thereby justify types of peace, kindness, love, fair-sharing, certain rights and responsibilities, and a great deal of various types of freedom, enjoyment and flourishing. Those aims involved trying to give people hope, justifiable hope, e.g., hope that there are meaningful, engaging, epistemically justifiable general guidelines regarding how one should live, and hence that there can be a justifiably meaningful purpose in life.

However, I needed to be very careful not to distort the theory, or construct a theory, or a moral theory, merely in order to achieve those emotional aims. As far as I can see, I’ve avoided doing that and the delusions involved therein. If not, I hope that the book at least indirectly suggests how a better, truly epistemically justifiable practical theory could be developed.

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APPENDIX: FURTHER DEFENCE OF THE INTERPRETATION OF KANT USED IN THIS BOOK. SOME OTHER PROBLEMS WITH KANT, ACCORDING TO THAT INTERPRETATION.

Issues here mostly concern whether Kant holds that we are legitimately permitted to obey either of any mutually-contradictory universalisable maxims, or either of (alleged) laws as in those implying alleged imperfect duties. If, as another interpretation says, there are permissible acts described explicitly by universalisable maxims outside the law, or we are legitimately permitted to obey either of such laws, there are not as many conflicts and other epistemic problems in Kant’s theory as are implied by the interpretation of Kant used in this book. (However, the above and the following show there would still be too many.)

(1) Kant says there is no intended act not described or covered by a law: all acts are either lawful or unlawful. The UCI says ‘Act only on a maxim you can will to be a universal law’, and Kant restates this as “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”[241]. (My emphases.) All justified acts then, are lawful, says Kant. And there are no universalisable maxims outside the law.

He says there are only two types of laws. These allegedly all-covering types are either, positively, a command (‘Do this’), or, negatively, a prohibition (‘Do not do that’). He says the negative type implies perfect duties, the positive type implies imperfect duties.

(2) Therefore, at least according to what he says in (1)[242], Kant believes there cannot be any acts permissible via being outside the law, and that there cannot be what I’ll call ‘multi-directional’ permissive covering laws, namely laws saying we may obey either of mutually-contradictory universalisable positive laws. He sometimes explicitly rules such permissive laws out.

(3) However, Kant says there can be what I’ll call ‘uni-directional’ permissive laws, which are covered by a commanding or prohibitive law. Kant says these permissive laws, these sub-laws, do not permit us to obey either of mutually-contradictory universalisable laws, X and not-X. Rather, these sub-laws only permit us to merely temporarily not obey a command or prohibition, X, because obeying X later rather than sooner will result in an overall more law-abiding situation in the long term, including our later obeying the covering law, X. So these permissive laws are uni-directional in that they insist we ultimately do only one thing, due to this thing coming under one covering law (which we are obliged to obey when the time is right — when contingencies permit).

Kant’s concept of a law can seem to rule out multi-directional permissibility or freedom. E.g: “[As a rational being] I must regard [moral] laws ... as imperatives ... [and] as [implying] duties ... [and as] categorical[243].” A categorical law or duty seems to be one where ultimately only one general thing ought to be done, not either of mutually-contradictory universalisable general things. However, there might be laws stating that we categorically ought to one thing, and that thing is: be permitted to do either of various mutually-contradictory universalisable things. This would mean a multi-directional permissive covering law. And Kant does at least imply this regarding what he says are laws implying imperfect duties.

Kant says we have various imperfect duties, and that there is no law or clear criteria stating precisely when, how and to what degree we should perform one rather than another. So here Kant at least implicitly permits an individual to choose among duties and, because each duty is implied by a law, he implies we are permitted to choose among laws, among universalisable mutually-contradictory notions. This implies that he assumes there is a multi-directional permissive covering law here. Yet he seems to clearly rule out any such permissive law:-

As a preliminary here, consider the following:- Kant says[244] that moral laws are only either commands (positive) or prohibitions (negative). To develop this claim he next asks whether there can be an

“action that is neither commanded nor prohibited [but] merely permitted ... [namely a] morally indifferent [action;] ... and, if there are [such actions], whether there must be permissive laws ... in addition to laws that command or prohibit, [which would mean] someone being free to do or not to do something as he pleases.”

Here he answers ‘No’:- Kant next says[245] that, if there are such actions, “[the freedom (and authorisation)] would not always [my emphasis] have to do with an indifferent action” and that, “considering the action in terms of moral laws, no special law would be required for [the action].” So, he again says there are only the two types of law, namely commands and prohibitions — there is not an additional third, special type. He is insisting that there are no laws permitting us to be free to do or not to do something as we please.

What pleases us, he often says, is ruled out as a basis for acting lawfully. And, of course, Kant says imperfect duties are things we are obliged to do regardless of whether it pleases us. But the general notion of permissibility is still a problem here, because we cannot know when to do this rather than that imperfect duty, and so we must have some method of deciding. Kant claims we have a duty to fulfil our and others’ true needs. Part I mentioned problems here. But even if those problems did not exist, Kant admits that sometimes we cannot know which duty to choose here. So, to some degree at least, the only alternatives are choosing via chance, as in a coin-toss, or choosing via a subjective standard, such as what pleases or displeases us. If permissibility applies, we are permitted to choose via any such method. So, either way, we are (allegedly) still free to do or not do something, as such. And that is the main, general issue. (Besides, if we are free here, why not do what you please? Permitted freedom implies being permitted to (be free to) do as you please.)

Kant’s ‘No’ here relates only to what I’ve called ‘multi-directional’ permission. Gregor[246] points us to where Kant says there is a different, ‘uni-directional’ type of permissive law. This is a sub-law, a law coming under a commanding or prohibiting law — and hence not a third, special, main type. She refers us to his Towards Perpetual Peace[247]. Here the ‘not always’ in the previous quote is shown to be important:-

(Firstly I’ll discuss what Kant says here in his Appendix 1.) He says there “are permissive laws of reason”, referring to a despotic State which he says is hence morally obliged to become non-despotic. He says this State is permitted to temporarily remain despotic if this will help it survive attacks from enemy States: the despotism will not always be a morally indifferent thing, i.e., it will not always be permitted. This permission is very different from a State’s rulers being permitted to be either despotic or non-despotic, as opposed to being whichever will temporarily best help the State survive.

Here Kant says the highest priority, or the covering obligation, is to preserve the State. (Here, ‘State’ means a ruling institution as such, an institution needed to preserve a society — as opposed to just this despotic State.) Kant says becoming non-despotic while being invaded would mean destruction of the State. Let’s assume he’s right. The act contrary to maintaining a politics effective against invasion is to not maintain it — and so invite successful invasion, which Kant says is forbidden. So the type of permissive law here implies a duty to do only one thing, and is hence uni-directional, but the permission applies only temporarily. Disobeying the obligation to become non-despotic will not always be an act which does not matter, i.e., a morally indifferent issue. It will matter once the threat to the State has been removed. Then the obligation to become non-despotic needs to be fulfilled. Kant says “[here] injustice must be allowed to stand ... until [conditions are] ... ripe for ... reform.” The ‘must’ and ‘until’ here do not mean injustice is permitted to always either exist or not exist.

Kant implies that fulfilling an imperfect duty is also only a temporary thing, in that we are later supposed to fulfil another one. Yet this does not fit with his uni-directional permissive laws because, e.g., according to Kant, after helping others, one should help oneself, but later go back to helping others, and so on: we should permanently shift among duties to others and to oneself. Yet, e.g., after a temporarily permitted despotism saves the State, the State is supposed to become non-despotic and ideally stay so, says Kant — not permanently shift between the two. So the previous paragraph’s notion that (alleged) permissibility applies to something temporary does not mean that permissibility applies to temporarily doing one imperfect duty rather than another.

“[permissive laws,] while not exceptions to the rule of [obligatory] law, nevertheless are subjectively broader in respect to their observation, containing permission to delay their execution without, however, losing sight of the end. This permission does not authorise ... delaying until doomsday [to do our duty;] it does not permit us to fail to do it.” And, in his footnote here: “in permissive law [there is prohibition, but] ... the prohibition refers only to the future, while the permission annuls this prohibition only ... [for the] present.”

Kant says the necessitating, covering law here is temporarily overruled by contingencies, e.g., a threat of invasion. Kant’s permissive laws are merely provisional, or conditional, i.e., ‘For now, only do X, not not-X, but only if doing X now is the best means to later do or achieve not-X.’ This is a problem for his notion of permissive laws, these laws under a law, because he elsewhere explicitly rules out the empirical, contingencies, provisionality or conditionality from the basis of moral laws[248]. And he says that an obligatory, lawful act’s consequences are to be ignored. This implies ignoring the invasion which would be a consequence of fulfilling that despotic State’s obligation to become non-despotic. So in those two ways he contradicts himself again.

A typical case of Kant’s German here being translated as ‘permitted’ is when he’s translated as saying[249] “An action ... consistent with the autonomy of the will [and hence with the most general moral law] is permitted; one that does not agree therewith is forbidden.” But two sentences after this he says “The dependence of a [human] will ... on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is obligation ... [or] duty.” As suggested above, necessitation and obligation or duty hardly fit with the free-choice notion, ‘multi-directional permissive laws’. Kant’s moral writings as a whole, and points above, suggest there could be another mistranslation here, and that what Kant meant regarding the word translated as ‘permitted’ is more like: ‘An action ... consistent with the [most general moral law] is not forbidden .... And moral necessitation or obligation applies to acts which are not forbidden’. This fits with Kant’s above explicit insistence that there are legitimately only either moral commands or prohibitions, and his discussion of his notion of permissive laws, involving his rejection of the notion that there is a type of universally (not temporarily) applicable law permitting us to please ourselves whether we do universalisable X or not-X. The Latin term Kant uses as a synonym for the term translated as ‘permitted’ in this paragraph’s quote is ‘licitum’. He uses ‘illicitum’, (illicit,) the opposite, for ‘forbidden’. The only meaning of ‘illicit’ is ‘forbidden’[250]. Now the opposite of ‘forbidden’ can be ‘not forbidden’, as I suggested. And ‘licitum’, or the English ‘licit’, can mean either permitted or lawful[251]. The above implies that Kant meant ‘lawful’, and hence that ‘not forbidden’ does mean, as he clearly suggests, uni-directional “moral necessitation” or “obligation”, not multi-directional permissibility. Again, Kant says there are only commanding or prohibiting moral laws. We are not lawfully permitted to do the opposite of that which is lawfully commanded or prohibited: doing either X or not-X is ruled out here.

The Appendix’s points above only concern maxims which qualify as laws, not acts coming under such maxims/laws, i.e., acts not explicitly described by, or at least not needing to be explicitly described by, the maxim. That which is lawfully commanded or prohibited involves a maxim. If ‘maxim’ means the most general rule in an area,[252] there might be equally available and effective non-described specific means to fulfil some maxim. E.g., suppose a lawful maxim is ‘Help all persons to have a healthy amount of Vitamin C’. In some situations, that end might be achievable via, say, either apples or pears. I cannot find anything in Kant’s writing that would not permit us to choose one such means rather than another, all else equal. Similarly, a constraining law such as ‘Never drive faster than 50 kph on side-streets’ states an end which can be achieved via various means, e.g., driving at 10, 20, 30 or 40 kph. He says laws concern maxims, not acts coming under maxims[253]. So here Kant does not seem to rule out multi-directional permissibility. However, this only concerns different or plural means to the same end, or different ways to act on the same, single maxim. So multi-directional permissibility can apply regarding means — but, regarding the end, i.e., fulfilling a duty, and hence the associated law or maxim, Kant (at least often) seems to only allow uni-directionality. And it is the end or the maxim that the necessitation or obligation concerns. Maxims constitute Kant’s specific moral laws. So the issue of whether equally available and effective means are hence equally permissible is not relevant to the issue of whether there are multi-directional permissive laws. On the other hand, according to the UCI and this paragraph, one moral law is: ‘To fulfil any maxim where there are equally available and effective means to do so, it is permitted to choose either means’. Still, as previous points show, this is trivial in that it is not applicable to any serious practical issue, involving the fundamental decision-making level, concerning ends — issues such as whether there should be despotism, suicide, healthy diets and so on. And this does not affect any other law in that choosing one such all-else-equal means rather than another cannot affect any maxim’s achievability. The issue is merely instrumental.

‘UCI’ stands for the ‘Universalisability version of the most general categorical imperative’, namely: Act only on a maxim you can at the same time will to be a universal law.

‘U H/I E/T’ stands for ‘Universally, there is either harmony or irrelevance regarding epistemic justifiability or practicable truth as-a-whole’

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